‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson

A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.     

Suppression-induced forgetting diminishes following a delay of either sleep or wake

ABSTRACT

We investigated the duration of suppression-induced forgetting (SIF), and the extent to which retrieval suppression differs between negative and neutral memories. We further examined if SIF was differently affected by sleep versus wake during the delay interval between retrieval suppression and re-test. Fifty participants first learned to associate neutral words with either neutral or negative images. Then, a subset of the words was shown again, and participants were asked to either recall (Think), or to suppress retrieval of (No-Think) the associated images. Finally, a memory test for all items was performed either immediately after the Think/No-Think (T/NT) phase (No Delay), or after a 3.5?h delay interval containing either sleep or wake. Results revealed a SIF effect only in the No Delay group, indicating that this forgetting effect dissipates already after a 3.5?h delay interval. Negative items were experienced as more intrusive than neutral ones during the T/NT phase.