Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects

Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605–626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1–25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks.     

Researching mind wandering from a first‐person perspective

Mind wandering is an inherently inner (or first‐person) phenomenon that leaves few direct traces for third‐person enquiry. Nonetheless, psychologists often study mind wandering using third‐person (e.g., behavioral or neuronal) research methods. And although research–participants may well be asked to introspect on their mind wandering experiences (e.g., via experience‐sampling or think‐aloud techniques), such introspective self‐observations typically lack methodological rigor and are hence of only preliminary value. Here, we argue that it is a missed opportunity to not train researchers to introspect on their own mind‐wandering experiences to better understand the associated mental processes. We propose a novel approach to cultivating an educated form of introspection in the study of attentional focusing and mind wandering. Our research adds to the current theoretical understanding by explicating conditions that facilitate mind wandering (e.g., the shifting and broadening of concepts) and help find the way back to the primary task (e.g., commitment; deliberate shifts between focusing and defocusing).     

The Regression Trap and Other Pitfalls of Replication Science—Illustrated by the Report of the Open Science Collaboration

The Open Science Collaboration’s 2015 Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science, 349, aac4716. doi:10.1126/science.aac4716[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] report suggests that replication effect sizes in psychology are modest. However, closer inspection reveals serious problems. When plotting replication effects are against original effects, the regression trap is lurking: Expecting replication effects to be equally strong as original effects is logically unwarranted; they are inevitably subject to regressive shrinkage. To control for regression, the reliability of original and replication studies must be taken into account. Further problems arise from missing manipulation checks and sampling biases. Our critical comment highlights the need for replication science to live up to the same methodological scrutiny as other research.