Agency And Consciousness

In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one’s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle’s view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Animalism versus Lockeanism: No Contest

In 'Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy', The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo-Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo-Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo-Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan's new neo-Lockean proposal is inadequate.
email : david.mackie@oriel.oxford.ac.uk