Where sex was, there shall gender be? The dialectics of psychoanalytic gender theory

Psychoanalytic theories of gender identity have come a long way since Freud. The author reviews two dialectics that have shaped psychoanalytic gender theory thus far: first, the tension between theories that emphasize biological versus sociocultural influences on gender, and second, the dialectic between nomothetic (i.e., universalizing) and idiographic (i.e., focusing on individual variation) approaches. The author argues that psychoanalytic gender theory could be further enriched with more attention to two additional dialectics. One involves the so-called gender binary and the relative focus on cultural versus developmental aspects of the binary; a second involves the relationship between gender identity and desire. Attention to these dialectics can help better integrate theoretical and clinical perspectives on gender identity.     

The role of defeat and entrapment in depression, anxiety, and suicide

Defeat and entrapment are psychological constructs that have played a central role in evolutionary accounts of depression. These concepts have since been implicated in theoretical accounts of anxiety disorders and suicidality. The current article reports on a systematic review of the existing research investigating the links among defeat, entrapment, and psychopathology in the domains of depression, suicidality, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other anxiety syndromes. Fifty-one original research articles were identified and critically reviewed. There was strong convergent evidence for a link with depressive symptoms, across a variety of clinical and nonclinical samples. Preliminary support for an association with suicidality was also observed, with effects not readily explainable in terms of comorbid depression. There was strong evidence for an association between defeat and PTSD, although this may have been partly accounted for by comorbid depression. The findings for other anxiety disorders were less consistent. There was, however, evidence that social anxiety in individuals with psychosis may be related to perceptions of entrapment. Overall, there was evidence that perceptions of defeat and entrapment were closely associated with various forms of human psychopathology. These effects were often in the moderate to large range and superseded the impact of other environmental and psychological stressors on psychopathology. We provide a unified theoretical model of how defeat and entrapment may contribute to these different psychopathological conditions. Clinical implications and avenues for future research are discussed.     

Data and phenomena: a restatement and defense

This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.     

The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled

van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’ entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science. The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times. It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it.     

Impulsivity partially mediates the relationship between BIS/BAS and risky health behaviors

Several theorists have suggested that impulsivity can be understood as a joint function of the behavioral approach (BAS) and behavioral inhibition systems (BIS). After resolving questions concerning the measurement of impulsivity and BAS, this study examined the relationships among risky health behaviors, impulsivity, BIS, and BAS. Utilizing a sample of undergraduates (N = 904), a structural model was tested in which BAS and BIS predicted impulsivity, which, in turn, predicted risky behavior. Fit indices were acceptable, but not good. A modified version of the model showed a statistically significant negative relationship between BAS and risky behaviors. However, the fit indices were not unequivocally supportive of the need to include that path. Overall, the data suggest that impulsivity is the joint result of countervailing motivational forces and that it partially or fully mediates the influence of BIS and BAS on risky health behavior.     

Effects of time between trials on rats' and pigeons' choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers

Parallel experiments with rats and pigeons examined reasons for previous findings that in choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not. In both experiments, the animals chose between a standard alternative and an adjusting alternative. A choice of the standard alternative led to a short delay (1 s or 3 s), and then food might or might not be delivered. If food was not delivered, there was an "interlink interval," and then the animal was forced to continue to select the standard alternative until food was delivered. A choice of the adjusting alternative always led to food after a delay that was systematically increased and decreased over trials to estimate an indifference point--a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Under these conditions, the indifference points for both rats and pigeons increased as the interlink interval increased from 0 s to 20 s, indicating decreased preference for the probabilistic reinforcer with longer time between trials. The indifference points from both rats and pigeons were well described by the hyperbolic-decay model. In the last phase of each experiment, the animals were not forced to continue selecting the standard alternative if food was not delivered. Under these conditions, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not, replicating results of previous studies. The differences between the behavior of rats and pigeons appears to be the result of procedural details, not a fundamental difference in how these two species make choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers.     

Discovery,theory change and structural realism

In this paper I consider two accounts of scientific discovery, Robert Hudson’s and Peter Achinstein’s. I assess their relative success and I show that while both approaches are similar in promising ways, and address experimental discoveries well, they could address the concerns of the discovery sceptic more explicitly than they do. I also explore the implications of their inability to address purely theoretical discoveries, such as those often made in mathematical physics. I do so by showing that extending Hudson’s or Achinstein’s account to such cases can sometimes provide a misleading analysis about who ought to be credited as a discoverer. In the final sections of the paper I work out some revisions to the Hudson/Achinstein account by drawing from a so-called structural realist view of theory change. Finally, I show how such a modified account of discovery can answer sceptical critics such as Musgrave or Woolgar without producing misleading analyses about who ought to receive credit as a discoverer in cases from the mathematical sciences. I illustrate the usefulness of this approach by providing an analysis of the case of the discovery of the Casimir effect.