Social Anxiety Disorder in Childhood and Adolescence: Current Status and Future Directions

This paper reviews the current status of research on the phenomenology, etiology, maintenance, assessment, and treatment of childhood and adolescent social anxiety disorder (SAD). Despite being one of the most prevalent disorders of childhood and adolescence, SAD paradoxically stands as one of the least recognized, researched, and treated pediatric disorders. The small treatment outcome literature provides preliminary support to the effectiveness of various forms of cognitive behavior therapy. The majority of studies to date, however, are limited by inadequate control conditions. Other findings include some support for the utility of parental involvement in treatment, significant advancements in outcome measures (e.g., normative comparisons, indices of naturalistic social functioning), and impressive durability of gains for the majority of treatments. Future directions are suggested, including experimental and naturalistic studies of developmental pathways and maintenance factors, the incorporation of positive psychology constructs (e.g., positive emotions, hope, self-control) in treatment and prevention, and the continued delineation of differences between child, adolescent, and adult manifestations of SAD.     

Film Review

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Levels of interpersonal concerns and social functioning in early adolescent boys and girls

Previous research has shown that the Interpersonal Concerns factor of the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (DEQ; Blatt, D'Affliti, & Quinlan, 1976, 1979; Depressive Experiences Questionnaire for Adolescent [DEQ-A]; Blatt, Schaffer, Bers, & Quinlan, 1992) assesses 2 levels of interpersonal relatedness in young adults and older adolescents: neediness and relatedness. However, studies investigating the relation of the DEQ and DEQ-A with social functioning have not used the Neediness and Relatedness subscales of the Interpersonal Concerns factor. This study investigated (a) whether the Neediness and Relatedness subscales can be differentiated in a sample of early adolescents and (b) how the 2 subscales are differentially associated with indexes of social functioning. Results indicate that this differentiation of Neediness and Relatedness, and their associations with social functioning, emerges in early adolescence, especially for girls.     

How much observational data is enough? An empirical test using marital interaction coding

Using three different samples of couples (clinic, nondistressed community, and engaged), we found that 15 minutes was sufficient to witness enough behavior to make reliable (i.e., internally consistent) estimations of most Rapid Marital Interaction Coding System (Heyman & Vivian, 1993) code frequencies. Ten minutes is sufficient for many codes of interest. The ease in which "how much time is necessary" calculations can be made should entice behavioral investigators from a variety of content areas to publish such figures. By empirically investigating a factor that in most fields becomes reified through convention, investigators can conduct observational research that is both maximally efficient and maximally scientifically defensible.     

Citizens' Sense of Justice and the Legal System

When an actor commits a wrong action, citizens have perceptions of the kind of responsibility the actor incurs, the degree to which the act was mitigated or justified, and the appropriate punishment for the actor. The legislatively mandated law of criminal courts, statutes, and criminal codes deals with the same issues. Experimental evidence shows that there are important discrepancies between the principles that people and legal codes use to assign responsibility. That is, the moral retributive-justice principles that people use are sometimes in conflict with the directions in which modern code drafters are taking criminal law. These discrepancies may cause citizens to feel alienated from authority, and to reduce their voluntary compliance with legal codes.     

The Genesis of Mind and Spirit

Spiritual life is made possible by the evolution of a human neuropsychology that requires social interdependence for its development. Extensive neuroplasticity requires experiential shaping throughout life. The evolution of frontal cortex hypertrophy suggests that much of this shaping is produced by a socially constructed virtual reality, extending beyond immediate experience. Prefrontal colonization makes possible the social scaffolding of neuroregulation, including the emotional attachments necessary for moral life. Cognitive independence from immediate environments enables symbioses with external memory systems, producing novel forms of socially constituted experience and making possible the transformative effect of religious systems upon individual biologies and psychologies.     

Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics

This paper represents the first installment of alarger project devoted to the relevance of pragmatism forbioethics. One self-consciously pragmatist move would be toreturn to the classical pragmatist canon of Peirce, James andDewey in search of substantive doctrines or methodologicalapproaches that might be applied to current bioethicalcontroversies. Another pragmatist (or neopragmatist) move wouldbe to subject the regnant principlist paradigm to Richard Rorty'ssubversive assaults on foundationalism in epistemology andethics. A third pragmatist method, dubbed ``freestandingpragmatism' by its proponents, embraces a ``pragmatist' approachto practical reasoning without discernable moorings either to theclassical canon or to Rorty's neopragmatism. This thirdpragmatist approach to method in practical ethics is the subjectof this article. I begin with an examination of freestandingpragmatism in the theory of judicial decision making. I arguethat this version of legal pragmatism – so described on account ofits commitments to contextualism, instrumentalism, eclecticism,and freedom from grand theory – bears a striking resemblance tomuch self-described pragmatist work in bioethics today. Ifurther argue that if this is what we mean by ``pragmatism,' thenin a certain sense ``we are all pragmatists now.'