Stability in the metamemory realism of eyewitness confidence judgments

The stability of eyewitness confidence judgments over time in regard to their reported memory and accuracy of these judgments is of interest in forensic contexts because witnesses are often interviewed many times. The present study investigated the stability of the confidence judgments of memory reports of a witnessed event and of the accuracy of these judgments over three occasions, each separated by 1 week. Three age groups were studied: younger children (8–9 years), older children (10–11 years), and adults (19–31 years). A total of 93 participants viewed a short film clip and were asked to answer directed two-alternative forced-choice questions about the film clip and to confidence judge each answer. Different questions about details in the film clip were used on each of the three test occasions. Confidence as such did not exhibit stability over time on an individual basis. However, the difference between confidence and proportion correct did exhibit stability across time, in terms of both over/underconfidence and calibration. With respect to age, the adults and older children exhibited more stability than the younger children for calibration. Furthermore, some support for instability was found with respect to the difference between the average confidence level for correct and incorrect answers (slope). Unexpectedly, however, the younger children’s slope was found to be more stable than the adults. Compared to the previous research, the present study’s use of more advanced statistical methods provides a more nuanced understanding of the stability of confidence judgments in the eyewitness reports of children and adults.     

The effect of variations of emotional expressions on mnemonic discrimination and traditional recognition memory

Face recognition occurs when a face is recognised despite changes between learning and test exposures. Yet there has been relatively little research on how variations in emotional expressions influence people’s ability to recognise these changes. We evaluated the ability to discriminate old and similar expressions of emotions (i.e. mnemonic discrimination) of the same face, as well as the discrimination ability between old and dissimilar (new) expressions of the same face, reflecting traditional discrimination. An emotional mnemonic discrimination task with morphed faces that were similar but not identical to the original face was used. Results showed greater mnemonic discrimination for learned neutral expressions that at test became slightly more fearful rather than happy. For traditional discrimination, there was greater accuracy for learned happy faces becoming fearful, rather than those changing from fearful-to-happy. These findings indicate that emotional expressions may have asymmetrical influences on mnemonic and traditional discrimination of the same face.     

Increased realism in eyewitness confidence judgements: the effect of dyadic collaboration

This study investigated to what extent, and under what circumstances, pair collaboration influences the realism in eyewitness confidence in event memory. The participants first saw a short film clip and then confidence rated their answers to questions on its content. A condition (the Individual–Pair condition) where individual effort preceded pair collaboration showed better calibration compared with a condition (the Simple Pair condition) where no individual effort took place. Furthermore, within the Individual–Pair condition, better calibration, and lower overconfidence, were found in the pair phase compared with the individual phase. The eyewitnesses in the Individual–Pair condition made more realistic judgements of the total number of questions answered correctly. In a control experiment no effect on realism in confidence was found when individuals performed the same task twice. The improved realism in the Individual–Pair condition may partly be explained in terms of the increased accuracy and lowered confidence found for such items where the pair members' had given different answers in the individual phase, and by a risky shift effect for such items where they had given the same answer. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson

A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.     

Suppression-induced forgetting diminishes following a delay of either sleep or wake

ABSTRACT

We investigated the duration of suppression-induced forgetting (SIF), and the extent to which retrieval suppression differs between negative and neutral memories. We further examined if SIF was differently affected by sleep versus wake during the delay interval between retrieval suppression and re-test. Fifty participants first learned to associate neutral words with either neutral or negative images. Then, a subset of the words was shown again, and participants were asked to either recall (Think), or to suppress retrieval of (No-Think) the associated images. Finally, a memory test for all items was performed either immediately after the Think/No-Think (T/NT) phase (No Delay), or after a 3.5?h delay interval containing either sleep or wake. Results revealed a SIF effect only in the No Delay group, indicating that this forgetting effect dissipates already after a 3.5?h delay interval. Negative items were experienced as more intrusive than neutral ones during the T/NT phase.