Bayesian inference for psychology,part IV: parameter estimation and Bayes factors

In the psychological literature, there are two seemingly different approaches to inference: that from estimation of posterior intervals and that from Bayes factors. We provide an overview of each method and show that a salient difference is the choice of models. The two approaches as commonly practiced can be unified with a certain model specification, now popular in the statistics literature, called spike-and-slab priors. A spike-and-slab prior is a mixture of a null model, the spike, with an effect model, the slab. The estimate of the effect size here is a function of the Bayes factor, showing that estimation and model comparison can be unified. The salient difference is that common Bayes factor approaches provide for privileged consideration of theoretically useful parameter values, such as the value corresponding to the null hypothesis, while estimation approaches do not. Both approaches, either privileging the null or not, are useful depending on the goals of the analyst.     

Subjective Difficulty of Movements With Ongoing Visual Control

Objective difficulty of a single-component visually controlled movement may be defined by Fitts's (1954) Index of Difficulty, which is a measure of difficulty in the sense that movement time is linearly related to the objective measure. For movements that have multiple components, it becomes difficult to determine an objective measure of task difficulty due to unknown interactions between components of the movement and interactions with other factors. Thus, it may be necessary to use indirect methods for allocating a measure of task difficulty. The purpose of the study was to determine whether participants could validly construct a subjective measure of the movement difficulty and whether this measure was related to the known objective measure of difficulty. Experiments showed that for single-component movements, there was a close relationship between measures of subjective and objective difficulty. With two-component visually controlled movements it was found that subjective difficulty could be related to objective difficulty, but not as simply as for single-component tasks.     

On the development of perfectionism in adolescence: Perceived parental expectations predict longitudinal increases in socially prescribed perfectionism

Adolescence is regarded a key period when individual differences in perfectionism develop. Yet, so far only a few longitudinal studies have investigated the development of perfectionism in adolescents. Using a longitudinal correlational design with 381 adolescents aged 15–19 years, the present study investigated whether perceived parental expectations and criticism predicted longitudinal increases in self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism over 7–9 months. Results showed that perceived parental expectations predicted longitudinal increases in socially prescribed perfectionism: Adolescents who perceived that their parents had high expectations of them at Time 1, showed increased socially prescribed perfectionism from Time 1 to Time 2 compared to adolescents who did not perceive their parents having such high expectations. No such effect was found for self-oriented perfectionism. The findings provide supportive evidence for the social expectations model of the development of perfectionism regarding socially prescribed perfectionism, but not self-oriented perfectionism. Implications of this finding for the understanding of the development of perfectionism and future studies are discussed.     

Honderich,Davidson, and the question of mental holism

Honderich's defence of aspects of his correlationist theory against many objections actually or likely to be raised today, in particular from the point of view of Davidson's anomalous monism and psychological holism, is accepted as largely successful. But it is suggested that, even if Davidson's theory is wrong‐headed, another kind of holism, more deeply ontological and less linguistic, regarding the mental seems to be true, and presents difficulties for Honderich's correlationism. Finally, it is contended that a panpsychist kind of identity theory escapes his strictures on identity theories and is probably true; however, the identity is, in virtue of certain synthetic necessities about the course of a stream of consciousness, either only between particular mental and physical events (and thus anomalously monist in Davidson's sense), or if it holds also between types of mental and of brain event then certain quite striking consequences follow as to the character of the fullest possible explanation of what goes on in the brain.     

Application of the rubber hand illusion paradigm: comparison between upper and lower limbs

The “rubber hand illusion (RHI)” is a perceptual illusion, which allows the integration of artificial limbs into the body representation of a person by means of combined visual and tactile stimulation. The illusion has been frequently replicated but always concerning the upper limbs. The present study verified an analog illusion that can be called the “rubber foot illusion” (RFI). In a conjoint experiment using both a rubber hand and a rubber foot, brushstrokes were applied to the respective real and rubber limb placed alongside the real one. However, only the artificial limb’s handling was visible. The brushstrokes were given either synchronously, with a delay of ±0.5 s, or without tactile stimulation of the real limb. Questionnaire data and the proprioceptive drift towards the rubber limb (determined by calling on the subjects to show where they locate their unseen limb) defined the illusion strength. Results revealed that the illusion was induced in both limbs with comparable strength, but only in the synchronous condition.     

Children's voluntary exploration and preference for tactually presented nonsense shapes differing in complexity

This study represents an extension of research on children's response to nonsense shapes varying in complexity to the tactual modality. Wooden cut-out shapes varying in number of turns from 3 to 40 were presented to children at Grades I, III, and VI, both for voluntary haptic exploration, and for preference choices. Both of these measures yielded monotonically increasing functions in the oldest group, while the youngest showed a similar but much flatter gradient for exploration times, and an inverted-U shaped preference function; data for the Third Grade subjects were in both cases intermediate. Supplementary data based on an analysis of preference choice latencies for stimulus pairs of adjacent levels of complexity, as well as on ratings of subject's mode of exploration of the stimuli under both response sets showed a marked shift from a predominantly passive to an increasingly active mode of exploration. These results are related to the age differences for the exploration-time and preference data, and discussed in relation to Schachtel's differentiation between allocentric and autocentric modes of perception.     

Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory

Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a short presentation of Carnap's theory it is then shown that this theory cannot claim validity for arbitrary random processes. It is suggested that the theory be only applied to binomial and multinomial experiments. By application of de Finetti's theorem Carnap's inductive probabilities are interpreted as consecutive probabilities of the Bayesian kind. Through the introduction of a new axiom the decision parameter λ can be determined even if no a priori knowledge is given. Finally, it is demonstrated that the fundamental problem of Wald's decision theory, i.e., the determination of a plausible criterion where no a priori knowledge is available, can be solved for the cases of binomial and multinomial experiments.     

What determines the detection of changes in motion velocity? A comment on Dzhafarov,Sekuler, and Allik (1993)

We comment on a recent model aimed at explaining data on speed of reaction to motion onset and to changes in motion velocity. The model is based on calculating the running variance of the stimulus positions passed during the motion. We show that although the model is successful in explaining data on motion onset and suprathreshold velocity changes, it may not be able to explain data on time of reaction to changes in velocity when these are near the detection threshold.     

Faces as objects of non-expertise: processing of thatcherised faces in congenital prosopagnosia

Congenital prosopagnosia (cPA) is a severe disorder in recognising familiar faces, a human characteristic that is presumably innate, without any macro-spatial brain anomalies. Following the idea that cPA is based on deficits of configural face processing, we used a speeded grotesqueness decision task with thatcherised faces, since the Thatcher illusion can serve as a test of configural disruption (Lewis and Johnston, 1997 Perception 26 225-227). The time needed to report the grotesqueness of a face in relation to orientation showed dissociate patterns between a group of fourteen people with cPA and a group of matched controls: whereas the RTs of controls followed a strong sigmoid function depending on rotation from the upright orientation, the RTs of people with cPA showed a much weaker sigmoid trend approaching a linear function. The latter result is interpreted as a diagnostic sign of impaired configural processing, being the primary cause of the absence of 'face expertise' in prosopagnosia.