Eye vergence is susceptible to the hollow-face illusion

When an observer looks at a hollow mask of a face, a normal convex face is often perceived [the hollow-face illusion--Gregory 1973, in Illusion in Nature and Art (London: Duckworth) pp 49-96]. We show that in exploring an illusory face, the eyes converge at the illusory and not at the real distances of fixated targets like the tip of the nose. The 'vergence error' appears even though the resulting disparities of the two retinal images of the target provide feedback that would allow an immediate correction. It is presumably the success of recognising a familiar object (a face) which overrides the correction of convergence. This suggests that the brain strives for a congruency of eye vergence and distance perception.     

The focus of attention in working memory: evidence from a word updating task

Three experiments examined the cognitive costs of item switching within working memory with a novel word updating task, thereby extending previous research to the field of linguistic stimuli and linguistic-graphemic updating operations. In Experiments 1 and 2 costs for switching between working memory items were evident on the word level, and they increased with an increasing word set size (Experiment 2). In contrast, a surprisingly similar switch effect on the level of letters was not affected by word set size (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that this effect is not simply based on the need for re-orienting visual spatial attention. To account for the overall picture of results, a recursive model of attentional foci is proposed. Moreover, individual working memory span appears to be associated with the accuracy of item switching, but not with its speed.     

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. ¹     

Patterns, chunks, and hierarchies in serial reaction-time tasks

The impact of relational structures (i.e., the systematicity of relations between successive items) on incidental sequence learning was investigated in a serial reaction-time (SRT) task while keeping constant the statistical structure. In order to assess the influence of relational structures in stimulus and response sequences separately, the strength of relational patterns in sequences of digits as stimuli and of keystrokes as responses was orthogonally varied. In Exps. 1 and 2, the variation of relational patterns was mainly effective in the keystroke sequence. In Exp. 2, in addition to the variation of relational patterns, the presentation of stimuli was delayed at serial positions that were incongruent with the relational structure. The results show that these incongruent pauses reduced the learning of strongly structured sequences of keystrokes but improved the learning of weakly structured sequences. Experiment 3 suggests that even higher-order relations between elementary patterns are utilized to accelerate responses. The data are interpreted as evidence for the impact of relational patterns, in addition to statistical redundancies, on the formation of chunks. Reasons are discussed for the finding that relational chunking was more pronounced in the keystroke than in the digit sequences. Received: 25 June 1998 / Accepted: 3 December 1998     

Evidence for task-specific resolution of response conflict

When a target requires different responses to a relevant and to an irrelevant task in a task-switching paradigm, there is response conflict. This target-induced response conflict was combined with conflict caused by a subliminally presented prime presented prior to the target. We found that target-related conflict reduced prime-induced conflict effects within the same trial. However, target-related conflict modified prime-related conflict effects according to the irrelevant stimulus-response (S-R) rule, but not according to the relevant S-R rule. Moreover, trial-to-trial modulations of the target congruency effect were observed in task repetition trials, but not in task switch trials. These results indicate that conflict resolution mechanisms, at least under the present circumstances, operate in a strictly task-specific manner.     

Psychology has to deal with efferences too

The authors argue that F. Mechsner's (2004) perceptual-cognitive approach is an important contribution to the current discussion of motor control. Mechsner presents convincing evidence against direct motor control. Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which perceptual-cognitive representations determine efferent commands must still be clarified.     

Deficits of anticipatory grip force control after damage to peripheral and central sensorimotor systems

Healthy subjects adjust their grip force economically to the weight of a hand-held object. In addition, inertial loads, which arise from arm movements with the grasped object, are anticipated by parallel grip force modulations. Internal forward models have been proposed to predict the consequences of voluntary movements. Anesthesia of the fingers impairs grip force economy but the feedforward character of the grip force/load coupling is preserved. To further analyze the role of sensory input for internal forward models and to characterize the consequences of central nervous system damage for anticipatory grip force control, we measured grip force behavior in neurological patients. We tested a group of stroke patients with varying degrees of impaired fine motor control and sensory loss, a single patient with complete and permanent differentation from all tactile and proprioceptive input, and a group of patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that exclusively impairs the motor system without affecting sensory modalities. Increased grip forces were a common finding in all patients. Sensory deficits were a strong but not the only predictor of impaired grip force economy. The feedforward mode of grip force control was typically preserved in the stroke patients despite their central sensory deficits, but was severely disturbed in the patient with peripheral sensory deafferentation and in a minority of stroke patients. Moderate deficits of feedforward control were also obvious in ALS patients. Thus, the function of the internal forward model and the precision of grip force production may depend on a complex anatomical and functional network of sensory and motor structures and their interaction in time and space.     

Variable action effects: response control by context-specific effect anticipations

The ideomotor principle (IMP) claims that bidirectional associations between actions and their contingent effects are acquired so that voluntary actions are accessed by the anticipation of intended effects. Until now, evidence for the IMP exists only for stable action-effect relations. The present paper explores whether the IMP also holds true for the initiation of actions for which no unconditional contingent action-effect relations exist. Participants responded with left and right key presses in two different contexts. They selected the responses according to the vertical (context A) or horizontal (context B) position of a target. Responses were followed by short/fast movements of the target in context A and comparatively long/slow movements in context B. Consequently, each response produced short and long effects equally often in both contexts. Nevertheless, RTs decreased in contexts with short effects and increased in contexts with long effects. Data confirm that action-effect associations were acquired context-specifically and that the same actions were accessed by different effect anticipations.     

Decision making under internal uncertainty: the case of multiple-choice tests with different scoring rules

This paper assesses framing effects on decision making with internal uncertainty, i.e., partial knowledge, by focusing on examinees' behavior in multiple-choice (MC) tests with different scoring rules. In two experiments participants answered a general-knowledge MC test that consisted of 34 solvable and 6 unsolvable items. Experiment 1 studied two scoring rules involving Positive (only gains) and Negative (only losses) scores. Although answering all items was the dominating strategy for both rules, the results revealed a greater tendency to answer under the Negative scoring rule. These results are in line with the predictions derived from Prospect Theory (PT) [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263]. The second experiment studied two scoring rules, which allowed respondents to exhibit partial knowledge. Under the Inclusion-scoring rule the respondents mark all answers that could be correct, and under the Exclusion-scoring rule they exclude all answers that might be incorrect. As predicted by PT, respondents took more risks under the Inclusion rule than under the Exclusion rule. The results illustrate that the basic process that underlies choice behavior under internal uncertainty and especially the effect of framing is similar to the process of choice under external uncertainty and can be described quite accurately by PT.