Chairmen, Cocaine, and Car Crashes: The Knobe Effect as an Attribution Error

In this paper, we argue that the so-called Knobe-Effect constitutes an error. There is now a wealth of data confirming that people are highly prone to what has also come to be known as the ‘side-effect effect’. That is, when attributing psychological states—such as intentionality, foreknowledge, and desiring—as well as other agential features—such as causal control—people typically do so to a greater extent when the action under consideration is evaluated negatively. There are a plethora of models attempting to account for this effect. We hold that the central question of interest is whether the effect represents a competence or an error in judgment. We offer a systematic argument for the claim that the burden of proof regarding this question is on the competence theorist. We sketch an account, based on the notion of the reactive attitudes, that can accommodate both the idea that these sorts of judgments are fundamentally normative and that they often constitute errors.     

Twilight of a Dilemma: A Réplique

In light of the nine open peer commentaries, we further explicate the social projection model and highlight its boundaries. We acknowledge that our model—like any extant model—cannot account for all the available empirical data. Yet the model is strong because it explains cooperation in a variety of social dilemmas and experimental games while deploying only one psychological construct as a parameter. Compared with its competitors, the social projection model more openly recognizes the struggle with uncertainty a person caught in a social dilemma must confront. In a series of simulations (and brute math), we show that cooperation can survive when players (humans) stay the Bayesian course.     

The Assessment of Self-Oriented and Socially Prescribed Perfectionism: Subscales Make a Difference

Campbell and Di Paula (2002) Campbell, J. D. and Di Paula, A. 2002. “Perfectionistic self-beliefs: Their relation to personality and goal pursuit”. In Perfectionism, Edited by: Flett, G. L. and Hewitt, P. L. 181–198. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  [Google Scholar] suggested differentiating Perfectionistic Striving and Importance of Being Perfect subscales when measuring self-oriented perfectionism and Others’ High Standards and Conditional Acceptance subscales when measuring socially prescribed perfectionism. In this study, we investigated the utility of this differentiation by analyzing data from 1,041 students and examining correlations with positive striving and maladaptive evaluation concerns aspects of perfectionism and with positive and negative indicators of well-being and psychological adjustment. As expected, (a) Perfectionistic Striving scores showed higher correlations with positive striving aspects of perfectionism and with positive indicators of well-being and adjustment than Importance of Being Perfect scores, and (b) Conditional Acceptance scores showed higher correlations with maladaptive evaluation concerns aspects of perfectionism and with negative indicators of well-being and adjustment than Others’ High Standards scores. The findings indicate that Campbell and Di Paula's differentiation provides for a more detailed and informative assessment of multidimensional perfectionism and its different aspects. Moreover, it provides for new insights into self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism and their relationships and associations.     

Honderich,Davidson, and the question of mental holism

Honderich's defence of aspects of his correlationist theory against many objections actually or likely to be raised today, in particular from the point of view of Davidson's anomalous monism and psychological holism, is accepted as largely successful. But it is suggested that, even if Davidson's theory is wrong‐headed, another kind of holism, more deeply ontological and less linguistic, regarding the mental seems to be true, and presents difficulties for Honderich's correlationism. Finally, it is contended that a panpsychist kind of identity theory escapes his strictures on identity theories and is probably true; however, the identity is, in virtue of certain synthetic necessities about the course of a stream of consciousness, either only between particular mental and physical events (and thus anomalously monist in Davidson's sense), or if it holds also between types of mental and of brain event then certain quite striking consequences follow as to the character of the fullest possible explanation of what goes on in the brain.     

Voluntary Engagement in an Open Web-Based Encyclopedia: Wikipedians and Why They Do It

The online encyclopedia Wikipedia is a highly successful “open content” project, written and maintained completely by volunteers. Little is known, however, about the motivation of these volunteers. Results from an online survey among 106 contributors to the German Wikipedia project are presented. Both motives derived from social sciences (perceived benefits, identification with Wikipedia, etc.) as well as perceived task characteristics (autonomy, skill variety, etc.) were assessed as potential predictors of contributors' satisfaction and self-reported engagement. Satisfaction ratings were particularly determined by perceived benefits, identification with the Wikipedia community, and task characteristics. Engagement was particularly determined by high tolerance for opportunity costs and by task characteristics, the latter effect being partially mediated by intrinsic motivation. Relevant task characteristics for contributors' engagement and satisfaction were perceived autonomy, task significance, skill variety, and feedback. Models from social sciences and work psychology complemented each other by suggesting that favorable task experiences might counter perceived opportunity costs in Wikipedia contributors. Moreover, additional data reported by Wikipedia authors indicate the importance of generativity motives.     

Experimentally Induced Increases in Early Gesture Lead to Increases in Spoken Vocabulary

Differences in vocabulary that children bring with them to school can be traced back to the gestures they produced at the age of 1;2, which, in turn, can be traced back to the gestures their parents produced at the same age (Rowe & Goldin-Meadow, 2009a Rowe, M. L. & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2009a). Differences in early gesture explain SES disparities in child vocabulary size at school entry. Science, 323, 951–953.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We ask here whether child gesture can be experimentally increased and, if so, whether the increases lead to increases in spoken vocabulary. Fifteen children aged 1;5 participated in an 8-week at-home intervention study (6 weekly training sessions plus follow-up 2 weeks later) in which all were exposed to object words, but only some were told to point at the named objects. Before each training session and at follow-up, children interacted naturally with caregivers to establish a baseline against which changes in communication were measured. Children who were told to gesture increased the number of gesture meanings they conveyed, not only during training but also during interactions with caregivers. These experimentally induced increases in gesture led to larger spoken repertoires at follow-up.     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

Uniforms affect the accuracy of children's eyewitness identification decisions

A substantial proportion of line‐up identifications involving child eyewitnesses in the UK are conducted by police officers wearing uniform. This study examined the possibility that wearing a uniform constitutes an authority cue that adversely affects a child's ability to make accurate eyewitness identifications. Sixty participants aged 9–10 years old witnessed a staged crime and were later asked to identify a ‘burglar’ from a simultaneous line‐up using a 2 (uniform: present vs. absent) × 2 (target: present vs. absent) design. Children in the uniform present conditions made significantly more choices than children in the uniform absent conditions. More importantly, in the presence of a uniform, children made significantly more false identifications in target‐absent line‐ups. Analysis of supplementary, identification‐related variables (identification time and confidence, state anxiety) suggested that (1) the children experienced uncertainty if the target was absent from the line‐up, but (2) this uncertainty was not expressed when the line‐up administrator wore a uniform, leading to an increase in false identifications. Implications for line‐up administration procedures for children are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identification of everyday objects on the basis of fragmented outline versions

Although Attneave (1954 Psychological Review 61 183 193) and Biederman (1987 Psychological Review 94 115-147) have argued that curved contour segments are most important in shape perception, Kennedy and Domander (1985 Perception 14 367-370) showed that fragmented object contours are better identifiable when straight segments are shown. We used the set of line drawings published by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 6 174-215), to make outline versions that could be used to investigate this issue with a larger and more heterogeneous stimulus set. Fragments were placed either around the 'salient' points or around the midpoints (points midway between two salient points), creating curved versus relatively straight fragments when the original outline was fragmented (experiment 1), or angular and straight fragments when straight-line versions were fragmented (experiment 2). We manipulated fragment length in each experiment except the last one, in which we presented only selected points (experiment 3). While fragmented versions were on average more identifiable when straight fragments were shown, certain objects were more identifiable when the curved segments or the angles were shown. A tentative explanation of these results is presented in terms of an advantage for straight segments during grouping processes for outlines with high part salience, and an advantage for curved segments during matching processes for outlines with low part salience.