Hedonic and instrumental motives in anger regulation

What motivates individuals to regulate their emotions? One answer, which has been highlighted in emotion-regulation research, is that individuals are motivated by short-term hedonic goals (e.g., the motivation to feel pleasure). Another answer, however, is that individuals are motivated by instrumental goals (e.g., the motivation to perform certain behaviors). We suggest that both answers have merit. To demonstrate the role instrumental goals may play in emotion regulation, we pitted short-term hedonic motives and instrumental motives against each other, by testing whether individuals were motivated to experience a potentially useful, albeit unpleasant, emotion. We found that (a) individuals preferred activities that would increase their level of anger (but not their level of excitement) when they were anticipating confrontational, but not nonconfrontational, tasks and that (b) anger improved performance in a confrontational, but not a nonconfrontational, task. These findings support a functional view of emotion regulation, and demonstrate that in certain contexts, individuals may choose to experience emotions that are instrumental, despite short-term hedonic costs.     

A comparative study of adolescent risk assessment instruments: predictive and incremental validity

Promising new adolescent risk assessment tools are being incorporated into clinical practice but currently possess limited evidence of predictive validity regarding their individual and/or combined use in risk assessments. The current study compares three structured adolescent risk instruments, Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (YLS/CMI), Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY), and Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV), for both predictive and incremental validity with respect to general and violent recidivism. Receiver operating characteristic and hierarchical logistic regression analyses revealed that the risk tools predicted general and violent recidivism to varying degrees of accuracy, but the SAVRY offered the most in incremental validity. Clinical implications and future directions for youth risk assessment are discussed.     

The latent structure of anxiety sensitivity--revisited

Anxiety sensitivity has been implicated as a risk factor for the development and maintenance of panic and other anxiety disorders. Although researchers have generally assumed that anxiety sensitivity is a dimensional, rather than categorical, variable, recent taxometric research has raised questions concerning the accuracy of this assumption. The present study examined the latent structure of anxiety sensitivity by applying four taxometric procedures (MAXEIG, MAXCOV, MAMBAC, and L-Mode) to data collected from two large nonclinical samples (n = 1,025 and n = 744) using two distinct measures of anxiety sensitivity (Anxiety Sensitivity Profile and Anxiety Sensitivity Index-Revised). In contrast to previous taxometric analyses of anxiety sensitivity, results of the present research provided convergent evidence for a latent anxiety sensitivity dimension. Several potential explanations for the discrepancy between these findings and those of previous research are discussed, as well as the implications of these findings for the conceptualization and measurement of anxiety sensitivity.     

Lack of a close confidant: prevalence and correlates in a medically underserved primary care sample

The present study examined prevalence of lack of a close confidant in a medically underserved primary care sample, and evaluated demographic, medical, and psychological correlates of patients' deficits in close, personal contact. Adult patients (n = 413) reported on confidant status and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Sociodemographic and medical information were obtained through chart review. One-quarter of patients endorsed lack of a close confidant. Past month anxiety and depression symptoms, but not medical status, were associated with unmet socioemotional needs. Implications for primary healthcare interventions are discussed.     

Coloured filters and reading accuracy, comprehension and rate: a placebo-controlled study

Literature suggests that visuoperceptual deficits not normally assessed by eye examinations may be responsible for certain reading disabilities. Previous studies indicate that the use of nonoptical coloured filters may reduce these deficits and improve reading performance. Present research involved 49 participants with visuo-perceptual reading disabilities. Participants were divided into a control group who received no intervention, a placebo group who received filters in a colour complementary to the individual's optimal colour, and an experimental group who received specifically matched coloured filters. At posttest the experimental group reported statistically significantly fewer visual discomfort symptoms. The remainder of the results were, however, inconsistent. Some potential explanations are explored.     

Van Inwagen and the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument

In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however, that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.