Relationship of Adult Representations of Childhood Parenting and Personality Tendencies to Adult Stressors and Political Ideology

Undergraduate students in a Southeastern US University (n = 232) responded to an inventory that included retrospective measures of their parents’ style of parenting (authoritarian vs. authoritative) and their own childhood psychological tendencies (insecurity vs. confidence), as well as their adult stressors and political orientation. Authoritative parenting positively correlated with childhood confidence and negatively correlated with both childhood insecurity and adult stressors. Conversely, authoritarian parenting was positively associated with childhood insecurity and adult stressors but was not significantly correlated with childhood confidence. For the most part, parenting styles, early childhood tendencies, and adult stressors were unrelated to adult political ideology, contrary to previous longitudinal research reporting these connections.     

The logic of Simpson’s paradox

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”     

Risk Taking and Sensitivity to Punishment in Children with ADHD,ODD, ADHD+ODD,and Controls

We used the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) to examine risk taking and sensitivity to punishment, two relevant aspects of behavioral inhibition, in 203 school-age children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), ADHD+ODD, and controls. Participants earned points on the BART by pumping 30 separate balloons that exploded at variable intervals. No points were earned on a trial when a balloon exploded. The number of pumps across all balloons estimated risk taking and the reduction in pumps following balloon explosions was interpreted as an indicator of sensitivity to negative punishment. We found that all groups significantly differed from one another on risk taking. The ADHD+ODD group pumped the most, followed by the ODD, ADHD, and the control group, respectively. For sensitivity to negative punishment, all groups performed differently, with the ODD group showing the least sensitivity to an exploded balloon, followed by the ADHD, control, and ADHD+ODD groups, respectively. Children with ADHD+ODD demonstrated significantly different patterns of risk taking and sensitivity to negative punishment than children with either ADHD-only or ODD-only. ADHD youth with comorbid ODD had the greatest levels of risk taking, but they were also the most sensitive to negative punishment. The relationship between ADHD and ODD, as well as the nature of comorbidity in constructs related to risk taking and related behaviors, are discussed.     

On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism

The aim of this paper is to articulate, discuss in detail and criticise Reichenbach’s sophisticated and complex argument for scientific realism. Reichenbach’s argument has two parts. The first part aims to show how there can be reasonable belief in unobservable entities, though the truth of claims about them is not given directly in experience. The second part aims to extent the argument of the first part to the case of realism about the external world, conceived of as a world of independently existing entities distinct from sensations. It is argued that the success of the first part depends on a change of perspective, where unobservable entities are viewed as projective complexes vis-à-vis their observable symptoms, or effects. It is also argued that there is an essential difference between the two parts of the argument, which Reichenbach comes (somewhat reluctantly) to accept.     

Resource control and status as stimuli for arousing power motivation: An American-Chinese comparison

In this paper, we analyze power motivation from a cross-cultural perspective. Power motivation has been mainly studied within the Western culture. However, previous research suggests that some contours and nuances of power and power motivation may be culturally specific. In this article, we analyze cultural differences between American and Chinese students in how power motivation is aroused. Drawing from the cross-cultural literature, we propose that having decision-making control over resources increases levels of power motivation among Americans but not Chinese, whereas status-elevation increases power motivation among both Americans and Chinese. These hypotheses were tested experimentally with resource-control, status-elevation, and neutral conditions. The first hypothesis was fully supported, but the second one was only partially supported. Levels of power motivation in the neutral condition (i.e., dispositional power motives) were similar for American and Chinese participants, but power motivation arousal was greater for Americans than Chinese, in both power arousal conditions. These findings contribute to our understanding of the power motivation construct in a non-Western context.     

Modifying Threat-related Interpretive Bias in Adolescents

Socially anxious feelings sharply increase during adolescence and such feelings have been associated with interpretive biases. Studies in adults have shown that interpretive biases can be modified using Cognitive Bias Modification procedures (CBM-I) and subsequent effects on anxiety have been observed. The current study was designed to examine whether the CBM-I procedure has similar effects in adolescents. Unselected adolescents were randomly allocated to either a positive interpretation training (n = 88) or a placebo-control condition (n = 82). Results revealed that the training was successful in modifying interpretations and effects generalized to a new task. The interpretive bias effects were most pronounced in individuals with a threat-related interpretive bias at pre-test. No effects on state anxiety were observed. The current findings are promising with regard to applying bias modification procedures to adolescents, while further research is warranted regarding emotional effects.     

Learning and Living Systemic: Exploring the Personal Effects of Family Therapy Training

Despite growing recognition that systemic family therapists need to be adept at personal reflection and managing the therapeutic relationship, little research has explored the effects of training beyond the development of skills. This article provides a report on a qualitative study focussed on the personal effects of family therapy training, with particular reference to the aspects of training that foster personal reflection and growth. Twenty three trainees from three training institutions were interviewed, utilizing the practices of grounded theory. Trainees reported a deepening relational awareness, which applied to both personal and professional domains and included shifts in perspectives on relationships with loved ones. Five aspects of training were identified as responsible: (1) personally challenging experiences with clients; (2) supervisors who live the paradigm; (3) the demystification of theory; (4) a safe supervisory space; and (5) the development of trusting peer relationships. Interns also described, in turn, how their personal development affected their clinical work, particularly in the development of compassion and empathy. This study serves to highlight training practices that support reflective practice in systemic family therapy.     

Attesting the Aristotelian Future

Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane (2003)) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday. A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright (2009)’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian view.     

Omniscience and worthiness of worship

At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than others—that may be offered by the theist.     

From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.