Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).     

Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism

In this paper I look at various ways that interpersonal and social relations can be seen as required for autonomy. I then consider cases where those dynamics might play out or not in potentially paternalistic situations. In particular, I consider cases of especially vulnerable persons who are attempting to reconstruct a sense of practical identity required for their autonomy and need the potential paternalist’s aid in doing so. I then draw out the implications for standard liberal principles of (anti-) paternalism, specifically in clinical or therapeutic situations. The picture of potential paternalism that emerges here is much more of a dynamic, interpersonal scenario rather than a case of two separate individuals making decisions independent of each other.     

Social and political perspectives on the psychotherapy and counselling profession: Returning caravelles

The counselling and psychotherapy profession is changing. For the first time in its history, it has begun to receive substantial Government funding in the UK and it also has to contend with the principles of evidence-based practice and the policies of the New Public Management systems in many countries. This paper argues that such recent developments present challenges to the profession’s historical apolitical standpoint. More importantly, it argues that the present social and political climate offers many opportunities such as the possibility of learning from psychosocial practices in other countries. The paper will look, in particular, at what can be learned from Latin America and India where mental health care and psychological therapy have adopted grassroots involvement, health-focused approaches and innovatory therapeutic methods.     

Prospective Associations Between Peer Victimization and Internalizing Symptoms in Adolescence: The Protective Role of Hope

Youth who experience aggression at the hands of peers are at an increased risk for a variety of adjustment difficulties, including depressive and anxiety symptoms and lower self-esteem. The links between peer victimization and internalizing problems are robust, but less work has been done to identify individual-level protective factors that might mitigate these outcomes. The current study investigated whether hope served as a moderator of the prospective links from peer victimization to depressive and anxiety symptoms and self-esteem during adolescence. Participants included 166 high school students (64% female; 88% Black/African American). Youth completed self-report measures at three different time points across the Spring semester of an academic year. As predicted, hope interacted with peer victimization to predict changes in depressive and anxiety symptoms over the course of the semester. That is, for youth with low levels of hope, peer victimization predicted more stable patterns of depressive and anxiety symptoms. For adolescents with average levels of hope, however, peer victimization did not influence anxiety and depressive symptoms over time. Finally, for adolescents with high levels of hope, peer victimization predicted greater decreases in anxiety symptoms over time. Hope did not interact with peer victimization to predict self-esteem. Rather, hope uniquely predicted higher levels of self-esteem, whereas peer victimization uniquely predicted lower levels of self-esteem. The current study provides initial support for the notion that hope can serve as a protective factor among youth who are victims of peer aggression.

     

Enactivist Big Five Theory

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The distinguishing feature of enactivist cognitive science is arguably its commitment to non-reductionism and its philosophical allegiance to first-person...     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Skeptical theism and divine permission: a reply to Anderson

Skeptical theism (ST) may undercut the key inference in the evidential argument from evil, but it does so at a cost. If ST is true, then we lose our ability to assess the all things considered (ATC) value of natural events and states of affairs. And if we lose that ability, a whole slew of undesirable consequences follow. So goes a common consequential critique of ST. In a recent article, Anderson has argued that this consequential critique is flawed. Anderson claims that ST only has the consequence that we lack epistemic access to potentially God-justifying reasons for permitting a prima facie “bad” (or “evil”) event. But this is very different from lacking epistemic access to the ATC value of such events. God could have an (unknowable) reason for not intervening to prevent E and yet E could still be (knowably) ATC-bad. Ingenious though it is, this article argues that Anderson’s attempted defence of ST is flawed. This is for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the consequential critique does not rely on the questionable assumption he identifies. Indeed, the argument can be made quite easily by relying purely on Anderson’s distinction between God-justifying reasons for permitting E and the ATC value of E. And second, Anderson’s defence of his position, if correct, would serve to undermine the foundations of ST.