The development of general competence and domain-specific competencies

The development of competence was studied in a longitudinal sample of 98 children, with measurement points when the children were 7, 10, and 12 years old. Competence was defined in terms of adequate adaptation to developmental tasks, both on a general and on a domain-specijic level. The general form of competence was measured by ego-resiliency, reflecting fexibility and ability to solve developmental problems Domain-specific competencies were measured by school achievement and social preference. The results showed that ego-resiliency was related to the two domain-specific competencies, although the hypothesized causal direction from general competence to specific competencies was not supported. Both domain-specific competencies were found to have a feedback effect on ego-resiliency. This feedback effect was stronger for social preference. These results suggest a transactional relationship between general and domain-specific competencies, and point to the importance of domain-specific competencies (especially social preference by the peer group) in the development of general competence in the child.     

Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis

Kelley and Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis states that competitors hold homogeneous views of others by assuming that most others are competitive, whereas cooperators or pro-social people hold more heterogeneous views by assuming that others are either cooperative or competitive. To evaluate the triangle hypothesis, this study examines differences between pro-socials, individualists, and competitors not only in their expectations about others' choice behaviour, but also in the confidence with which such expectations are held. It was found that pro-social subjects expected more cooperation than individualists and competitors. More importantly, as predicted on the basis of the triangle hypothesis, pro-socials were less confident about their expectations than competitors, with individualists holding intermediate levels of confidence.     

Suggestiveness in photospread line-ups: Similarity induces distinctiveness

The present research examined whether line-ups based on target (‘suspect’) face similarity are biased or suggestive. Four experiments are described in which subjects constructed photographic line-ups by selecting foils similar in appearance to a target. Later, another group of subjects who had not seen the faces before (mock witnesses) were asked to pick out the targets from the line-ups. All four experiments showed that mock witnesses selected the target significantly more often than expected by chance, thereby demonstrating suggestiveness. Three alternative line-up construction methods were also evaluated. In these methods, foil selection was based not only on target similarity but also on similarity with one or more of the other line-up faces. Results showed that alternative line-up targets were not selected significantly more often than chance, suggesting that bias was reduced. An overall analysis showed that the alternative line-ups were significantly less suggestive than target-based line-ups. The results indicate that foil selection procedures that incorporate foil-to-foil similarity produce fairer line-ups than those exclusively based on target similarity.     

Family reunions: Visionary encounters with the departed in a modern-day psychomanteum

A poignant feature of many near-death experiences is a visionary encounter with deceased loved ones. Over the centuries, researchers have sought safe ways to replicate near-death and related experiences, hoping to induce the powerful aftereffects of these events. The ancient Greeks contructed psychomanteums, or oracles of the dead, where seekers could consult spirits of the deceased. I describe a modern attempt to recreate the psychomanteum. Like near-death experiences, visionary encounters in this modern psychomanteum are experienced as real and not as hallucinatory, and have profound personal aftereffects. This novel experimental technique may permit the scientific study of phenomena that previously occurred only spontaneously and under uncontrolled circumstances.     

Task bias and the accuracy of judgment: Setting a baseline for expected group performance

When a judgment task evokes unbiased estimates (i.e. the errors in individual judgments are distributed randomly around the true value), mathematical aggregation of individual estimates, even by a simple arithmetic mean, often will outperform all group members. However, when a task evokes biased estimates, mathematical aggregation does not perform so well. In this study, simulated data were accumulated to specify the expected' accuracy of mathematical aggregation relative to the accuracy of observed judgment of individual group members under varying conditions of task bias. Three types of judgment tasks were employed: (1) single-estimate, holistic tasks, (2) multiple-estimate, ranking tasks, and (3) multi-cue, decomposed tasks. Findings indicated across all task types that a large percentage of judgment-making group estimates formed strictly by computing the arithmetic mean of individual estimates performed better than their most capable members when a judgment task evoked little or no bias, a result particularly pronounced for ranking tasks. When the task was more greatly bias-evoking, a large percentage of parallel groups performed more poorly than average (or median) members, again a pattern more starkly evident for ranking tasks. These results suggest that the extent to which a judgment task evokes bias in a population of prospective group members is an important explanatory variable deserving much greater attention in the study of group performance. For example, an assertion about the efficacy of a particular group intervention based on a reliable demonstration of group performance as accurate as the most capable members may be unfounded when a task evokes no bias, since the baseline standard under such conditions should be much higher. By selecting tasks and populations that jointly produced highly biased estimates, researchers can lower the performance floor enough to detect (with reasonably small samples of groups) experimental effects should they occur.     

La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions (Rhetoric 1, 2, 8). On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples (viz., historical example, comparison, and fable). Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be made by the orator, whereas historical examples are not (Rhetoric 2, 20, 2s). The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by induction reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term induction preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, induction gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which induction applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term (M) meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples (like real inductions) produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof.

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La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)