Likelihoodism,Bayesianism, and relational confirmation

Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a “middle way” between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the “Monty Hall” problem. Thanks to the participants of the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Seminar at the University of Konstanz (especially Stephan Hartmann, Franz Huber, Wolfgang Spohn, and Teddy Seidenfeld), for a very fruitful discussion of an early draft of this paper in July, 2004. Since then, discussions and correspondences with Prasanta Bandyopadhyay, Luc Bovens, Alan Hájek, Jim Hawthorne, Jim Joyce, Jon Kvanvig (and other participants of his “Certain Doubts” blog, which had a thread on a previous draft of this paper), Patrick Maher, Sherri Roush, Richard Royall, Elliott Sober, Dan Steel, and an anonymous referee of Synthese has been very valuable.     

Animal Rights and Animal Experiments: An Interest-Based Approach

This paper examines whether non-human animals have a moral right not to be experimented upon. It adopts a Razian conception of rights, whereby an individual possesses a right if an interest of that individual is sufficient to impose a duty on another. To ascertain whether animals have a right not to be experimented on, three interests are examined which might found such a right: the interest in not suffering, the interest in staying alive, and the interest in being free. It is argued that while the first two of these interests are sufficient to ground animal rights against being killed and made to suffer by experiments, the interest in freedom does not ground a general animal right not to be used in experimentation. Winner of the second annual Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2006.     

Academic optimistic bias: Implications for college student performance and well-being

Although optimism has several benefits, there are potential drawbacks associated with “too much of a good thing”. Within an academic context, a possible determinant of the adaptiveness of optimistic bias is whether students have a sense of control over academic outcomes: optimistically-biased (OB) achievement expectations paired with perceptions of academic control may enhance performance and well-being; optimistic bias in the absence of perceived control may result in disappointment, poor performance, and diminished well-being. The current longitudinal study examined academic control cognitions (ACC) among OB college students (n = 319) versus non-optimistically biased (non-OB) students (n = 321). We also examined the effects of academic optimistic bias on composite measures of college performance (perceived success, final psychology course grades, cumulative GPA, course attrition) and well-being (positive and negative emotions, health behaviors, future optimism) 6 months later; and determined whether ACC accounted for those associations. Significant MANCOVAs showed OB students had greater ACC, better subsequent well-being, and outperformed their non-OB counterparts. These well-being and performance differences remained significant after statistically accounting for initial aptitude and ACC. Overall, academic optimistic bias was accompanied by perceived controllability over scholastic outcomes, yet beyond the effects of ACC, optimistic bias was associated with better year-end performance and well-being. Findings have implications for maximizing the successful transition of first-year college students.     

Examination of the MMPI-2 Restructured Clinical (RC) Scales in a Sample of Bariatric Surgery Candidates

The current study examined the MMPI-2 Restructured Clinical (RC) scales (Tellegen et al., MMPI-2 Restructured Clinical (RC) scales: Development, validation, and interpretation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) in a sample of 1,091 bariatric surgery candidates. The RC scales were developed to address concerns about limited discriminant validity of the Clinical scales. Internal consistency and external validity analyses were conducted to evaluate the RC scales in this setting. Results indicated that the RC scales are generally more internally consistent than the Clinical scales and display significantly better convergent and discriminant validity in predicting a variety of behavioral, psychological, and developmental variables relevant to preoperative bariatric psychological evaluations. Implications of the results and recommendations for future research with the RC scales in medical settings are discussed.     

Fictions,feelings, and emotions

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.     

The Unity of a Tractarian Fact

It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity of the whole, for Wittgenstein the unity of a fact is the product of copulative powers inherent in all its elements. All kinds of constituents of Tractarian facts – all kinds (forms) of object – are, to use Fregean terminology, unsaturated.     

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

The Effect of Language Immersion Education on the Preattentive Perception of Native and Non-native Vowel Contrasts

Proficiency in a second language (L2) may depend upon the age of exposure and the continued use of the mother tongue (L1) during L2 acquisition. The effect of early L2 exposure on the preattentive perception of native and non-native vowel contrasts was studied by measuring the mismatch negativity (MMN) response from 14-year-old children. The test group consisted of six Finnish children who had participated in English immersion education. The control group consisted of eight monolingual Finns. The subjects were presented with Finnish and English synthetic vowel contrasts. The aim was to see whether early exposure had resulted in the development of a new language-specific memory trace for the contrast phonemically irrelevant in L1. The results indicated that only the contrast with the largest acoustic distance elicited an MMN response in the Bilingual group, while the Monolingual group showed a response also to the native contrast. This may suggest that native-like memory traces for prototypical vowels were not formed in early language immersion.