Goodness, Values, Reasons

Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.     

On the biomedicalization of alcoholism

The shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism from a moral paradigm towards a biomedical paradigm is often characterized as a form of biomedicalization. We will examine and critique three reasons offered for the claim that viewing alcoholism as a disease is morally problematic. The first is that the new conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease will lead to individualization, e.g., a too narrow focus on the individual person, excluding cultural and social dimensions of alcoholism. The second claim is that biomedicalization will lead to stigmatization and discrimination for both alcoholics and people who are at risk of becoming alcoholics. The third claim is that as a result of the biomedical point of view, the autonomy and responsibility of alcoholics and possibly even persons at risk may be unjustly restricted. Our conclusion is that the claims against the biomedical conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease are neither specific nor convincing. Not only do some of these concerns also apply to the traditional moral model; above that they are not strong enough to justify the rejection of the new biomedical model altogether. The focus in the scientific and public debate should not be on some massive “biomedicalization objection” but on the various concerns underlying what is framed in terms of the biomedicalization of alcoholism.     

Investigating latent constructs with item response models: A MATLAB IRTm toolbox

Item response theory (IRT) models are the central tools in modern measurement and advanced psychometrics. We offer a MATLAB IRT modeling (IRTm) toolbox that is freely available and that follows an explicit design matrix approach, giving the end user control and flexibility in building a model that goes beyond standard models, such as the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) and the two-parameter logistic model. As such, IRTm allows for a large variety of unidimensional IRT models for binary responses, the incorporation of additional person and item information, and deviations from common model assumptions. An exclusive key feature of the toolbox is the inclusion of copula IRT models to handle local item dependencies. Two appendixes for this report, containing example code and information on the general copula IRT in IRTm, may be downloaded from brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Using Response Surface Analysis to Interpret the Impact of Parent–Offspring Personality Similarity on Adolescent Externalizing Problems

Personality similarity between parent and offspring has been suggested to play an important role in offspring's development of externalizing problems. Nonetheless, much remains unknown regarding the nature of this association. This study aimed to investigate the effects of parent–offspring similarity at different levels of personality traits, comparing expectations based on evolutionary and goodness‐of‐fit perspectives. Two waves of data from the TRAILS study (N = 1587, 53% girls) were used to study parent–offspring similarity at different levels of personality traits at age 16 predicting externalizing problems at age 19. Polynomial regression analyses and Response Surface Analyses were used to disentangle effects of different levels and combinations of parents and offspring personality similarity. Although several facets of the offspring's personality had an impact on offspring's externalizing problems, few similarity effects were found. Therefore, there is little support for assumptions based on either an evolutionary or a goodness‐of‐fit perspective. Instead, our findings point in the direction that offspring personality, and at similar levels also parent personality might impact the development of externalizing problems during late adolescence. © 2017 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens,colours and cardinals

McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of argument and show that it rests on the assumption that a specific model of justification, the Comparison Model, must apply to all cases of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. We then show that the Comparison Model cannot be applied to McDowell’s new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. As a consequence, McDowell is in need of an alternative model of justification and an alternative argument for conceptualism. We propose such an alternative model of justification based on McDowell’s reading of Sellars, but argue that the model only serves to make the need for an alternative motivation for conceptualism more urgent.     

How Not to Criticise Scientism

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.     

Effects of losing and testosterone upon subsequent behavior in male and female S3 (Tryon Maze Dull) rats

Attempts were made to determine whether modification of agonistic behavior by experience differs in the sexes and if so, whether testosterone is involved in this response. Gonadectomized male and female CPB-S3 (Tryon Maze Dull) rats were treated with testosterone propionate (TP, 250 μg) or vehicle and subjected to tests in which they became either winners or losers. S3 males and females were tested against Long Evans rats to become losers or against Wistar rats to become winners. Subsequently, S3 winners were tested against losers. In addition, winners and losers were tested against naive S3 opponents of the same sex. After varied agonistic experiences, all animals were tested for social preference in a situation in which they could choose between their respective opponents without the possibility of social interaction. Thereafter, they were also exposed to a two-choice passive avoidance learning procedure to see if the behavioral effects of aggressive interactions generalized to nonsocial learning. Males and females reacted differently to winning or losing, the presence of testosterone being a critical factor in the manifestation of this sex difference. Relatively permanent effects on aggressive and other behaviors were only established in TP-treated males. Losing experiences in the social-preference test generally led to a slight preference for naive, less aggressive animals. Testosterone-treated male losers, the group expected to be most vulnerable to generalized inhibition and impairment of learning, did not differ from other categories in the two-choice passive avoidance procedure, although marked differences were observed between the sexes and between testosterone and oil-treated animals.     

Mimicking attractive opposite-sex others: the role of romantic relationship status

Based on the recent literature indicating that nonconscious behavioral mimicry is partly goal directed, three studies examined, and supported, the hypothesis that people who are involved in a romantic relationship nonconsciously mimic an attractive opposite-sex other to a lesser extent than people not involved in a relationship. Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 revealed that romantically involved persons tended to mimic an attractive alternative less to the extent that they were more close to their current partner. Finally, Study 3 provided preliminary support for a potential underlying mechanism, revealing that the effect of relationship status on level of mimicry displayed toward an opposite-sex other is mediated by perceived attractiveness of the opposite-sex other. The present findings suggest that behavioral mimicry serves an implicit self-regulatory function in relationship maintenance. Implications for both the literature on relationship maintenance and the literature on behavioral mimicry are discussed.     

Logic and Reasoning: do the facts matter?

Modern logic is undergoing a cognitive turn, side-stepping Frege’s ‘antipsychologism’. Collaborations between logicians and colleagues in more empirical fields are growing, especially in research on reasoning and information update by intelligent agents. We place this border-crossing research in the context of long-standing contacts between logic and empirical facts, since pure normativity has never been a plausible stance. We also discuss what the fall of Frege’s Wall means for a new agenda of logic as a theory of rational agency, and what might then be a viable understanding of ‘psychologism’ as a friend rather than an enemy of logical theory. Edited by Hannes Leitgeb