Anxiety: The cognitive perspective,by Michael W. Eysenck Hove,UK: Lawrence erlbaum; 1992; 195 pp.

Abstract

The purpose of the study was twofold: To investigate the structure of the test anxiety construct. and to compare the psychometric properties of rating scales versus questionnaire scales of test anxiety.

The intercorrelations among fourteen test anxiety measures, representing the one-, two-and four-dimensional models were examined as well as the correlations between those scales and eight measures of test-related perceptions.

The sample consisted of 172 undergraduate and graduate students of education. The results indicated that the underlying structure of the test anxiety construct consists of four primary factors. It was noted that the pattern of the relationships among the test anxiety measures remained intact when the broader context, which included also test-related perceptions, was studied. Based on the intra- and intercorrelations among the test anxiety and the test-related perceptions, a speculative causal model for explaining the effect of test anxiety on performance was suggested.

The findings regarding the format issue seemed to support the contention that rating scales are at least as valid measures of a simple single trait as questionnaire scales. However, it was stressed that further research is needed in order to find out whether or not rating scales are robust enough to be considered valid measures in situations that elicit social desirability distortion.     

Performance deficits following failure: Integrating motivational and functional aspects of learned helplessness

Abstract

This paper deals with the psychological processes that mediate between repeated, uncontrollable failure on one task and performance deficits on subsequent tasks. A model is presented that integrates Seligman's (1975) motivational and Kuhl's (1981) functional interpretation of performance deficits following failure. The central assumptions of this model were tested in a laboratory study with college students. In accordance with our model, repeated failure (1) increasingly led to task- and solution-irrelevant cognitive activities (state orientation, according to Kuhl) the more it was attributed to internal, stable, and global causes, and (2) led to an increment in effort the more it was attributed to unstable and specific causes. Furthermore, results indicated that the influence of failure on state orientation was partly mediated by the importance subjects attached to the failure, and that the performance on subsequent tasks was influenced by both the motivational (effort) and functional (state orientation) consequences of failure.     

Books

(Sargant, W. Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brain-Washing. New York: Doubleday, 1957. Pp. 263.) Reviewed by Gladys C. Schwesinger.

(Anastasi, A. Differential Psychology, 3rd Ed. New York: Macmillan, 1958. Pp. 664.) Reviewed by Gladys C. Schwesinger.     

An Inconsistency in the Philebus?

Plato's Philebus contains an intricate difficulty. Plato seems to hold both (a) that all pleasures are processes of becoming, a crucial premise in the argument that no pleasure is good (53c–55c) and (b) that some pleasures contribute in their own right to the goodness of the best life (64c–67b). Since it seems also plausible that only things which are good can contribute to the goodness of the best life in their own right, Plato's view seems to be inconsistent. Interpreters usually reject either (a) or (b). As Plato seems firmly committed to both (a) and (b), I propose a third way of dealing with the inconsistency. The apparent inconsistency highlights a vital contrast between what is independently good (good per se), what is dependently good (good through participating in what is independently good), and what is derivatively good (good through standing in a certain relation to dependent goods). I argue that while pleasure's being a process of becoming marks it out as derivatively good, some kinds of pleasure are also dependent goods in virtue of their objects – irrespective of their being processes of becoming.     

How the brain blinks: towards a neurocognitive model of the attentional blink

When people monitor a visual stream of rapidly presented stimuli for two targets (T1 and T2), they often miss T2 if it falls into a time window of about half a second after T1 onset-the attentional blink (AB). We provide an overview of recent neuroscientific studies devoted to analyze the neural processes underlying the AB and their temporal dynamics. The available evidence points to an attentional network involving temporal, right-parietal and frontal cortex, and suggests that the components of this neural network interact by means of synchronization and stimulus-induced desynchronization in the beta frequency range. We set up a neurocognitive scenario describing how the AB might emerge and why it depends on the presence of masks and the other event(s) the targets are embedded in. The scenario supports the idea that the AB arises from "biased competition", with the top-down bias being generated by parietal-frontal interactions and the competition taking place between stimulus codes in temporal cortex.     

Empirically and clinically useful decision making in psychotherapy: differential predictions with treatment response models

In the delivery of clinical services, outcomes monitoring (i.e., repeated assessments of a patient's response to treatment) can be used to support clinical decision making (i.e., recurrent revisions of outcome expectations on the basis of that response). Outcomes monitoring can be particularly useful in the context of established practice research networks. This article presents a strategy to disaggregate patients into homogeneous subgroups to generate optimal expected treatment response profiles, which can be used to predict and track the progress of patients in different treatment modalities. The study was based on data from 618 diagnostically diverse patients treated with either a cognitive-behavioral treatment protocol (n = 262) or an integrative cognitive-behavioral and interpersonal treatment protocol (n = 356). The validity of expected treatment response models to predict treatment in those 2 protocols for individual patients was evaluated. The ways such a procedure might be used in outpatient centers to learn more about patients, predict treatment response, and improve clinical practice are discussed.     

Unconscious manipulation of free choice in humans

Previous research has shown that subliminally presented stimuli accelerate or delay responses afforded by supraliminally presented stimuli. Our experiments extend these findings by showing that unconscious stimuli even affect free choices between responses. Thus, actions that are phenomenally experienced as freely chosen are influenced without the actor becoming aware of the manipulation. However, the unconscious influence is limited to a response bias, as participants chose the primed response only in up to 60% of the trials. LRP data in free choice trials indicate that the prime was not ineffective in trials in which participants chose the non-primed response as then it delayed performance of the incongruently primed response.     

Comparing continuous and dichotomous scoring of the balanced inventory of desirable responding

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1994) is a widely used instrument to measure the 2 components of social desirability: self-deceptive enhancement and impression management. With respect to scoring of the BIDR, Paulhus (1994) authorized 2 methods, namely continuous scoring (all answers on the continuous answer scale are counted) and dichotomous scoring (only extreme answers are counted). In this article, we report 3 studies with student samples, and continuous and dichotomous scoring of BIDR subscales are compared with respect to reliability, convergent validity, sensitivity to instructional variations, and correlations with personality. Across studies, the scores from continuous scoring (continuous scores) showed higher Cronbach's alphas than those from dichotomous scoring (dichotomous scores). Moreover, continuous scores showed higher convergent correlations with other measures of social desirability and more consistent effects with self-presentation instructions (fake-good vs. fake-bad instructions). Finally, continuous self-deceptive enhancement scores showed higher correlations with those traits of the Five-factor model for which substantial correlations were expected (i.e., Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness). Consequently, these findings indicate that continuous scoring may be preferable to dichotomous scoring when assessing socially desirable responding with the BIDR.     

Unskilled, unaware, or both? The better-than-average heuristic and statistical regression predict errors in estimates of own performance

People who score low on a performance test overestimate their own performance relative to others, whereas high scorers slightly underestimate their own performance. J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999) attributed these asymmetric errors to differences in metacognitive skill. A replication study showed no evidence for mediation effects for any of several candidate variables. Asymmetric errors were expected because of statistical regression and the general better-than-average (BTA) heuristic. Consistent with this parsimonious model, errors were no longer asymmetric when either regression or the BTA effect was statistically removed. In fact, high rather than low performers were more error prone in that they were more likely to neglect their own estimates of the performance of others when predicting how they themselves performed relative to the group.     

The impact of anticipated action effects on action planning

Three experiments with a total of 72 participants investigated the assumption that motor actions are planned in terms of their sensorial effects. Participants had to prepare a certain action A that consistently led to a sensorial effect (a tone of certain pitch). Instead of (in Experiment 1) or before (in Experiments 2 and 3) the execution of the prepared action, another response B had to be carried out, which either resulted in the same or in a different auditory effect (a tone of same or different pitch). It was found that a to-be-executed response B was in general initiated more quickly when it resulted in the same effect as a concurrently prepared response A. The results are considered as evidence for the basic notion that the preparation and initiation even of very simple actions is mediated by an anticipation of their reafferences.