Category-specific naming impairments? Yes

Recently, Stewart, Parkin, and Hunkin (1992) have questioned previously reported cases of selective damage in processing items from categories of animate objects, arguing that there has been a lack of adequate control for visual familiarity, visual complexity, and name frequency of the stimuli employed. When re-testing Michelangelo (see Sartori & Job, 1988), one of the patients cited by Stewart et al. (1992), with a set of materials matched on all three factors, the asymmetry in naming animal and artefact items still remains. An analogous pattern is obtained when--in addition to such factors--the visual similarity within the sub-sets of animals and artefacts is taken into account. These results constitute empirical evidence for category-specific impairments and cannot be interpreted as being due to isolated or conjoint effects of visual familiarity, visual complexity, or name frequency.     

Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.     

Schematic information, attention, and memory for places

Recall and recognition of various aspects of three places were studied under incidental and intentional conditions. Data showed that subjects passing through a place incidentally remembered structural features such as walls better than variable features such as furniture. On the other hand, subjects passing through a place knowing they will be tested for memory of its remembered the variable elements better than the structural elements. The results are interpreted in terms of intentionally governed coding.     

On the existence of category-specific impairments. A reply to Parkin and Stewart

Parkin and Stewart (this issue) criticize Sartori, Miozzo, and Job's (this issue) demonstration of a category-specific naming impairment for living things when sets of living and non-living things were matched for familiarity, visual complexity, name frequency, and visual similarity. In this paper we discuss the points raised by Parkin and Stewart and argue that they do not undermine our demonstration of a category-specific impairment.