Implicit memory bias for eating- and body appearance-related sentences in eating disorders: an application of Jacoby's white noise task

Jacoby's white noise task and an explicit recognition task were used to investigate whether individuals with eating disorders demonstrate implicit memory bias and explicit memory bias, respectively, for information related to eating and body appearance. Included were 33 women with eating disorders (seven with anorexia nervosa and 26 with bulimia nervosa), 29 with nonclinical eating disorder-related concerns, and 36 healthy controls. Results showed partial support for implicit memory bias but no support for explicit memory bias. These findings suggest that eating disorders may be characterized by relative initial automatic bias for eating disorder-relevant information but not by bias at later stages of information processing. However, previous studies have demonstrated explicit memory bias in eating disorders, which is inconsistent with this interpretation. Future research is required to clarify the precise cognitive biases associated with eating disorders.     

Piece of cake? Allocating rewards to third parties when fairness is costly

Reactions to third-party inequality were investigated in three experiments. In Experiment 1, 52 undergraduates allocated money between themselves and two others. Preferences for equal and unequal distributions were also rated. The results show that people are averse to inequalities between themselves and others, and to inequalities between others. Post-experimental ratings indicate that egocentric equality, third-party equality, and max–min preferences are important motives. The findings were replicated in Experiment 2, where 74 undergraduates allocated compensation for a previously conducted task, and in Experiment 3, where 112 participants rated preferences. In these experiments random determination of rewards to third parties altered participants’ behavior and preferences. The results indicated that random determination decreases the importance of all fairness motives while increasing the importance of monetary payoff. While people still care about economic equality under these conditions, contextual factors, such as perceived responsibility for unfair outcomes, seem to alter the impact of fairness.     

Scale‐dependent automatic shifts in brand evaluation standards

Different schema-based expectations for competing brands can produce shifting evaluative standards in consumers' relative ratings of these brands. This shift in standards differentially affects objective (number-based) and subjective (word-based) rating scales. Several studies support the proposition that a brand rated as objectively inferior to another can be subjectively perceived as equivalent to—or even better than—the same brand. Such anomalous response inconsistency originates in consumers' recourse to different expectations for the competing brands and their automatic adjustment of expectations for the inferior brand when responding to subjective measures. The implicit relaxing of evaluative standards for the objectively dominated brand leads to an unconscious upward bias in its subjective ratings. The effect is moderated by consumer expertise and is asymmetric—it is not accompanied by an escalation of evaluative standards for objectively dominating brands.     

Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time

Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

In Defense of the Notion of Truthlikeness

The notion of truthlikeness (verisimilitude, approximate truth), coined by Karl Popper, has very much fallen into oblivion, but the paper defends it. It can be regarded in two different ways. Either as a notion that is meaningful only if some formal measure of degree of truthlikeness can be constructed; or as a merely non-formal comparative notion that nonetheless has important functions to fulfill. It is the latter notion that is defended; it is claimed that such a notion is needed for both a reasonable backward-looking and a reasonable forward-looking view of science. On the one hand, it is needed in order to make sense of the history of science as containing a development; on the other, it is needed in order to understand present-day sciences as containing knowledge-seeking activities. The defense of truthlikeness requires also a defense of two other notions: quasi-comparisons and regulative ideas, which is supplied in this paper as well.     

Yin yoga and mindfulness: a five week randomized controlled study evaluating the effects of the YOMI program on stress and worry

Background and objectives: The YOMI program is a psychoeducational training and physical practice-based program that bridges knowledge from evidence-based psychotherapy with the practice of mindfulness and yin yoga. It consists of 10 content-specific sessions and does not include home assignments. The primary purpose of this randomized controlled trial is to evaluate the effects of the five-week YOMI program on perceived stress, worry and mindfulness in a non-clinical sample.

Design and method: In this randomized controlled trial participants were assigned to two groups. Group 1 participated in the five-week intervention twice a week while Group 2 was assigned to a waiting-list condition and participated in the intervention after Group 1. All measures were administered through self-report questionnaires, conducted via a web-based program.

Results and conclusions: The results of the study indicated significant effects of the YOMI program on decreasing stress and worry, and increasing mindfulness. Notably these changes were still present at five-week follow up. Consistent with the hypotheses, results suggested that the YOMI program established a group setting where individuals learned to use tools and methods to facilitate better self-directed practice. The study shows moderate to large effect sizes.     

Problems with computer games without monetary reward: similarity to pathological gambling

An epidemiological study was performed on a representative sample of the Norwegian youth population (12 to 18 years old, N=3,237; response rate 45.2%). The percentage who were frequent players (weekly) of different computer games was 63.3%, and the percentage of infrequent users was 36.7%. A mean of 2.7% (4.2% of the boys, 1.1% of the girls) could be described as exhibiting "pathological playing" according to the criteria in the 1998 Diagnostic Questionnaire for Internet Addiction of Young, and an additional 9.82% (14.5% of the boys, 5.0% of the girls) were considered to be engaging in "at-risk playing." Of the weekly gamblers, 4.2% fulfilled 5 criteria for pathological playing, and an additional 15.5% 3 to 4 criteria, i.e., at-risk playing. This indicated that frequent gaming on computer games without money rewards may be related to problematic playing even though no monetary reward is involved.     

Internet addiction: characteristics of a questionnaire and prevalence in Norwegian youth (12-18 years)

The use of the Internet has increased considerably during the last few years, and there are also some clinical observations that some people 'get hooked', and develop an Internet addiction. An epidemiological study was performed in a representative sample of the Norwegian youth population (N= 3,237; response rate 45.2%). The proportion not using Internet was only 4.9%, while 35.8% were non-frequent users, and 49.6% (1,591) were frequent (weekly) users. They used the Internet on the mean 4.3 hours a week. A mean of 1.98% (boys 2.42%, girls 1.51%) could be described as having an 'Internet addiction' according to the criteria in the Diagnostic Questionnaire of Young (1998), and an additional 8.68% (in sum 10.66) were considered to have an at-risk Internet use (boys 9.21%, girls 8.13%). If these proportions were calculated on individuals who used the Internet frequently, 4.02% fulfilled 5 criteria, and an additional 17.66% 3-4 criteria, giving quite high figures of problematic Internet use (in sum 21.68). The different diagnostic criteria gave a broad range of affirmative answers (from 0.4% to 27.9%). The results have important implications for further studies of prevalence, implementation of preventive measures, and the development of treatment approaches for Internet addiction.     

How something can be said about telling more than we can know: on choice blindness and introspection

The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes (1977), is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., &; Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310(5745), 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis (LSA) to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports.