Interpersonal leveling,independence, and self‐enhancement: a comparison between Denmark and the US,and a relational practice framework for cultural psychology

We argue that the relational model that people use for organizing specific social interactions in any culture determines whether people self‐enhance. Self‐enhancement is not a functional consequence of the (independent or interdependent) cultural model of self. Across three studies, Danes self‐enhanced considerably less than did Americans but were more independent on the Twenty Statements Test, made more individual attributions about social life, made more autonomous scenario choices, and were more independent on the self‐construal scale. Public modesty did not account for these Danish‐American differences in self‐enhancement. However, Danes practiced interpersonal leveling, preferring equality of outcome more than did Americans. This leveling strongly and inversely predicted self‐enhancement within both cultures and mediated Danish‐American differences in self‐enhancement. In contrast, no independence measure systematically predicted self‐enhancement within both cultures nor mediated the cultural differences in self‐enhancement. This dissociation of independence and self‐enhancement demonstrates that self‐enhancing downward social comparisons are not functionally necessary for an independent concept of self. We conclude that social relationships, not the model of the self, mediate the mutual constitution of psyche and culture. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equivocation as a Point of Order

Equivocation, or multiple meaning, is explained through the introduction of an additional response, the distinction, to points of order in formal dialogue objecting to immediate inconsistency.     

The Impact of Breast Cancer Genetic Risk Assessment on Intentions to Perform Cancer Surveillance Behaviors

One hundred and fifty-four women undergoing breast/ovarian cancer genetic risk assessment completed questionnaires at entry into the Cancer Genetic Service for Wales (CGSW) assessment program and following risk provision, mapping the strength of intentions to engage in a number of preventive/surveillance behaviors, including seeing specialists, breast self-examination, and involvement in screening programs, including mammography. A number of potential predictors of intentions were also assessed, including participants' mood and emotional response to receiving risk information, the perceived benefits (in terms of reassurance and early disease detection) of engaging in each preventive behavior, and the perceived desires of their family and General Practitioner. Intentions to self-examine did not change following risk provision, although strength of intentions to engage in some other preventive behaviors did lessen. Family and General Practitioners appeared to be strong social influences on behavioral intentions, as were the perceived benefits of gaining reassurance and/or early detection of disease.     

‘Unlucky’ Gettier Cases

This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti‐luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?     

“We Now Control Our Evolution”: Circumventing Ethical and Logical Cul-de-Sacs of an Anticipated Engineering Revolution

Philosophers, scientists, and other researchers have increasingly characterized humanity as having reached an epistemic and technical stage at which “we can control our own evolution.” Moral–philosophical analysis of this outlook reveals some problems, beginning with the vagueness of “we.” At least four glosses on “we” in the proposition “we, humanity, control our evolution” can be made: “we” is the bundle of all living humans, a leader guiding the combined species, each individual acting severally, or some mixture of these three involving a market interpretation of future evolutionary processes. While all of these glosses have difficulties under philosophical analysis, how we as a species handle our fate via technical developments is all-important. I propose our role herein should be understood as other than controllers of our evolution.