Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.     

Action,Control and Sensations of Acting

Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle’s theory, do not add up to agency. I find the agent at work, her engagement in her action, in her sensation of acting.It is often thought that bodily movements are either mere events or actions. I suggest that there is a third possibility: that they are activities which are not actions. Activities, whether they are actions or not, differ from mere events in that they are controlled from within the brain. They are actions only if this control forms agent control, that is, control in which the conscious mind, the agents’ intentions in acting and her sensations of acting, participates.Internally wayward actions are characterized by the fact that the person involved does not have a sensation of action and therefore does not control her movements. In the absence of such a sensation she does not act.     

The Ambiguity of Quantifiers

In the tradition of substructural logics, it has been claimed for a long time that conjunction and inclusive disjunction are ambiguous:we should, in fact, distinguish between ‘lattice’ connectives (also called additive or extensional) and ‘group’ connectives (also called multiplicative or intensional). We argue that an analogous ambiguity affects the quantifiers. Moreover, we show how such a perspective could yield solutions for two well-known logical puzzles: McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens and the lottery paradox.     

Predicting attitudes toward operation Iraqi freedom

98 male and female college students ranging in age from 17 to 22 years (M= 19.2, SD= 1.1) were administered a questionnaire that contained Altemeyer's 20-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA), questions about the legitimacy of the 2000 presidential election, Mayton's Physical Nonviolence Subscale, and a scale designed to measure attitudes toward Operation Iraqi Freedom. RWA scores, perceptions of the legitimacy of the 2000 presidential election, and scores on the Physical Nonviolence subscale were independent predictors of attitudes toward Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, those who had higher RWA scores were more likely to perceive the 2000 presidential election as legitimate. There was no significant correlation between RWA scores and attitudes toward physical nonviolence.     

On the existence and uniqueness of JML estimates for the partial credit model

A necessary and sufficient condition is given in this paper for the existence and uniqueness of the maximum likelihood (the so-called joint maximum likelihood) estimate of the parameters of the Partial Credit Model. This condition is stated in terms of a structural property of the pattern of the data matrix that can be easily verified on the basis of a simple iterative procedure. The result is proved by using an argument of Haberman (1977). The author wishes to thank the Editor and the anonymous reviewers for their comments that helped to substantially improve the final version of this paper. This research was supported in part by a MURST grant (ex 60%).