Money Pumps,Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy

In an alleged counter‐example to the completeness of rational preferences, a career as a clarinettist is compared with a career in law. It seems reasonable to neither want to judge that the law career is at least as preferred as the clarinet career nor want to judge that the clarinet career is at least as preferred as the law career. The two standard interpretations of examples of this kind are, first, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete and, second, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate. In this paper, I shall argue that the difference between these interpretations is crucial for the money‐pump argument for transitivity, which is the standard argument that rational preferences are transitive. I shall argue that the money‐pump argument for transitivity fails if preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete but that it works if preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate and rationally required to be complete.     

What is "marked" in visual marking? Evidence for effects of configuration in preview search

Visual search for a conjunction target is facilitated when distractor sets are segmented over time: the preview benefit Watson and Humphreys (1997) suggested that this benefit involved inhibition of old items (visual marking, VM). We investigated whether the preview benefit is sensitive to the configuration of the old distractors. Old distractors changed their location prior to the occurrence of the new items, while also either changing or maintaining their configuration. Configuration changes disrupted search. The results are consistent with object-based VM, which is sensitive to the configuration of old stimuli.     

A computer simulation of the argument from disagreement

In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006).     

Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.     

Opposing effects of phonological similarity on item and order memory of words and nonwords in the serial recall task

This study shows that the classical phonological similarity effect (PSE) in immediate serial recall is critically affected by the lexicality of list items, the type of phonological similarity involved, and the scoring procedure. PSE was present in the serial recall score when phonologically distinct words were compared to words that share the middle vowel and end consonant (rhyming lists). PSE was absent in the serial recall score when phonologically distinct words were compared to words that share the initial and final consonants (consonant frame lists). There was a reversal of PSE in serial recall of nonwords when comparing distinct lists to both types of similar lists. Recall accuracy on the other hand was higher for distinct lists regardless of lexicality. Item errors dominated in relation to order errors in the case of nonwords, whereas order errors dominated in relation to item errors in the case of words. Furthermore, order errors were more common for phonologically similar lists, whereas item errors were more common for phonologically distinct lists. This may be the result of intra-list and inter-list interference, respectively. The dominance of the former error type may cause a classical PSE, whereas the dominance of the latter error type may cause a reversal of PSE. Finally, an item identification task yielded no evidence of an association between intra-list interference and discriminability of items in a list.     

Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition

Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.     

Timing of Stressful Life Events Affects Stability and Change of Neuroticism

Neuroticism is a predictor of many health problems. To study the determinants of within‐subject change in neuroticism, three hypotheses were tested: (i) subjects who experienced stressful life events (SLEs) show an increase in neuroticism; (ii) high baseline neuroticism moderated this effect; and (iii) recent SLEs had a greater impact on neuroticism than distant SLEs. Data came from the Finnish Twin Cohort. Neuroticism data were collected in 1975 and 1981 and SLEs data in 1981 (n = 21 085). By entering baseline neuroticism as a predictor for neuroticism at follow‐up, the outcome measure was change in neuroticism. Changes in neuroticism were predicted from SLE indices or their interaction with baseline neuroticism. Timing of SLEs was taken into account by distinguishing recent from distant SLEs. To control for confounding by shared genes and environments, both within‐twin pair and between‐twin pair effects were tested for monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs separately. Neuroticism's six‐year stability was high (r = .58, p < .001). Exposure to SLEs modestly increased neuroticism (βs > .55, ps < .001), unconfounded by shared genes. This effect was not moderated by high baseline neuroticism. Recent SLEs (.09 < βs < .15) had more impact than distant SLEs (.03 < βs < .11; ps < .01). In conclusion, the findings strongly supported a model of environmentally driven SLEs causing dynamic fluctuations around a person's set point of neuroticism. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Latent class analysis of anxiety and depressive symptoms of the Youth Self-Report in a general population sample of young adolescents

This study examined whether distinct groups of young adolescents with mainly anxiety or mainly depression could be identified in a general population sample. Latent class analysis was used on self-report ratings of DSM-IV symptoms of anxiety and depressive disorders, because it was hypothesized that these ratings provide a bigger chance to identify distinct groups than parent ratings of symptoms that are poorly associated with DSM-IV. Results from exploratory and confirmatory latent class analysis showed that only very small numbers of young adolescents had mainly anxiety or mainly depressive symptoms. Instead, a five-group model fitted the data best. These five groups contained young adolescents who either had a high, intermediate, or low probability to have comorbid symptoms of anxiety and depression. It was concluded that symptoms of DSM-IV anxiety and depressive disorders co-occur in young adolescents, and that latent class analysis on items that capture also severe symptoms like suicidal thoughts are needed to derive groups with specific comorbidity patterns in a general population sample.     

Is it impossible to inhibit isoluminant items, or does it simply take longer? Evidence from preview search

Visual search can be facilitated when participants receive a preview of half the distractors (the preview benefit in search; Watson & Humphreys, 1997). Donk and Theeuwes (2001) have argued that preview-based benefits are abolished if the display items are isoluminant to a background. This is consistent with the preview benefit being due to onset capture by the new stimuli. In contrast, the present experiments challenge this suggestion and show that preview benefits can occur under isoluminant conditions, providing that they are given enough time to occur. In Experiment 1, we showed that a preview benefit can occur even with isoluminant stimuli, provided that the old items are previewed for a sufficient time. In Experiment 2, we tested and rejected the idea that this advantage is due to low-level sensory fatigue for the preview stimuli. These findings indicate that the preview effect is not caused solely by onset capture.