Non-Reductionism and Special Concern

The so-called ‘Extreme Claim’ asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.     

The Executive Manager and His or Her Organisation

Thoughts based on an inquiry and on experiences from my practice as a consultant, manager and company executive.     

Past and Future Non-Existence

According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses.     

Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr’s incoherence claim.     

The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time

If a person’s death is bad for him for the reason that he would have otherwise been intrinsically better off, as the Deprivation Approach says, does it not follow that his prenatal nonexistence is bad for him as well? Recently, it has been suggested that the “A-theory” of time can be used to support a negative answer to this question. In this paper, I raise some problems for this approach.     

Reflective team and process-oriented supervision – a case study on differences

To meet the Swedish healthcare legislation’s requirements for evidence-based care, a work model for reflection has been developed, called a reflective team (RT). Because this RT model can be perceived as either a competitor of or a complement to caring supervision, this case study aims to explore what distinguishes these two in psychiatric care. Five members of one RT who are psychiatric nurses with previous experiences in caring supervision were interviewed. The transcribed interviews were analysed according to phenomenography. The findings reveal three qualitatively separated categories, which describe differences in focus, competencies, and relationships between confirmation and demands. It is concluded that an RT by no means replaces supervision. Instead, both can contribute to care improvement by complementing each other and increasing the professionalism of psychiatric nurses.     

Trait anxiety, working memory capacity, and the effectiveness of memory suppression

We aimed at replicating the finding that humans are able to suppress unwanted memories, and tested whether this ability varies with individual differences in working memory capacity, trait anxiety and defensiveness. In a think/no-think experiment, participants either recalled or suppressed previously learned words for 0, 8 or 16 times. Suppression did not have an overall detrimental effect on later recall performance. However, higher recall rates after repeated suppression were exclusively predicted by higher trait anxiety. These results are discussed in relation to current theories on anxiety and executive control.     

Hail the impossible: p-values, evidence, and likelihood

Significance testing based on p-values is standard in psychological research and teaching. Typically, research articles and textbooks present and use p as a measure of statistical evidence against the null hypothesis (the Fisherian interpretation), although using concepts and tools based on a completely different usage of p as a tool for controlling long-term decision errors (the Neyman-Pearson interpretation). There are four major problems with using p as a measure of evidence and these problems are often overlooked in the domain of psychology. First, p is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis and can therefore never indicate evidence for the null. Second, p is conditioned solely on the null hypothesis and is therefore unsuited to quantify evidence, because evidence is always relative in the sense of being evidence for or against a hypothesis relative to another hypothesis. Third, p designates probability of obtaining evidence (given the null), rather than strength of evidence. Fourth, p depends on unobserved data and subjective intentions and therefore implies, given the evidential interpretation, that the evidential strength of observed data depends on things that did not happen and subjective intentions. In sum, using p in the Fisherian sense as a measure of statistical evidence is deeply problematic, both statistically and conceptually, while the Neyman-Pearson interpretation is not about evidence at all. In contrast, the likelihood ratio escapes the above problems and is recommended as a tool for psychologists to represent the statistical evidence conveyed by obtained data relative to two hypotheses.     

Controlling anger in self-reported sober and alcohol intoxicated states: moderating effects of trait anger and alcohol consumption

Controlling anger in self-reported sober and alcohol intoxicated states: Moderating effects of trait anger and alcohol consumption. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 52, 382-388. Retrospective self-reports about prior sober and alcohol intoxicated states were explored to reveal moderating effects of trait anger and alcohol consumption on anger control. The analyses were based on self-reports of trait anger and alcohol consumption as well as self-reports of the participants' typical levels of anger control in sober and alcohol intoxicated states in a population based sample of Finnish twins and their siblings (N = 4,852). The reported levels of anger control were lower regarding prior alcohol intoxicated states than sober states. A three-way interaction between alcohol consumption, trait anger and anger control was found. Whereas no interaction between alcohol consumption and trait anger was found in the self-reported sober state, there was an interactive effect of trait anger and alcohol consumption on anger control in the intoxicated state, indicating that the difference in anger control between those with high levels of alcohol consumption and those with low levels, was greater at higher levels of trait anger. Women had lower levels of anger control than men, but the relationship between trait anger, alcohol consumption and anger control was similar for both genders. In conclusion, the results showed that those with high levels of trait anger and alcohol consumption showed the lowest levels of anger control in self-reported alcohol intoxicated states, and indicate the importance of separating between anger control when sober and intoxicated since anger control seems to be differently related to at least trait anger and alcohol consumption in these states.     

Oh, it's you again: memory interference from irrelevant emotional and neutral faces

In two experiments, repeated runs of a continuous recognition task were employed to assess healthy participants' ability to handle interference from irrelevant emotional and neutral memories. Presumably, such interference can be due to salience from either emotional or mnemonic processing. In both experiments, participants made more false alarms to emotional faces that were familiar from preceding runs (i.e., emotion-induced temporal-context confusion). Participants performed well for neutral faces in the first experiment including only two runs. However, increasing the number of runs to four in the second experiment induced temporal context confusion also for neutral faces. The findings suggest that memory interference can be induced when the salience of irrelevant information is erroneously considered diagnostic for memory judgements.