Could positive affect help engineer robot control systems?

Emotions have long been seen as counteracting rational thought, but over the last decades, they have been viewed as adaptive processes to optimize human (but also animal) behaviour. In particular, positive affect appears to be a functional aspect of emotions closely related to that. We argue that positive affect as understood in Kuhl’s PSI model of the human cognitive architecture appears to have an interpretation in state-of-the-art hybrid robot control architectures, which might help tackle some open questions in the field.     

Response specific temporal expectancy: Evidence from a variable foreperiod paradigm

When a stimulus-response event is frequently paired with a specific foreperiod, response performance for this event is improved after this foreperiod. This phenomenon is referred to as specific temporal expectancy. In four experiments, we investigated whether stimulus- or response-related processing benefits from specific temporal expectancy. In a speeded choice reaction task, different features of the imperative stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods in such a way that only in some experiments were the responses also frequently paired with foreperiods. Participants revealed evidence for specific temporal expectancy when responses were frequently paired with foreperiods, but not when only the stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods. We concluded that specific temporal expectancy affects response-related processing.     

Dual representation of item positions in verbal short-term memory: Evidence for two access modes

Memory sets of N=1 ~ 5 digits were exposed sequentially from left-to-right across the screen, followed by N recognition probes. Probes had to be compared to memory list items on identity only (Sternberg task) or conditional on list position. Positions were probed randomly or in left-to-right order. Search functions related probe response times to set size. Random probing led to ramped, “Sternbergian” functions whose intercepts were elevated by the location requirement. Sequential probing led to flat search functions—fast responses unaffected by set size. These results suggested that items in STM could be accessed either by a slow search-on-identity followed by recovery of an associated location tag, or in a single step by following item-to-item links in study order. It is argued that this dual coding of location information occurs spontaneously at study, and that either code can be utilised at retrieval depending on test demands.     

Eye vergence is susceptible to the hollow-face illusion

When an observer looks at a hollow mask of a face, a normal convex face is often perceived [the hollow-face illusion--Gregory 1973, in Illusion in Nature and Art (London: Duckworth) pp 49-96]. We show that in exploring an illusory face, the eyes converge at the illusory and not at the real distances of fixated targets like the tip of the nose. The 'vergence error' appears even though the resulting disparities of the two retinal images of the target provide feedback that would allow an immediate correction. It is presumably the success of recognising a familiar object (a face) which overrides the correction of convergence. This suggests that the brain strives for a congruency of eye vergence and distance perception.     

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. ¹     

The focus of attention in working memory: evidence from a word updating task

Three experiments examined the cognitive costs of item switching within working memory with a novel word updating task, thereby extending previous research to the field of linguistic stimuli and linguistic-graphemic updating operations. In Experiments 1 and 2 costs for switching between working memory items were evident on the word level, and they increased with an increasing word set size (Experiment 2). In contrast, a surprisingly similar switch effect on the level of letters was not affected by word set size (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that this effect is not simply based on the need for re-orienting visual spatial attention. To account for the overall picture of results, a recursive model of attentional foci is proposed. Moreover, individual working memory span appears to be associated with the accuracy of item switching, but not with its speed.     

Feelings of Safety: Ironic Consequences of Police Patrolling

Increasing police patrolling is often assumed to be an effective means of enhancing general feelings of safety. This relationship between perceiving police and feelings of safety was tested by having police officers patrol during a field experiment (Study 1) and by manipulating the police presence in pictures of neighborhoods in a laboratory experiment (Study 2). Both studies show that in environments that are generally considered to be safe, feelings of safety are not increased by police presence. Moreover, men feel less safe when police are present compared with when police are absent. The results are discussed in terms of possible underlying mechanisms and implications for police patrolling.     

Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered.     

Perceived superiority in close relationships: why it exists and persists

Two studies used a thought-listing technique to examine perceived superiority, or the inclination to regard one's own relationship as better than (and not as bad as) others' relationships. Consistent with the claim that this is a motivated phenomenon-and motivated in part by strong commitment-Study 1 revealed that (a) tendencies toward perceived superiority and (b) the commitment-superiority link are both strongest given psychologically threatening instructions and weakest given accuracy instructions (control instructions are intermediate). Consistent with the claim that this phenomenon serves a functional purpose, Study 2 revealed that earlier perceived superiority predicts later relationship status (persisted vs. ended) and increases over time in dyadic adjustment. Also, commitment accounts for unique variance in perceived superiority beyond self-esteem.