Incidental regulation of attraction: the neural basis of the derogation of attractive alternatives in romantic relationships

Although a great deal of research addresses the neural basis of deliberate and intentional emotion-regulation strategies, less attention has been paid to the neural mechanisms involved in implicit forms of emotion regulation. Behavioural research suggests that romantically involved participants implicitly derogate the attractiveness of alternative partners, and the present study sought to examine the neural basis of this effect. Romantically committed participants in the present study were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while indicating whether they would consider each of a series of attractive (or unattractive) opposite-sex others as a hypothetical dating partner both while under cognitive load and no cognitive load. Successful derogation of attractive others during the no cognitive load compared to the cognitive load trials corresponded with increased activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (pDMPFC), and decreased activation in the ventral striatum, a pattern similar to those reported in deliberate emotion-regulation studies. Activation in the VLPFC and pDMPFC was not significant in the cognitive load condition, indicating that while the derogation effect may be implicit, it nonetheless requires cognitive resources. Additionally, activation in the right VLPFC correlated with participants' level of relationship investment. These findings suggest that the RVLPFC may play a particularly important role in implicitly regulating the emotions that threaten the stability of a romantic relationship.     

On Scientific Ontology: Reply to Tambassi

Axiomathes - Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between (empirical) science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can...     

Networks of happiness: applying a Network Approach to Well-Being in the General Population

Journal of Happiness Studies - Even though well-being can be seen as a multidimensional construct, made up of a variety of interacting aspects, most studies examine total scores on well-being...     

Maternal and paternal infant representations: A comparison between parents of term and preterm infants

Objective

Research on parental attachment representations after preterm birth is limited and inconclusive. The present study is the first in which maternal and paternal attachment representations after term, moderately and very preterm birth are compared. In addition, special attention was directed toward disrupted attachment representations.

Method

Mothers and fathers of term infants (≥37 weeks of gestational age, n = 71), moderately preterm infants (≥32–37 weeks of gestational age, n = 62) and very preterm infants (<32 weeks of gestational age, n = 56) participated in the present study. Attachment representations (balanced, disengaged, distorted) about their infants were evaluated with the Working Model of the Child Interview (WMCI). To asses disrupted representations the coding of the WMCI was extended with the disrupted scale (WMCI-D).

Results

The three main classifications of attachment representations were not affected by preterm birth. In addition, there were no gender differences in the rate of balanced representations. In case of non-balanced representations however, maternal representations were more often distorted, whereas fathers showed more often disengaged representations. Results further revealed that maternal disrupted attachment representations were marked by role/boundary confusion or disorientation, whereas paternal disrupted attachment representations were characterized by withdrawal.

Conclusion

Given the gender differences it is essential to tailor interventions according to the attachment representations of the parent, in order to be able to alter their non-balanced and/or disrupted attachment representations.     

THE IMAGO DEI AS A WORK IN PROGRESS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM PALEOANTHROPOLOGY

This article considers the imago Dei from the perspective of paleoanthropology. We identify structural, functional, and relational elements of the imago Dei that emerged mosaically during human evolution. Humans are unique in their ability to relate to each other and to God, and in their membership of cultural communities where shared attention, the transmission of moral norms, and symbolic behavior are important elements. We discuss similarities between our approach and the concept of theosis adopted in the Eastern Orthodox Church.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

Timing of Stressful Life Events Affects Stability and Change of Neuroticism

Neuroticism is a predictor of many health problems. To study the determinants of within‐subject change in neuroticism, three hypotheses were tested: (i) subjects who experienced stressful life events (SLEs) show an increase in neuroticism; (ii) high baseline neuroticism moderated this effect; and (iii) recent SLEs had a greater impact on neuroticism than distant SLEs. Data came from the Finnish Twin Cohort. Neuroticism data were collected in 1975 and 1981 and SLEs data in 1981 (n = 21 085). By entering baseline neuroticism as a predictor for neuroticism at follow‐up, the outcome measure was change in neuroticism. Changes in neuroticism were predicted from SLE indices or their interaction with baseline neuroticism. Timing of SLEs was taken into account by distinguishing recent from distant SLEs. To control for confounding by shared genes and environments, both within‐twin pair and between‐twin pair effects were tested for monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs separately. Neuroticism's six‐year stability was high (r = .58, p < .001). Exposure to SLEs modestly increased neuroticism (βs > .55, ps < .001), unconfounded by shared genes. This effect was not moderated by high baseline neuroticism. Recent SLEs (.09 < βs < .15) had more impact than distant SLEs (.03 < βs < .11; ps < .01). In conclusion, the findings strongly supported a model of environmentally driven SLEs causing dynamic fluctuations around a person's set point of neuroticism. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.     

Emotional responses to behavioral economic incentives for health behavior change

Many people aim to change their lifestyle, but have trouble acting on their intentions. Behavioral economic incentives and related emotions can support commitment to personal health goals, but the related emotions remain unexplored. In a regret lottery, winners who do not attain their health goals do not get their prize but receive feedback on what their forgone earnings would have been. This counterfactual feedback should provoke anticipated regret and increase commitment to health goals. We explored which emotions were actually expected upon missing out on a prize due to unsuccessful weight loss and which incentive-characteristics influence their likelihood and intensity. Participants reported their expected emotional response after missing out on a prize in one of 12 randomly presented incentive-scenarios, which varied in incentive type, incentive size and deadline distance. Participants primarily reported feeling disappointment, followed by regret. Regret was expected most when losing a lottery prize (vs. a fixed incentive) and intensified with prize size. Multiple features of the participant and the lottery incentive increase the occurrence and intensity of regret. As such, our findings can be helpful in designing behavioral economic incentives that leverage emotions to support health behavior change.