General slowing alone cannot explain age-related search effects: reply to Cerella (1991)

Cerella (1991) has argued that the performance of older adults in the Fisk and Rogers (1991) study is a linear function of the performance of younger adults that is independent of task-specific cognitive requirements. We demonstrate that this is not the case. First, we show that the scatter plot analyses used by Cerella can hide the very task-specific age-related slowing they were designed to reveal. Second, we demonstrate that the percentage of variance explained by such analyses can be misleading. Third, we show that there are reliable differences across tasks in the parameters relating younger and older adults' performance. Finally, we argue that the general, task-independent proportionate slowing that Cerella suggested explains so much of the variance in age-related performance is actually an average slowing that is a function of a relatively small task-independent and a relatively large task-dependent factor.     

Multivariate genetic analysis of specific cognitive abilities in the Colorado adoption project at age 7

A multivariate hierarchical model of specific cognitive abilities was fitted to data from 7-year-old adopted and nonadopted sibling pairs in the Colorado Adoption Project in order to assess differential genetic influence on specific mental abilities. Model fitting results and Schmid-Leiman (Schmid & Leiman, 1957) transformations reveal significant heritable variation for verbal, spatial, and memory factors independent of general cognitive ability for the eight ability tests examined. In contrast, environmental influences are primarily measure-specific. The results suggest genetic effects in middle childhood that differentially influence mental ability scores.     

Soul Healing: A Model of Feminist Therapy

A feminist psychospiritual model of therapy that can be used in working with clients who value the spiritual dimension in their lives is offered. The history, philosophy, and work of Women for a New World, a multidisciplinary team of women representing the areas of psychology, religious education, and the arts is presented. Using examples drawn from the developmental history of our retreat-workshop paradigm and from some of our programs, including a weekend retreat for women and a day of reflection for persons affected by AIDS (including family and friends of those with AIDS), the metaphor of therapy as soul healing is developed.     

The Pinocchio Syndrome: Lying and Its Impact on the Counseling Process

Surprisingly little has been written in the counseling journals on the topic of lying: that is, why some clients consciously choose to be either dishonest with their counselors or deliberately hold back (i.e., keep secrets) important information from their counselors. This article discusses the dynamics of lying and offers suggestions to counselors on how to work with clients who lie.     

The relationship between research and design of AIDS prevention program

The global threat of AIDS requires massive public educational campaigns that employ social and behavioral sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology because sexual behavior possesses a social dimension. Research is concerned with what stimulates behavioral change, what are the prerequisites of learned behavior, and what enables personal control over the environment and future. Educational programs designing strategies for AIDS prevention require social and behavioral science content and input. Interdisciplinary provides general principles with psychological, social, and cultural aspects of human behavior. Without knowledge about psychological processes (thinking, perception, speech, aspects of personality, and interactive behavior) and social processes (economic conditions, social networks, and resources) which are implicated in health problems and also in AIDS, these educational programs cannot produce credible results. These programs and their subsequent implementation require their application in practice in a systemic and consistent fashion. Evaluations are also needed to make sure that the applied processes for behavioral change conform to methodological criteria that ensure their effectiveness. These types of studies are more complex than pure AIDS research which is aimed at finding a cure.     

A social-cognitive,attributional model of personal goals: An empirical evaluation

A model of cognitive and affective antecedents and consequences of personal goals, which integrates constructs from social-cognitive and attribution theories, was examined. Data were gathered before and after course examinations in a large university class. Hierarchical and moderated regression analyses supported the model indicating that (1) relationships between self-efficacy, goals, and performance were positive during repeated trials over 4 1/2 months in a naturally occurring setting; (2) the stability dimension of causal attributions moderated the relationship between goal-performance discrepancies and self-efficacy; and (3) the locus of causality dimension of causal attributions moderated the relationship between goal-performance discrepancies and affective responses.We thank Susan Ashford, Jim Austin, Donald Fedor, Ruth Kanfer, Edwin Locke, Paul Nystrom, Donna Randall, Christina Shalley, Masoud Yasai-Ardekani and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. We also thank Eric Dietenberger for his help with graphics.     

A priori truth

Conclusion There are several epistemic distinctions among truths that I have argued for in this paper. First, there are those truths which holdof every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class A truths). Second, there are those truths which holdin every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class B truths). And finally, there are those truths whose truthvalue status isindependent of the empirical sciences (class C truths). The last category broadly includes statementsabout systems and the statements they contain, as well as statements true by virtue of the rules of language itself.At the risk of anachronism, I'll describe the positions of Carnap (1956); Quine (1980); Grice et al. (1956); the various Putnam's and myself in terms of the above distinctions: both Carnap and Quine (pretty much) think there are no class A or class B truths. Both Putnam (1975) and Putnam (1983c) think there are class A and class B truths, and that these classes overlap. I deny there are class B truths but affirm the existence of class A truths (although I haven't given explicit examples of the latter here). Finally, everyone here but Quine (1980) thinks there are class C truths (of one sort or another). Putnam (1975) attempts to show that certain class C truths are simultaneously class A and class B truths. Grice et al. (1956) take pains to distinguish the claim that there are class C truths from the claim that there are class A truths, and claim (against Quine, 1980) that no argument showing there are no class A truths shows there are no class C truths.On my interpretation of Quine (1980) he thinks that the nonexistence of class A truths shows there are no class C truths-given the extra bit of argument that a notion of true by convention or true by virtue of meaning without epistemic content, is a distinction without significance. But that issue, which is the one Grice et al. (1956) are concerned with, has not been the focus in this paper-and so in a sense I have shifted the terms of the original debate.Here I have been primarily concerned to distinguish epistemic notions and sort out how and in what ways they relate to each other. A primary tool in this exercise has been the explicit recognition that formal models of truth make universality an unlikely property of our conceptual schemes. If I have not convinced anyone that the epistemic notions sort out the way I think they do, I hope at least that some burden-shifting has occurred: that philosophers do not either take it for granted that certain notionsmust be expressible in any conceptual scheme or treat the fact that conceptual schemes must be (in some sense) limited as of little (philosophical) moment.On the other hand, if I am right about the epistemology, it follows that previous attempts to mark out the necessary structures in rationally accessible conceptual schemes via a priori truths is hopeless. What I think must replace their role, what I call globally incorrigible sets of sentences, is a topic for another time.My thanks to Arnold Koslow and Mark Richard for their helpful suggestions. I also want to thank the City University of New York Graduate Center for inviting me to be a visiting scholar academic year 1989–90, during which time this paper was written. While there I was partially supported by a Mellon fellowship from Tufts University, for which I am grateful.