Getting scientists to think about what they are doing

Research scientists are trained to produce specialised bricks of knowledge, but not to look at the whole building. Increasing public concern about the social role of science is forcing science students to think about what they are actually learning to do. What sort of knowledge will they be producing, and how will it be used? Science education now requires serious consideration of these philosophical and ethical questions. But the many different forms of knowledge produced by modern science cannot be covered by any single philosophical principle. Sociology and cognitive psychology are also needed to understand what the sciences have in common and the significance of what they generate. Again, traditional modes of ethical analysis cannot deal adequately with the values, norms and interests activated by present-day technoscience without reference to its sociological, political and economic dimensions. What science education now requires is ‘metascience’, a discipline that extends beyond conventional philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific enterprise. For example, students need to learn about the practices, institutions, career choices, and societal responsibilities of research scientists, and to rehearse in advance some of the moral dilemmas that they are likely to meet. They need also to realise that science is changing rapidly, not only in its research techniques and organisational structures but also in its relationships with society at large.     

Intended and unintended effects of explicit warnings on eyewitness suggestibility: Evidence from source identification tests

Previous studies have shown that source identification (ID) tests reduce, and in some cases eliminate, eyewitness suggestibility errors. The present study showed that the suggestibility errors participants committed on a source ID test were further reduced when they were given the explicit postwarning that the experimenter was trying to trick them. These postwarnings reduced suggestibility to the same extent as prewarnings, and they did so for both once and repeatedly suggested items. In addition, the benefits of the pre- and postwarnings persisted when participants were retested 1 week later, but only if the suggestions had been repeated. For once-suggested items, the warning had the unintended effect of improving old/new recognition of the suggested information at retest, an effect that offset the improvements in source discrimination accuracy conferred by the warning. The advantages of using source ID tests for investigating group differences in eyewitness suggestibility are discussed.     

The use of diagrams in analogical problem solving

In four experiments, we examined the impact of perceptual properties on the effectiveness of diagrams in analogical problem solving, using variants of convergence diagrams as source analogues for the radiation problem. Static diagrams representing the initial problematic state (one large line directed at a target) and the final state for a convergence solution (multiple converging lines) were not accessed spontaneously but were often used successfully once a hint to consider the diagram had been provided. The inaccessibility of static diagrams was not alleviated by adding additional diagrams to represent intermediate states (Experiment 1), but spontaneous access was improved by augmenting static diagrams with a verbal statement of the convergence principle (Experiment 3). Spontaneous retrieval and noticing were increased markedly by animating displays representing converging forces and thereby encouraging encoding of the lines as indicating motion toward a target (Experiments 3 and 4). However, neither static nor animated diagrams were effective when the arrows were reversed to imply divergence rather than convergence (Experiment 2). The results indicate that when animation encourages the interpretation of a diagram as a helpful source analogue, it can greatly enhance analogical transfer.     

Tops are more salient than bottoms.

Past research has verified that observers assume that objects are reliably oriented with respect to a gravitationally centered coordinate system. Observers also appear to attend more to specific parts of objects, like faces, that typically are closer to the top. In the present work, we explored whether or not observers have a generic bias to view tops as being more salient than bottoms. In three experiments, observers indicated whether random shapes appeared to be more similar to comparison shapes that shared identical tops rather than bottoms. Observers exhibited a reliable tendency to match figures with similarly shaped tops. Matching choice was also a function of global shape attributes such as axis of elongation or size. The findings are consistent with the notion that, in nature, tops tend to be the most visible part and to provide the best information with respect to important aspects of objects such as animal intentionality and artifact functionality.     

Emotional intelligence meets traditional standards for an intelligence

An intelligence must meet several standard criteria before it can be considered scientifically legitimate. First, it should be capable of being operationalized as a set of abilities. Second, it should meet certain correlational criteria: the abilities defined by the intelligence should form a related set (i.e., be intercorrelated), and be related to pre-existing intelligences, while also showing some unique variance. Third, the abilities of the intelligence should develop with age and experience. In two studies, adults (N=503) and adolescents (N=229) took a new, 12-subscale ability test of emotional intelligence: the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). The present studies show that emotional intelligence, as measured by the MEIS, meets the above three classical criteria of a standard intelligence.