When rock bottom rocks your world: Crisis of belief as a catalyst for change

An experience of severe difficulty can turn the world upside-down, causing individuals to question important beliefs with which they identify. This phenomenon, which we label as Crisis of Belief (COB), amalgamates the disparate conceptualizations of crisis that exist across several subdisciplines of psychology. Unlike existing ideas of crisis, COB distinguishes itself from stress or trauma alone, and is a clearly specified construct that lends itself to practical operationalization and study. Thus, COB addresses a key gap in literature and offers unique value for understanding how hardship that affects closely held beliefs can catalyze change. We conclude by describing the potential utility of COB as a predictor of both positive (e.g., life satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depression) outcomes and the pressing need for a validated measure.     

A longitudinal examination of breadth and intensity of youth activity involvement and successful development

Connections between youth activity involvement and indicators of successful development were examined in a longitudinal high school sample. Drawing on theories of expertise skill development (e.g., J. C?té, 1999); the selection, optimization, and compensation framework (P. B. Baltes, 1997); and theories of positive youth development (e.g., R. M. Lerner, J. B. Almerigi, C. Theokas, & J. Lerner, 2005), reciprocal associations between breadth and intensity of activity involvement and developmental success were explored. Time 1 breadth (but not intensity) and increases in breadth predicted higher levels of successful development at Time 2 (20 months later). Time 1 developmental success and improvements predicted greater Time 2 breadth and intensity. Implications for research and theory related to connections between youth activity involvement and successful development are discussed.     

Changes in ADHD Symptom Endorsement: Preschool to School Age

To investigate endorsement patterns among the 18 DSM-IV symptoms of ADHD in a longitudinal sample of children with and without ADHD (n?=?144), as assessed at ages 4-5, 5-6, and 6-7 years. Symptom endorsements and diagnoses were determined at all time-points via K-SADS-PL interview administered to parents and supplemented by teacher questionnaires and clinician observations. Changes in endorsement patterns over time for each of the 18 DSM-IV symptoms were ascertained. Several symptoms, particularly those of inattention, were infrequently endorsed and of apparently limited diagnostic utility at ages 4-5; hyperactive/impulsive symptoms were more frequently endorsed among young children with ADHD than were inattentive symptoms. However, by ages 6-7, inattention items were somewhat superior at discriminating ADHD from Non-ADHD children. Several DSM-IV and now DSM-V symptoms provide limited diagnostic differentiation prior to school-age, particularly those most commonly observed in the context of formal schooling. Consideration should be made in future iterations of the DSM that account for such developmental and contextual differences.     

On feeling good at work: the role of regulatory mode and passion in psychological adjustment

The major postulate of this work is that regulatory modes influence the type of passion people experience with regard to an activity, which in turn influences their psychological adjustment. Integrating regulatory mode theory and the dualistic model of passion, we hypothesized that locomotion—associated with intrinsic and autonomous motivations—would positively predict harmonious passion, which in turn would enhance workers' psychological adjustment. In contrast, we hypothesized that assessment—associated with extrinsic and non‐autonomous motivations—would positively predict obsessive passion, which in turn would reduce workers' psychological adjustment. Two field studies supported these hypotheses with psychological adjustment measures of stress (Study 1) and burnout (Study 2) in different work contexts.     

Sleep Increases Susceptibility to the Misinformation Effect

When individuals witness an event and are exposed to misleading postevent information, they often incorporate the misleading information into their memory for the original event, a phenomenon known as the misinformation effect. The present study examined the role of sleep in the misinformation effect. Participants (N = 177) witnessed two events; were exposed to misleading postevent information immediately, 12 hours later the same day, 12 hours later the next day, or 24 hours later; and then took a recognition test. All groups demonstrated the misinformation effect, and this effect was larger in groups with an overnight retention interval. Signal detection analyses revealed that sleep decreased sensitivity. These results suggest that sleep increases susceptibility to the misinformation effect, which may occur because sleep results in gist‐based representations of original events or because sleep improves learning of postevent information. Implications for interviewing eyewitnesses are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The misinformation effect is unrelated to the DRM effect with and without a DRM warning

The misinformation and Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigms are used to study forms of false memories. Despite the abundance of research using these two paradigms, few studies have examined the relationship between the errors that arise from them. In the present study, 160 participants completed a misinformation task and two DRM tasks, receiving a warning about the effect before the second DRM task. Participants demonstrated misinformation and DRM effects (with and without the warning), but susceptibility to these forms of false memory were not significantly related across individuals. The DRM warning reduced the DRM effect, and signal detection analysis revealed that the DRM warning reduced a liberal response bias in this task. Sensitivity and response bias in both DRM tasks were not significantly related to these measures in the misinformation task. These findings suggest that these two forms of false memories are not interchangeable and they appear to be the result of different cognitive processes.