Use of the MMPI-2 in American Indians: II. Empirical correlates

R. W. Robin, R. L. Greene, B. Albaugh, A. Caldwell, and D. Goldman (2003) reported that members of 2 American Indian tribal groups had statistically significant higher T scores on several MMPI-2 clinical, content, and supplementary scales than did the MMPI-2 normative group. The present study investigated the empirical correlates of the MMPI-2 scales in these American Indian tribal members. There were a large number of significant correlates reflecting antisocial symptoms with Scales 4 (Psychopathic Deviate), 9 (Hypomania), Anger, and Antisocial Practices. There were even a larger number of significant correlates reflecting generalized distress and negative affect with Scales 7 (Psychosthenia), 8 (Schizophrenia), Anxiety, Obsessions, Depression, and Welsh Anxiety. The rationally derived MMPI-2 content scales generally had larger correlations with these constructs than the clinical scales. Thus, the differences reported by R. W. Robin et al. (2003), appear to reflect behaviors and symptoms that American Indians participants were experiencing rather than test bias.     

Author Index

Authors Index

Author Index     

Variations in the intelligence test performance of referred boys of differing racial and socioeconomic backgrounds as a function of feedback or monetary reinforcement

One hundred fifty-six elementary school males referred to school psychologists were characterized as lower-class whites, lower-class Negroes, or middle-class whites. Each of these groups was tested with the verbal scale of the WISC under either standardized conditions, feedback concerning correct answers, or contingent monetary reinforcement for correct answers. Middle-class whites and lower-class Negroes did not differ across treatments. However, lower-class whites tested under feedback or monetary conditions performed significantly better than lower-class whites tested under standardized conditions. Implications for testing procedures or the interpretation of test scores were evident.     

The logical structure of Michael Williams's response to skepticism

This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti-skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses. According to the account developed here, this claim is misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that response.     

Heterosexist discrimination and relational sacrifice of same-sex couples

Drawing on the family stress process model and using data from 141 same-sex couples (N = 282 partners), we examined associations between heterosexist discrimination and relational sacrifices (i.e., willingness and behaviors). We also examined the moderating roles of both partners' internalized homophobia and state-level liberalism on same-sex marriage legalization. Actor-partner interdependence moderation models were conducted. Most of our findings supported hypotheses from the family stress process model. One individual's experiences of greater heterosexist discrimination were related to the partner's higher levels of sacrifice willingness and the individual's own higher frequency of sacrifice behaviors. Such associations emerged (a) among couples living in more liberal states that legalized same-sex marriage earlier, and (b) when the individual's partner reported lower levels of internalized homophobia. Yet the moderating role of an individual's internalized homophobia was the opposite of our hypothesis. When individuals reported high (versus low) internalized homophobia, individuals' experiences of more discriminative events were related to partners' higher levels of sacrifice willingness. Collectively, our study findings highlight that—when investigating how same-sex couples forge and maintain romantic bonds—researchers should consider their experiences in the social cultural context of heteronormativity, which includes the focus on discrimination, stigma, and affirmative laws and policies.     

How Mathematics Isn't Logic

If logical truth is necessitated by sheer syntax, mathematics is categorially unlike logic even if all mathematics derives from definitions and logical principles. This contrast gets obscured by the plausibility of the Synonym Substitution Principle implicit in conceptions of analyticity: synonym substitution cannot alter sentence sense. The Principle obviously fails with intercepting : nonuniform term substitution in logical sentences. 'Televisions are televisions' and 'TVs are televisions' neither sound alike nor are used interchangeably. Interception synonymy gets assumed because logical sentences and their synomic interceptions have identical factual content, which seems to exhaust semantic content. However, intercepting alters syntax by eliminating term recurrence, the sole strictly syntactic means of ensuring necessary term coextension, and thereby syntactically securing necessary truth. Interceptional necessity is lexical, a notational artifact. The denial of interception nonsynonymy and the disregard of term recurrence in logic link with many misconceptions about propositions, logical form, conventions, and metalanguages. Mathematics is distinct from logic: its truth is not syntactic; it is transmitted by synonym substitution; term recurrence has no essential role. The '=' of mathematics is an objectual relation between numbers; the '=' of logic marks a syntactic relation of coreferring terms.     

Visual bridgingof empty gaps in the optic flow

This is a study of perception of bending motion and jointed rigid motions over large invisible segments of a bending line. In this project, we investigated the visual perception of changing form of lines, built up by a series of dots and presented under highly reduced pictorial conditions. The changing form was indicated by one or two moving and continuously changing visible fragments of the line. The most extreme condition studied was the perception of the bending of an initially vertical 24-dot line, visually represented only by the stationary base dot and the two moving dots at its top. In this experiment, nearly all subjects reported experiencing a smooth bending connection over the 21-dot empty gap. Three experiments are described and analyzed. The results suggest that the human visual system is astonishingly well adapted for derivation of relevant figurai information from such severely reduced, continuously changing optical presentation. An explanation in terms of automatic sensory mechanisms related to the physiological receptive field effect is proposed.