Do alcoholic Korsakoff's syndrome patients acquire affective reactions?

In this study we report two experiments that investigate the acquisition of affective reactions. In Experiment 1, unfamiliar melodies were played to Korsakoff's syndrome patients and alcoholic and nonalcoholic control subjects who were matched with them according to age and education. Following a retention interval of 5 min, subjects received a preference test on old and new melodies. Korsakoff's syndrome patients showed the same increase in preference for old melodies as a consequence of prior exposures as control subjects did, but their recognition of melodies was significantly impaired in comparison with controls. In Experiment 2, the same subjects saw photographs of two men. Fictional biographical information depicted one as a "good guy" and the other as a "bad guy." After a retention interval of approximately 20 days, Korsakoffs recalled virtually none of the biographical information; however, 78% preferred the good guy, and impression ratings were less favorable for the bad guy. Korsakoff patients developed preferences and impressions even though they did not have voluntary access to the information on which the preferences were based. However, their impression ratings were less extreme than those of controls. The pattern of results of the two studies is discussed in terms of Johnson's (1983) MEM model of memory.     

Reasons black african adults use to explain their acceptance of sex-role reversals

A structured questionnaire based on Rest's Defining Issues Test format was adopted to investigate the reasons used by 50 Black African males and 50 Black African females to explain their degree of acceptance of sex-role reversals. Both males and females showed little acceptance of sex-role reversals. The organization of the reasons they used to explain their degree of acceptance of sex-role reversals was most parsimoniously explained by Rest's complex stage model rather than the model suggested by Ullian, which is based on Piagetian stage criteria.     

Disqualified and qualified poor sleepers: subjective and objective variables

Sleep laboratory studies of patients complaining of insomnia have demonstrated discrepancies between subjective reports and electroencephalograph (EEG)-recorded measures. In our research studies on sleeping aids, 60% of the self-described poor sleepers who reported usual sleep latencies of at least 45 min did not meet the laboratory qualification criterion of a 30-min or longer sleep latency. To learn to predict who would qualify for our studies, we compared 30 laboratory-qualified poor sleepers (QPS) with 30 laboratory-disqualified poor sleepers (DPSs) on subjective report, mood, and all-night sleep laboratory variables. QPSs had significantly lower sleep efficiency and total sleep time in the laboratory, but these differences were due to the longer sleep latencies (50.7 +/- 27.8 min vs. 15.2 +/- 6.1 min) of the QPS group. QPSs and DPSs differed significantly in their morning estimates of their laboratory sleep latencies; as a group, QPSs gave an accurate estimate (51.6 +/- 27.8 min), but DPSs were significantly more likely to exaggerate their sleep latencies. Although we did not identify ways of predicting which poor sleepers would show sleep-onset insomnia in the sleep laboratory, we did find that, in this young, healthy population, there are poor sleepers who give an accurate report of a rather severe sleep-onset insomnia.     

Positive and negative motivational gradients during first use of the dissecting room

Immediately after their first use of the dissecting room, 45 preclinical medical students rated their enthusiasm and reluctance at seven points along a time sequence encompassing their experience from the night before to the completion of their first dissection. A second group of 42 preclinical medical students carried out the same ratings in real time. A naive group of 24 psychology students were asked to imagine a first visit to the dissecting room and rate their imagined feelings in the same way. Gradients for reluctance for the two experimental groups rose to maxima at the point of entering the dissecting room. The reluctance gradient for the naive group and the enthusiasm gradients for all three groups, prior to this point, were zero. These are discussed as negative and positive motivational gradients that meet the predictions of approach/avoidance theory (Miller, 1959).     

The cognitive model of depression and mood-induction procedures: A reply to Clark (1983)

In a recent article on mood-induction procedures, Clark (1983) concluded that the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) produces a good analog state of mild, naturally occurring, retarded depression that is not explicable in terms of experimental demand characteristics. Clark concluded, however, that it is erroneous to view the relative success of the VMIP in simulating the effects of depression as support for cognitive theories of depression. While we agree with the first of Clark's conclusions, we disagree with his second conclusion that the VMIP is not a cognitive manipulation. The purpose of the present article is to argue that his ideas regarding the impact of the VMIP on mood and behavior are not supported by the existing data. Therefore, the VMIP results can be used to support Beck's (1976) cognitive theory of depression.     

Interpersonal attraction,social identification and psychological group formation

Two perspectives on the nature of the social group and psychological group formation are discussed. The traditional social cohesion approach traces group formation to processes of interpersonal attraction, while the social identity approach defines the group in cognitive terms and considers identification, or self-categorization, to be the mechanism of psychological group formation. On the basis of an experiment by Turner, Sachdev and Hogg (1983) it is hypothesized that interpersonal attraction (positive or negative) is related to group formation only in so far as it enhances intergroup distinctiveness. This hypothesis is experimentally tested in a 2 × 3 (interpersonal liking/disliking per se versus no explicit categorization/random categorization/criterial categorization on the basis of affect) factorial design employing the ‘minimal group’ paradigm. People who like each other and were not explicitly categorized formed a group. This effect was enhanced by criterial categorization but disappeared when categorization was random. Although the results do not support the hypothesis, they are not explicable in social cohesion terms. A social identity explanation is furnished—attraction influences group formation by acting, under certain specifiable conditions, as a cognitive criterion for common category membership. This explanation is located in current theorizing and is proposed as part of a reconceptualization of the relationship between interpersonal attraction and group formation.     

Symbolic comparisons with and without perceptual referents: Is interval information used?

In an attempt to investigate the range effect obtained by Moyer and Bayer (1976), two groups of subjects were taught to associate colors with circles that differed in size by larger or smaller intervals and then participated in a symbolic comparison task, in which they determined which of two simultaneously presented symbols (the first letters of two colors) represented the larger magnitude. A third group of subjects, who merely learned an arbitrary ordering of the colors along the dimension of size, also participated in the symbolic comparison task. Despite the fact that no practice trials were given, there was no effect of interval size in either early or late blocks, and the circle-learning groups did not differ in performance from the group who only learned an arbitrary ordering of colors, even when pairs containing end terms were removed from the analysis. It is concluded that subjects do not use analogue codes in symbolic comparison tasks involving small, repeated sets of arbitrarily defined symbols.     

How much is an icon worth?

We report a new technique for assessing the amount of information extracted from the icon that follows a briefly presented picture. The problem of how to measure such information was formulated in terms of how much physical exposure of a picture an icon is worth. Consider two types of stimulus presentations, each with a base duration of d ms. The first is a d-ms picture followed by an icon, and the second is a d + a-ms picture not followed by an icon. How large does a have to be so that equivalent amounts of information are extracted in the two cases? To answer this question, we showed people pictures and later tested their memory for the pictures. We found that the physical exposure duration needed to reach a particular level of performance was approximately 100 ms longer when an icon was not permitted versus when the icon was permitted. This value was independent of the base duration and the luminance of the picture. Moreover, the same value was obtained using three different kinds of memory test and four different sets of pictures. We conclude that an icon is worth approximately 100 ms of additional physical exposure duration. A reasonable explanation for this robust equivalence between icon and stimulus is that the same encoding processes are responsible for extracting information from the icon and from the physical stimulus. Therefore, any variable that affects these encoding processes must affect extraction of information from the icon and the physical stimulus in an identical manner. This prediction was confirmed for one such variable, picture luminance.