Reduced extinction of hippocampal-dependent memories in CPEB knockout mice

CPEB is a sequence-specific RNA binding protein that regulates translation at synapses. In neurons of CPEB knockout mice, synaptic efficacy is reduced. Here, we have performed a battery of behavioral tests and find that relative to wild-type animals, CPEB knockout mice, although similar on many baseline behaviors, have reduced extinction of memories on two hippocampal-dependent tasks. A corresponding microarray analysis reveals that about 0.14% of hippocampal genes have an altered expression in the CPEB knockout mouse. These data suggest that CPEB-dependent local protein synthesis may be an important cellular mechanism underlying extinction of hippocampal-dependent memories.     

An islet of social ability in Asperger Syndrome: judging social attributes from faces

We asked adults with Asperger Syndrome to judge pictorial stimuli in terms of certain social stereotypes to evaluate to what extent they have access to this type of social knowledge. Sixteen adults with Asperger Syndrome and 24 controls, matched for age and intelligence, were presented with sets of faces, bodies and objects, which had to be rated on a 7-point scale in terms of trustworthiness, attractiveness, social status, and age, or, in the case of objects, price. Despite impaired performance on two important aspects of social cognition (second-order mentalizing and face recognition) the social judgements of the individuals with Asperger Syndrome were just as competent and consistent as those of their matched controls, with only one exception: there was a trend for them to be less able to judge the attractiveness of faces if they were the same sex. We explain this difference in terms of a weakness in mentalizing, specifically the ability to take a different point of view: While all other stereotypic attributions could be made from an egocentric point of view, judging the attractiveness of faces of one's own sex requires taking the perspective of someone of the opposite sex, a challenge for people with mentalizing problems. We conclude that individuals with Asperger Syndrome show preserved aspects of social knowledge, as revealed in the attribution of stereotypes to pictures of people. These findings suggest that there are dissociable subcomponents to social cognition and that not all of these are compromised in Asperger Syndrome.     

The role of inhibition in the production of disfluencies

Disfluency is a common occurrence in speech and is generally thought to be related to difficulty in the production system. One unexplored issue is the extent to which inhibition is required to prevent incorrect speech plans from being articulated. Therefore, we examined disfluency production in participants with attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which is linked to deficits in inhibitory function and response suppression (Nigg, 2001). Participants completed a sentence production task in which they were presented with two pictures and a verb and their task was to produce a sentence. If inhibition plays a role in preventing incorrect speech plans, we would expect ADHD participants to produce more repetition and repair disfluencies than would non-ADHD controls. The results showed that one subtype of ADHD (i.e., the combined) produced more repair disfluencies as task demands increased. We conclude that the production system relies on inhibitory control in order to prevent errors in language production.     

Descartes on the Identity of Passion and Action

According to the standard Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of passion and action (I_pa), a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a distinction of reason, and both passion and action are located in the patient. Descartes has recently been interpreted by some scholars to be rejecting I_pa in favor of a view that throws into contention a dualistic interpretation of his philosophy of mind. This article contends that Descartes did hold I_pa, albeit expressed in his own metaphysical vocabulary of substance and mode. On this interpretation, (1) a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a conceptual distinction or distinction of reason and (2) the passion and the action constitute one and the same mode which is locatedin the patient. This result is significant first, because it shows Descartes's retention of a fundamentally Aristotelian understanding of the metaphysical categories of passion and action and second, because it removes some of the support for recent interpretations on which Descartes is seen in the Passions of the Soul to diverge from a dualistic view of mind and body.     

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence,management and nature

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterizing this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925–69, a sectarian form of critical philosophy.     

From the Galleries to the Clinic: Applying Art Museum Lessons to Patient Care

Increasingly, medical educators integrate art-viewing into curricular interventions that teach clinical observation—often with local art museum educators. How can cross-disciplinary collaborators explicitly connect the skills learned in the art museum with those used at the bedside? One approach is for educators to align their pedagogical approach using similar teaching methods in the separate contexts of the galleries and the clinic. We describe two linked pedagogical exercises—Visual Thinking Strategies (VTS) in the museum galleries and observation at the bedside—from “Training the Eye: Improving the Art of Physical Diagnosis,” an elective museum-based course at Harvard Medical School. It is our opinion that while strategic interactions with the visual arts can improve skills, it is essential for students to apply them in a clinical context with faculty support—requiring educators across disciplines to learn from one another.     

Psychological effects of risk glorification in the media: Towards an integrative view

Media contents that glorify risk-taking (e.g., video games that simulate illegal street racing, TV depictions of dangerous extreme sports or stunts) are becoming increasingly popular. Theory and research suggest that risk glorification is associated with risk-taking among the audience. Until recently the evidence was limited in three ways: First, most studies, being correlational, did not permit clear causal inferences. Second, we did not know the strength of the effect of different types of media and different types of risk-taking outcomes. Third, early research did little to isolate the underlying psychological processes that mediate the pernicious effects of risk glorifying media formats. In order to address these open questions we review the results of an experimental programme of research and the findings of a comprehensive meta-analysis. The main findings are that (a) the risky media contents do indeed have causal force; (b) according to our meta-analysis active participation in risk glorifying media interfaces has a larger effect than passive consumption; (c) psychological processes include the priming of risk-related constructs, effects of risk-positive situational heuristic cues, perceived social norms, personal risk habituation, and changes in the recipient's self-concept. To integrate these findings we propose a theoretical framework derived from broad-range socio-cognitive models. We conclude with a discussion of possible directions for future research.     

A Cybernetic Theory of Psychopathology

Abstract

Cybernetics, the study of principles governing goal-directed, self-regulating systems, offers a useful approach to understanding psychopathology or psychological dysfunction, overcoming limitations of other naturalistic approaches. Whereas influential theories of psychopathology have relied on definitions of dysfunction rooted in evolution and fitness, we define psychopathology in terms of cybernetic dysfunction, failure to make progress toward important goals. Cybernetic function in organisms is not identical to evolutionary function, despite their causal phylogenetic relationship. We define psychopathology as persistent failure to move toward one’s goals, due to failure to generate effective new goals, interpretations, or strategies when existing ones prove unsuccessful. This definition allows a thorough integration of dimensional approaches to psychopathology and personality and provides a new perspective on the nosology of mental disorder. We review evidence that the major dimensions of psychopathology correspond to major trait dimensions of personality, but we assert that extremity on these dimensions is neither necessary nor sufficient for psychopathology, which requires cybernetic dysfunction. Drawing from psychological and neurobiological research on personality and psychopathology, we present a theory of the mechanisms underlying the five major dimensions of psychopathology, some of their subdimensions, and the general risk factor for psychopathology. We conclude by discussing implications of our theory for research, diagnosis, and mental health interventions.     

Merleau‐Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction

It is commonly believed that Merleau‐Ponty rejected Husserl's phenomenological reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau‐Ponty rejected what he saw as the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. Contrary to a number of Merleau‐Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the epoché, and Merleau‐Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau‐Ponty's liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signifies a rejection of the epoché. A proper understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology is that, at least in Merleau‐Ponty's eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau‐Ponty accepted Husserl's demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets.