A dual-process model of reactions to perceived stigma

The authors propose a theoretical model of individual psychological reactions to perceived stigma. This model suggests that 2 psychological systems may be involved in reactions to stigma across a variety of social contexts. One system is primarily reflexive, or associative, whereas the other is rule based, or reflective. This model assumes a temporal pattern of reactions to the stigmatized, such that initial reactions are governed by the reflexive system, whereas subsequent reactions or "adjustments" are governed by the rule-based system. Support for this model was found in 2 studies. Both studies examined participants' moment-by-moment approach-avoidance reactions to the stigmatized. The 1st involved participants' reactions to persons with HIV/AIDS, and the 2nd, participants' reactions to 15 different stigmatizing conditions.     

A function of form: terror management and structuring the social world

Drawing on lay epistemology theory, the authors assessed a terror management analysis of the psychological function of structuring social information. Seven studies tested variations of the hypothesis that simple, benign interpretations of social information function, in part, to manage death-related anxiety. In Studies 1-4, mortality salience (MS) exaggerated primacy effects and reliance on representative information, decreased preference for a behaviorally inconsistent target among those high in personal need for structure (PNS), and increased high-PNS participants' preference for interpersonal balance. In Studies 5-7, MS increased high-PNS participants' preference for interpretations that suggest a just world and a benevolent causal order of events in the social world.     

Remember-know: a matter of confidence

This article critically examines the view that the signal detection theory (SDT) interpretation of the remember-know (RK) paradigm has been ruled out by the evidence. The author evaluates 5 empirical arguments against a database of 72 studies reporting RK data under 400 different conditions. These arguments concern (a). the functional independence of remember and know rates, (b). the invariance of estimates of sensitivity, (c). the relationship between remember rates and overall hit and false alarm rates, (d). the relationship between RK responses and confidence judgments, and (e). dissociations between remember and overall hit rates. Each of these arguments is shown to be flawed, and despite being open to refutation, the SDT interpretation is consistent with existing data from both the RK and remember-know-guess paradigms and offers a basis for further theoretical development.     

How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.     

An integrated theory of the mind

Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert.     

Visiting Santa: an informal look

Using a modified six cartoon-face rating scale, employed in the health care field to help judge pain being experienced by young children, the facial expressions of 300 youngsters queued up to visit Santa Claus were observed and rated as showing indifference to the impending visit.     

Myers-Briggs personality types of art collectors

27 art collectors (13 men, 14 women) completed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Their age range was 37 to 86 years and the mean 59.5 yr. Seventy percent were classified as Intuition types instead of Sensation types (versus its 25% incidence in the general population). This corresponds to personality profiles of artists and the disproportionately high incidence of high scores on the related Openness to Experience factor in studies of creative personalities, thereby supporting the contention that persons creating art and appreciating art have personality traits in common.     

Social anxiety in stuttering: measuring negative social expectancies

Much research has suggested that those who stutter are likely to be anxious. However, to date, little research on this topic has addressed the role of expectancies of harm in anxiety, which is a central construct of anxiety in modern clinical psychology. There are good reasons to believe that the anxiety of those who stutter is related to expectancies of social harm. Therefore, in the present study, 34 stuttering and 34 control participants completed the Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) Scale and the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scales-Trait (EMAS-T). The FNE data showed a significant difference between the stuttering and control participants, with a large effect size. Results suggested that, as a group, a clinical population of people who stutter has anxiety that is restricted to the social domain. For the EMAS-T, significant differences between groups were obtained for the two subtests that refer specifically to people and social interactions in which social evaluation might occur (Social Evaluation and New/Strange Situations) but not for the subtests that contained no specific reference to people and social interactions (Physical Danger and Daily Routines). These results were taken to suggest that those who stutter differ from control subjects in their expectation of negative social evaluation, and that the effect sizes are clinically significant. The findings also suggest that the FNE and the EMAS-T are appropriate psychological tests of anxiety to use with stuttering clients in clinical settings. The clinical and research implications of these findings are discussed, in terms of whether social anxiety mediates stuttering or is a simple by-product of stuttering. Possible laboratory explorations of this issue are suggested, and potential Cognitive Behavior Therapy packages for stuttering clients who might need them are discussed. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will be able to: (1) explain why expectancy of social threat or harm may be associated with stuttering; (2) name and describe two psychological tests that are suitable for assessment of the social threat or harm that may be associated with stuttering; and (3) explain how findings for the EMAS-T test in the present results suggest that expectancy of social threat or harm, but not other kinds of negative expectancy, are associated with stuttering.     

Absence of an interaction between navigational strategies based on local and distal landmarks

In 3 experiments, rats were required to escape from a Morris pool by swimming to a submerged platform that was located at the apex of a notional, equilateral triangle with 2 different landmarks occupying the corners at the base. Training for 1 group was always conducted in view of the landmarks surrounding the pool and with the triangular array in a fixed orientation. Subjects could therefore identify the direction of the platform from a single landmark within the pool by reference to cues outside the pool or to the other landmark within the pool. Both strategies were used, and the results from additional groups revealed that the first of these strategies did not affect the acquisition of the second one.