Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy in the Treatment of Adult Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse

This study investigated the effectiveness of Rational-emotive behavior therapy in the treatment of adult victims of childhood sexual abuse. A sample of 42 women, seeking help for their psychological distress associated with childhood sexual abuse, was selected by means of an assessment interview and the Trauma Sympton Checklist, and randomly assigned to a treatment (n=28) and a delayed treatment control group (n=14). The treatment group participated in 10 weekly sessions of group Rational-emotive behavior therapy and was followed up 8 weeks after termination of treatment. Repeated measurements were obtained by means of the Beck Depression Inventory, State-Trait Anxiety Scale, State-Trait Anger Scale, Guilt Inventory, Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory and Golombok-Rust Inventory of Sexual Satisfaction. Results indicated significant reductions in depression, State anxiety, State anger, State guilt and low self-esteem. These improvements were maintained at follow-up.     

Spreading the sparing: against a limited-capacity account of the attentional blink

The identification of the second of two targets presented in close succession is often impaired—a phenomenon referred to as the attentional blink. Extending earlier work (Di Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, and Enns, in Psychological Research 69:191–200, 2005), the present study shows that increasing the number of targets in the stream can lead to remarkable improvements as long as there are no intervening distractors. In addition, items may even recover from an already induced blink whenever they are preceded by another target. It is shown that limited memory resources contribute to overall performance, but independent of the attentional blink. The findings argue against a limited-capacity account of the blink and suggest a strong role for attentional control processes that may be overzealously applied.     

The role of automaticity in determining the inclination to forgive close others

Hitherto, the literature on forgiveness has almost exclusively focused on the role of deliberative processes (e.g., attribution processes) in determining forgiveness. However, in the present article, we argue that in the context of close relationships, the inclination to forgive can be relatively automatically evoked in response to an offense. Four studies provide evidence relevant to this general hypothesis. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that the subliminal presentation of close others (versus non-close others or a control word) induces a relatively strong inclination to forgive various offenses. Study 3 provides insight into the cognitive processes that underlie the closeness-forgiveness link, demonstrating that thinking of (a transgression of) a close other (compared to a non-close other) leads to enhanced accessibility of the construct of forgiveness. Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that forgiving responses toward a close offender are less dependent on cognitive resources than are forgiving responses toward a non-close offender, suggesting that, in close relationships, the inclination to forgive arises in a relatively effortless, habitual manner. Implications for theorizing on how people forgive are being discussed.     

How Not to Criticise Scientism

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.     

On the biomedicalization of alcoholism

The shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism from a moral paradigm towards a biomedical paradigm is often characterized as a form of biomedicalization. We will examine and critique three reasons offered for the claim that viewing alcoholism as a disease is morally problematic. The first is that the new conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease will lead to individualization, e.g., a too narrow focus on the individual person, excluding cultural and social dimensions of alcoholism. The second claim is that biomedicalization will lead to stigmatization and discrimination for both alcoholics and people who are at risk of becoming alcoholics. The third claim is that as a result of the biomedical point of view, the autonomy and responsibility of alcoholics and possibly even persons at risk may be unjustly restricted. Our conclusion is that the claims against the biomedical conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease are neither specific nor convincing. Not only do some of these concerns also apply to the traditional moral model; above that they are not strong enough to justify the rejection of the new biomedical model altogether. The focus in the scientific and public debate should not be on some massive “biomedicalization objection” but on the various concerns underlying what is framed in terms of the biomedicalization of alcoholism.     

Goodness, Values, Reasons

Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.     

Investigating latent constructs with item response models: A MATLAB IRTm toolbox

Item response theory (IRT) models are the central tools in modern measurement and advanced psychometrics. We offer a MATLAB IRT modeling (IRTm) toolbox that is freely available and that follows an explicit design matrix approach, giving the end user control and flexibility in building a model that goes beyond standard models, such as the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) and the two-parameter logistic model. As such, IRTm allows for a large variety of unidimensional IRT models for binary responses, the incorporation of additional person and item information, and deviations from common model assumptions. An exclusive key feature of the toolbox is the inclusion of copula IRT models to handle local item dependencies. Two appendixes for this report, containing example code and information on the general copula IRT in IRTm, may be downloaded from brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Everything Else Being Equal: A Modal Logic for <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris Paribus</Emphasis> Preferences

This paper presents a new modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences understood in the sense of “all other things being equal”. This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von Wright in the early 1960’s and has returned in computer science in the 1990’s and in more abstract “dependency logics” today. We show how it differs from ceteris paribus as “all other things being normal”, which is used in contexts with preference defeaters. We provide a semantic analysis and several completeness theorems. We show how our system links up with Von Wright’s work, and how it applies to game-theoretic solution concepts, to agenda setting in investigation, and to preference change. We finally consider its relation with infinitary modal logics.