Risk perception and acceptance--one process or two? The impact of aspirations on perceived risk and preferences

The experiments discussed here are aimed at determining whether risk perception and risk acceptance are two distinct psychological processes. This study is motivated by the idea of a double-criterion model of choice. In particular, in line with risk-value (R-V) models, in which risk is treated as a primitive, it is tested whether risk is independent of aspirations and whether preferences depend on aspirations. In two experiments, 305 university students were presented with pairs of risky projects and were asked to compare their riskiness and select one. The aspiration level, defined as the target return on the project, was set through an explicit instruction. In Experiment 1, a within-subject designwas applied, and thus aspirations were set at two different levels. In Experiment 2, with a between-subject design, two different aspiration levels were set for each group. The results indicate that risk ordering is insensitive to changes in aspirations, but preferences are sensitive to those changes. This supports distinctness of risk perception and risk acceptance. The findings are discussed in terms of the CPT and SP/A models and the R-V approach. It appears that double-criterion models provide better and psychologically sounder predictions of subjects' preferences.     

Food caching by western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) is sensitive to the conditions at recovery

Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) cached perishable and nonperishable food items, which they could recover after both short and long retention intervals. When perishable items were always degraded at recovery, jays decreased the number of perishable items cached and increased their caching of nonperishable items, relative to a control group whose caches were always fresh at recovery. Jays reduced the number of nonperishable items cached, however, when highly preferred food items were degraded only after the long retention intervals. The findings are discussed in terms of the role of retrospective and prospective processes in the control of caching.     

Letter detection in very familiar texts

In the present study, we investigated whether patterns of letter detection for function and content words in texts are affected by the familiarity of the material being read. In Experiment 1, subjects searched for target letters in sentences that had been rehearsed prior to performing the letter detection on them as well as on unfamiliar sentences. In Experiment 2, subjects searched for target letters in highly familiar verses (e.g., nursery rhymes) and in unfamiliar sentences that were matched to the familiar verses. A disadvantage in letter detection for function as compared with content words consistently found with unfamiliar passages was reduced significantly with the familiar material in both experiments. Specifically, letter detection for content words grew worse in familiar text, but letter detection for function words showed a contrasting modest, though nonsignificant, improvement. The results are consistent with the proposition that in very familiar texts, parafoveal analysis permits the identification of generally less familiar content words. Simultaneously, the normal pattern of weighing the structure and content elements of text changes so that more fixations on function words occur than when one is reading unfamiliar texts.     

The “Circular” Problems of Calculating Risk: Dealing with Consanguinity

An ongoing problem in the genetics clinic is the calculation of inbreeding coefficients and recurrence risks for complex pedigrees, particularly when multiple loops are present. Although the Human Genome Project promises information about more of our genes in the foreseeable future, the actual assignment of disease status to specific loci will continue at a slower pace, so that accurate risk calculations are needed. In the past few months several families with consanguinity were referred to us to confirm the calculations performed by the genetic counselor, and we became aware of some confusion in the field. We present here both (a) a clarification of definitions and concepts and (b) a review of how to perform the calculations, for several quantities (coefficient of relationship, coefficient of inbreeding, coefficient of kinship, and recurrence risk), in complex pedigrees. We discuss the availability of computer algorithms to assist in these calculations, and we encourage counselors to call on a reliable computer program for any but the simplest cases. At the same time, we reiterate our belief that computer algorithms do not relieve the counselor of the responsibility of knowing what to calculate and when.     

Where Does I Stand? Reflections on Home and Identity Ensnared in a Cultural Narrative

In this paper the author explores a cultural narrative that she suggests rests on the concepts of the Feminine and Masculine as such, employing both as though they contain an agreed set of universal givens. These givens are extrapolated from an androcentric perspective on female and male bodies, in particular their biological functions regarding reproduction. The metaphors of the baby-in-womb, mother’s preoccupation with child and heteronormative sexual relations are the primary cyphers for the narrative. She suggests that remaining unconscious of this narrative, such that it is taken as a universal given, can hamper a person’s relation to themselves, the world and others. The author names two concepts, Home and Identity: Home being an hospitable and accommodating space with Identity denoting the one who inhabits the space. In the narrative these two are unhelpfully categorized as belonging to the Feminine and the Masculine respectively. For ease of understanding the author uses a capital letter to designate an abstract idea, and lower case when referring to the concrete or particular. Clinical examples are given throughout the paper to illustrate how acknowledgement and awareness of this narrative might free the analyst or therapist to think more broadly around issues pertaining to space and identity.     

The impact of note taking style and note availability at retrieval on mock jurors’ recall and recognition of trial information

Jurors forget critical trial information and what they do recall can be inaccurate. Jurors’ recall of trial information can be enhanced by permitting them to take notes during a trial onto blank sheets of paper (henceforth called freestyle note taking). A recent innovation is the trial-ordered-notebook (TON) for jurors, which is a notebook containing headings outlining the trial proceedings and which has space beneath each heading for notes. In a direct comparison, TON note takers recalled more trial information than freestyle note takers. This study investigated whether or not note taking improves recall as a result of enhanced encoding or as a result of note access at retrieval. To assess this, mock jurors watched and freely recalled a trial video with one-fifth taking no notes, two-fifths taking freestyle notes and two-fifths using TONs. During retrieval, half of the freestyle and TON note takers could access their notes. Note taking enhanced recall, with the freestyle note takers and TON note takers without note access performing equally as well. Note taking therefore enhances encoding. Recall was greatest for the TON note takers with note access, suggesting a retrieval enhancement unique to this condition. The theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed.     

Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?

I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated.     

Training Pediatric Psychologists for Perinatal Behavioral Health Services in a Pediatric Hospital

Although pediatric hospitals specialize in providing care to children and adolescents, at The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP), our team has been providing behavioral health services for two unique parent populations—parents with a child in the Newborn Infant Intensive Care Unit and pregnant women carrying fetuses with specific birth defects and receiving prenatal care in the Center for Fetal Diagnosis and Treatment. A new training program was developed to expand the scope of pediatric psychologists’ practice to include perinatal behavioral health services, specifically for these two unique parent populations served at CHOP. The program includes direct service provision for adult mental health concerns, as well as education and support to help families cope with the existing medical conditions. This article describes the training program and its implementation as a model of training for other pediatric hospitals. The roles of psychologists embedded in these units and hospital privileges are discussed.