A General Method of Empirical Q-matrix Validation

In contrast to unidimensional item response models that postulate a single underlying proficiency, cognitive diagnosis models (CDMs) posit multiple, discrete skills or attributes, thus allowing CDMs to provide a finer-grained assessment of examinees’ test performance. A common component of CDMs for specifying the attributes required for each item is the Q-matrix. Although construction of Q-matrix is typically performed by domain experts, it nonetheless, to a large extent, remains a subjective process, and misspecifications in the Q-matrix, if left unchecked, can have important practical implications. To address this concern, this paper proposes a discrimination index that can be used with a wide class of CDM subsumed by the generalized deterministic input, noisy “and” gate model to empirically validate the Q-matrix specifications by identifying and replacing misspecified entries in the Q-matrix. The rationale for using the index as the basis for a proposed validation method is provided in the form of mathematical proofs to several relevant lemmas and a theorem. The feasibility of the proposed method was examined using simulated data generated under various conditions. The proposed method is illustrated using fraction subtraction data.     

Implicit Attitudes Reflect Associative,Non‐associative,and Non‐attitudinal Processes

It is a common assumption that responses on implicit measures are proxies for automatically activated associations stored in memory. Consequently, explanations for implicit attitude malleability, variability, and prediction have assumed differences in underlying associations. However, a growing body of evidence challenges the assumption that implicit attitude change is driven only by associative processes. This paper reviews evidence from research with the Quadruple Process model on the influence of associative and non‐associative processes on implicit task performance. We also describe recent research on non‐attitudinal processes that do not pertain directly to the attitude object of interest but that, nevertheless, influence implicit task performance. Implications for the interpretation of implicit measures and implicit attitude change are discussed.     

On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View

There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world almost completely, there are hordes of epistemic peers, who disagree with almost any arbitrarily chosen belief had by residents of the actual world. Further, the mere modality of these peers is not itself an epistemic difference-maker. Thus, on the equal-weight view, we should significantly lower the credence we place in most of our beliefs. Surely, this is seriously mistaken. Thus, there are serious considerations that cut against the equal-weight view.     

Does a pear growl? Interference from semantic properties of orthographic neighbors

In this study, we investigated whether semantic properties of a word’s orthographic neighbors are activated during visual word recognition. In two experiments, words were presented with a property that was not true for the word itself. We manipulated whether the property was true for an orthographic neighbor of the word. Our results showed that rejection of the property was slower and less accurate when the property was true for a neighbor than when the property was not true for a neighbor. These findings indicate that semantic information is activated before orthographic processing is finished. The present results are problematic for the links model (Forster, 2006; Forster & Hector, 2002) that was recently proposed in order to bring form-first models of visual word recognition into line with previously reported findings (Forster & Hector, 2002; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Wagenmakers, 2005; Rodd, 2004).     

How do slender mineral crystals resist buckling in biological materials?

Mineral crystals in biological materials such as bone, tooth, and sea shell are susceptible to buckling under compressive loading due to their slender geometry with large aspect ratios. How does nature deal with this problem? This question is especially interesting in view of the three orders of magnitude difference in elastic modulus between protein and mineral. As a first analysis of this question, we study the stability of a single mineral platelet confined in an otherwise perfect protein–mineral nanostructure. We find that there exists a transition of buckling strength from an aspect ratio-dependent regime to a lower threshold value, independent of the crystal geometry. Typical values of the aspect ratio of mineral crystals of bone and nacre fall in this transition region. The existence of a buckling strength independent of the detailed geometrical parameters of mineral may be critically important from the point of view of structure robustness as the composite behaviour of biomaterials should not depend sensitively on small variations in crystal size and shape.     

Modest meta‐philosophical skepticism

Intractable disagreement among philosophers is ubiquitous. An implication of such disagreement is that many philosophers hold false philosophical beliefs (i.e. at most only one party to a dispute can be right). Suppose that we distribute philosophers along a spectrum arranged from philosophers with mostly true philosophical beliefs on one end (high‐reliability), to those with mostly false philosophical beliefs on the other (low‐reliability), and everyone else somewhere in‐between (call this is the reliability spectrum). It is hard to see how philosophers could accurately locate themselves on the reliability spectrum; they are prima facie as well positioned as their peers with respect to philosophical matters (call this the placement problem). In this paper, I argue that the reliability spectrum and placement problem lend support to modest meta‐philosophical skepticism: we have a pro tanto (but not an all‐things‐considered) reason to withhold ascent to philosophical claims.     

Exposure to sexism can decrease implicit gender stereotype bias

Two studies examined the effect of exposure to sexism on implicit gender bias, focusing specifically on stereotypes of men as competent and women as warm. Male and female participants were exposed to sexism or no sexism. In both Experiment 1 (Implicit Association Task; N = 115) and Experiment 2 (Go/No‐go Association Task; N = 167), women who had been exposed to sexist beliefs demonstrated less implicit gender stereotype bias relative to women who were not exposed to sexism. In contrast, exposure to sexism did not influence men's implicit gender stereotype bias. In Experiment 2, process modelling revealed that women's reduction in bias in response to sexism was related to increased accuracy orientation and a tendency to make warmth versus competence judgments. The implications of these findings for current understandings of sexism and its effects on gender stereotypes are discussed.