Ruminations and Flow: Why Do People with a More Harmonious Passion Experience Higher Well-Being?

Research shows that harmonious and obsessive passion are positively and negatively linked to well-being respectively (e.g., Vallerand et al. in J Personal 75:505?C534, 2007; Psychol Sport Exerc 9:373?C392, 2008). The present study investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying the different impact of the two types of passion on well-being. A theoretical model involving passion, ruminations, flow experiences, and well-being was tested. Results showed that the more people have a harmonious passion, the more they tend to experience flow in their favorite activity, which in turn predicts higher well-being. Obsessive passion did not seem to be systematically linked to flow in the favorite activity. In contrast, the more people have an obsessive passion, the more they tend to ruminate about their passionate activity while engaging in another activity, which did not seem to be systematically the case for people with a harmonious passion. These ruminations are negatively related to flow experiences in the other activity, which are positively associated with well-being. Flow and ruminations thus seem to contribute to the understanding of the link between passion and well-being.     

Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom

A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the claim that traditional Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which depend for their success on the presence of a perfectly reliable indicator (or prior sign) of what an agent will freely do if left to act on his own, are guilty of begging the question against incompatibilists, since such indicators seem to presuppose a deterministic relation between an agent’s free action and its causal antecedents. Objections of this sort have given rise to considerable efforts to construct alternative Frankfurt-type counterexamples that do not rely on prior signs of this kind and so do not presuppose determinism in a way that incompatibilists should find objectionable. One consequence of this shift in the way Frankfurt-type counterexamples are formulated is that it provides an opportunity for the forceful resurgence of certain versions of the so-called flicker defense of PAP. In this paper I develop two versions of the flicker defense, indicate their advantages over other versions of this strategy, and defend them against objections. Insofar as either of these is successful, it will show not only that PAP has yet to be falsified by any of the modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples currently on offer but that cases of this sort are in principle incapable of falsifying PAP.     

Effective choice in all the symmetric 2 × 2 games

Solution concepts for game play implicitly assume what information is relevant for choosing moves. Maximin and Eliminating Dominated Strategies use payoff order; mixed strategies and Harsanyi??s risk dominance use payoff values. ??Cooperative?? strategies use previous choices, ignoring payoffs altogether. We first define the 12 symmetric 2 × 2 games as a continuous payoff space then use this space to evaluate strategies based on different types of information. Strategic success is shown to be sensitive to actual payoffs and seldom consistent for all games of an ordinally defined category such as Chicken. A new hybrid strategy using both payoff and choice information is introduced and shown to produce efficient outcomes in all symmetric 2 × 2 games when employed by both players. It does well in evolutionary tournaments against strategies of other types, especially in the difficult distribution games including Battle-of-the-Sexes.     

Counting to ten milliseconds: low-anger, but not high-anger, individuals pause following negative evaluations

Low-anger individuals are less reactive, both emotionally and behaviourally, to a large variety of situational primes to anger and aggression. Why this is so, from an affective processing perspective, has been largely conjectural. Four studies (total N=270) sought to link individual differences in anger to tendencies exhibited in basic affective processing tasks. On the basis of motivational factors and considerations, it was hypothesised that negative evaluations would differentially activate a psychological alarm system at low levels of anger, resulting in a pause that should be evident in the speed of making subsequent evaluations. Just such a pattern was evident in all studies. By contrast, high-anger individuals did not pause following their negative evaluations. In relation to this affective processing tendency, at least, dramatically different effects were observed among low- versus high-anger individuals. Implications for the personality-processing literature, theories of trait anger, and fast-acting regulatory processes are discussed.     

Miller (1944) revisited: Movement times in relation to approach and avoidance conflicts

Three experiments (total N = 291) sought to provide support for the idea that avoidance conflicts, relative to approach conflicts, are more difficult to motorically resolve. Conflicts were instantiated by asking individuals to approach desirable stimuli and avoid undesirable stimuli under conditions in which there was no objectively-correct direction of movement. To control for baseline movement speeds, non-conflict trials presented desirable (e.g., reward) and undesirable (e.g., threat) stimuli in the absence of any spatial conflict. In addition, movement times were isolated through the use of a joystick movement paradigm in which movement speeds were quantified subsequent to some initial tendency to move in one direction or the other. Consistent with hypotheses, all experiments found that movement times were slowed in the context of avoidance conflicts relative to approach conflicts. Results are discussed in terms of theories of motivation, affective processing, conflict, and anxiety.     

The Use of Propensity Scores in Mediation Analysis

Mediation analysis uses measures of hypothesized mediating variables to test theory for how a treatment achieves effects on outcomes and to improve subsequent treatments by identifying the most efficient treatment components. Most current mediation analysis methods rely on untested distributional and functional form assumptions for valid conclusions, especially regarding the relation between the mediator and outcome variables. Propensity score methods offer an alternative whereby the propensity score is used to compare individuals in the treatment and control groups who would have had the same value of the mediator had they been assigned to the same treatment condition. This article describes the use of propensity score weighting for mediation with a focus on explicating the underlying assumptions. Propensity scores have the potential to offer an alternative estimation procedure for mediation analysis with alternative assumptions from those of standard mediation analysis. The methods are illustrated investigating the mediational effects of an intervention to improve sense of mastery to reduce depression using data from the Job Search Intervention Study (JOBS II). We find significant treatment effects for those individuals who would have improved sense of mastery when in the treatment condition but no effects for those who would not have improved sense of mastery under treatment.     

Moral principles as moral dispositions

What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena “falling within their scope,” support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary connections” between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or “lawlike” moral generalizations.