Sex role orientations of male and female collegiate athletes from selected individual and team sports

The purpose of the present study was to determine whether the sex role orientations of male and female collegiate athletes were more similar in team sports than in individual sports. It was predicted that females in masculine-oriented team sports (basketball and volleyball) would exhibit sex role orientations more similar to those of their male counterparts than would females in individual sports (track/field and swimming). To test this notion the S. L. Bem (The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1974, 42, 155–167) Sex Role Inventory was administered to 381 athletes from 37 National Collegiate Athletic Association institutions. The median-split procedure (S. L. Bem, On the Utility of Alternative Procedures for Assessing Psychology Androgyny, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1977, 45, 196–205) was used to classify subjects as masculine, feminine, androgynous, or undifferentiated. Separate Gender × Sex Role Orientation chi square tests were performed on the frequency data of team and individual sport athletes. The results indicated no significant differences in the sex role orientations of male and female team sport performers, with the greatest proportion (66%) having a masculine (33%) or androgynous (33%) orientation. For individual sports there was a significant difference in the sex role orientations of males and females. The highest proportion of females were classified as feminine (37%) and the lowest proportion were classified as masculine (11%). Individual sport males were somewhat evenly distributed among the four sex role orientation categories, with the highest proportion classified as undifferentiated (36%). It was concluded that sex role orientation of elite female athletes may be associated with the male appropriateness of the sport in which they participate.     

Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Long latency auditory evoked potentials

Experiment 1 elicited the P1, N1, P2, and N2 components of the long latency auditory evoked potential (AEP) using a 1000 Hz tone presented at 30, 50, or 70 dB SPL and 1-, 3-, or 5- second inter-stimulus intervals to assess the relative effects of the combination of these variables on component amplitude and latency. Four blocks of 16 tone presentations each were recorded from each subject to determine if changes in the AEP would occur because of short-term habituation. Both stimulus factors interacted significantly in a systematic fashion for the amplitude measures, with increases in latency also associated with increases in intensity and inter-stimulus interval. Only minor changes across the four trial blocks for either the amplitude or latency measures were observed over the various stimulus presentation conditions. Experiment 2 employed the same tone stimulus presented at 50 dB SPL and a 3-second inter-stimulus interval. Eight blocks of 64 trials were recorded from each subject on each day for four days to investigate long-term habituation effects. No substantial changes in any of the component amplitudes or latencies were obtained across the 32 trial blocks. It was concluded that intensity and inter-stimulus interval interact to determine AEP amplitude as well as latency values and that the constituent components do not change appreciably with repeated stimulus presentations, even after several days.     

Revision algebra semantics for conditional logic

The properties of belief revision operators are known to have an informal semantics which relates them to the axioms of conditional logic. The purpose of this paper is to make this connection precise via the model theory of conditional logic. A semantics for conditional logic is presented, which is expressed in terms of algebraic models constructed ultimately out of revision operators. In addition, it is shown that each algebraic model determines both a revision operator and a logic, that are related by virtue of the stable Ramsey test.The author is grateful for a correction and several other valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

Partial monotonicity and a new version of the Ramsey test

We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known Gärdenfors dilemma.In addition, we present the consequential correctness axiom as a new measure of minimal revision in terms of the deductive core of a proposition whose support we wish to excise. We survey several syntactic and semantic belief revision systems and evaluate them according to both the Gärdenfors axioms and our new axioms. Furthermore, our algebraic characterization of semantic revision systems provides a useful technical device for analysis and comparison, which we illustrate with several new proofs.Finally, we have a new inconsistency result, which is dual to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results. Any elementary belief revision system that is consequentially correct must violate the Gärdenfors axiom of strong boundedness (K^*8), which we characterize as yet another monotonicity condition.This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

The representation and integration in memory of spatial and nonspatial information

A series of experiments investigated whether people could integrate nonspatial information about an object with their knowledge of the object's location in space. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects learned the locations of cities on a fictitious road map; in Experiments 2, 4, and 5, subjects were already familiar with the locations of buildings on a campus. The subjects then learned facts about the cities on the maps or the buildings on the campus. The question of interest was whether or not these nonspatial facts would be integrated in memory with the spatial knowledge. After learning the facts, subjects were given a location-judgment test in which they had to decide whether an object was in one region of the space or another. Knowledge integration was assessed by comparing levels of performance in two conditions: (a) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a neighboring city or building, and (b) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a distant city or building. Results showed that responses in Condition a were faster or more accurate, or both faster and more accurate, than responses in Condition b. These results indicate that the spatial and nonspatial information were encoded in a common memory representation.     

Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 1: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference

During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict an experiment was conducted with Australian university students (N = 200) to investigate whether the social stereotyping of Americans varied with social contextual manipulations related to the hostilities. The study, conducted in two phases at the start and end of the conflict, examined how the assignment of standard stereotypical traits to Americans was affected (a) by the large-scale social change constituted by the war and (b) by variation in the frame of reference provided by relevant comparison groups. The elicited stereotypes were sensitive to both of these contextual variables, demonstrating significant variation and fluidity. Overall, stereotypes of Americans were relatively negative. They were significantly more negative (a) at the end of the war than at the beginning in the restricted frame (when Australia and Britain were comparison groups) and (b) in the first phase of the conflict when the frame was extended to include Iraq as a comparison group. The findings were in line with expectations derived from self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985) that the social categorization of self and other into ingroup and outgroup is inherently variable, comparative and context-dependent. They question the long-held view of stereotypes as fixed, rigid and resistant to change.     

Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference,self-categorization and accentuation

This paper examines the hypothesis that patterns of stereotypic accentuation reflect the degree to which judged stimuli share the same social category membership as the stereotyper, Following self-categorization theory, the degree of this shared identity is operationalized in terms of the meta-contrast ratio as a function of the positions of (a) stereotyper and (b) stereotyped target relative to (c) the stereotyper's frame of reference. Three experiments are reported which sought to manipulate shared category membership either by extension of subjects' frame of reference or by extremitization of target and subject with respect to that frame. As predicted, greater shared identity was associated with stronger assimilation of the target to subjects' own position and with change in stereotype content. Findings are discussed in relation to theories of personality, social judgement and social cognition. Like the accentuation processes which underpin them, it is proposed that stereotypes are sensitive to comparative context and that they reflect veridically the social self-categorical properties of stimuli.     

Output and retrieval interference in the missing-number task

Three experiments are reported that represent a reexamination of the missing-number method (Buschke, 1963b) of estimating short-term memory span. The missing-number task involved presenting a random sequence of all but one of the numbers of a known reference set and asking subjects to identify the missing number. Experiment 1 introduced a modified missing-number task that included two missing items and two choices made by the subject. With a large decline in performance for the second choice relative to the first, it is possible that only the second choice was subject to output or retrieval interference. An alternative explanation is that subjects output the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response. By postcuing subjects to report their two choices in a forward or backward sequence, Experiment 2 provided evidence against the importance of output interference and support either for the importance of retrieval interference or for the "weakest-first" hypothesis. However, with a paradigm that replaced only correctly identified missing numbers, a prediction that subjects would select the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response was not confirmed in Experiment 3. Instead, retrieval interference was implicated to explain the first-choice superiority found in Experiments 1 and 3. The results were interpreted in terms of the TODAM model of Murdock (1982, 1987, in press).