Axiomatizing Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic $$\mathbf {D_2}$$

We outline the rather complicated history of attempts at axiomatizing Ja?kowski’s discussive logic \(\mathbf {D_2}\) and show that some clarity can be had by paying close attention to the language we work with. We then examine the problem of axiomatizing \(\mathbf {D_2}\) in languages involving discussive conjunctions. Specifically, we show that recent attempts by Ciuciura are mistaken. Finally, we present an axiomatization of \(\mathbf {D_2}\) in the language Ja?kowski suggested in his second paper on discussive logic, by following a remark of da Costa and Dubikajtis. We also deal with an interesting variant of \(\mathbf {D_2}\), introduced by Ciuciura, in which negation is also taken to be discussive.     

Leadership Perspectives on Integrating Psychologists into Specialty Care Clinics: An Evolving Paradigm

Integration of health psychologists into specialty care is a shift in the tertiary care construct that addresses all aspects of a patient’s presentation, including psychiatric/social history, psychological well-being, and behavioral contributions to the disease process, assuring both optimal health outcomes and cost-effectiveness in a financially challenging healthcare environment. In this paper, we discuss leadership perspectives (physician and psychologists) on the factors involved in integrating a health psychologist into a busy tertiary care environment. Ultimately, we hope that this information provides a primer on how to frame a proposal for an integrated health psychologist emphasizing the elements important to senior medical leadership and administration. First, we briefly discuss the current payer framework, providing support for integration emphasizing costs and other metrics. Second, we introduce organizational structure models and strategies for integration. Lastly, we will discuss the unique skillset psychologists possess, and additional skills necessary, to be effective in the changing landscape of healthcare. We think this information is important both for leaders attempting to integrate a health psychologist into specialty care and for the early career health psychologist embarking on his/her first senior staff position.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

Sleep quality, sleep propensity and academic performance

We examined associations between measures of sleep propensity on the Epworth Sleepiness Scale, sleep quality on the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index and academic performance by GPA and grades in introductory psychology for 414 students. In the total sample, neither sleep propensity nor sleep quality correlated with GPA or introductory psychology grades. However, among students carrying a full course load, those reporting poor sleep quality performed less well on academic measures than those reporting a better quality of sleep. Further research is needed to assess the moderating influence of overall demands of daytime functioning on the association between sleep quality and academic performance.     

Explanations versus applications: the explanatory power of valuable beliefs

People hold beliefs that vary not only in their perceived truth, but also in their value to the believer--their meaning, relevance, and importance. We argue that a belief's value is determined, at least in part, by its explanatory power. Highly valuable beliefs are those that can uniquely explain and organize a diverse set of observations. Less valuable beliefs, in contrast, are those that can be explained by other observations, or that explain and organize few observations. The results of three experiments are consistent with these hypotheses. These experiments demonstrate that applying either scientific or religious beliefs to explain other observations increases the perceived value of those beliefs, whereas generating explanations for the existence of beliefs decreases their perceived value. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for people's resistance to explaining their own beliefs, for the perceived value of science and religion, and for culture wars between people holding opposing beliefs.     

Effects of adding a second reinforcement alternative: implications for Herrnstein's interpretation of r(e)

Herrnstein's hyperbola describes the relation between response rate and reinforcer rate on variable-interval (VI) schedules. According to Herrnstein's (1970) interpretation, the parameter r(e) represents the reinforcer rate extraneous to the alternative to which the equation is fitted (the target alternative). The hyperbola is based on an assumption that extraneous reinforcer rate remains constant with changes in reinforcer rate on the target alternative (the constant-r(e) assumption) and that matching with no bias and perfect sensitivity occurs between response and reinforcer ratios. In the present experiment, 12 rats pressed levers for food on a series of 10 VI schedules arranged on the target alternative. Across conditions, six VI values and extinction were arranged on a second alternative. Reinforcer rate on the second alternative, r2, negatively covaried with reinforcer rate on the target alternative for five of the six VI values on the second alternative, and significant degrees of bias and undermatching occurred in response ratios. Given covariation of reinforcer rate on the second and target alternatives, the constant-r(e) assumption can be maintained only by assuming that reinforcer rate from unmeasured background sources, rb, covaries with reinforcer rate on the second alternative such that their sum, r(e), remains constant. In a single-schedule arrangement, however, r(e) equals rb and thus rb is assumed to remain constant, forcing a conceptual inconsistency between single- and concurrent-schedule arrangements. Furthermore, although an alternative formulation of the hyperbola can account for variations in bias and sensitivity, the modified equation also is based on the constant-r(e) assumption and therefore suffers from the same logical problem as the hyperbola when reinforcer rate on the second alternative covaries with reinforcer rate on the target alternative.     

Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Education in the Hispanic World: A Response

We concentrate on four questions among the many posed by this special collection of papers on Pragmatism and the Hispanic world. They are, first, what took pragmatism beyond the borders of the United States and into the Hispanic world? Next, what are the ideas of Dewey (or pragmatism) that have had the greatest impact on Hispanic culture? Third, what are the past and present obstacles that has kept the Hispanic world from using pragmatism to deal with many of their educational and social problems? Finally, why does pragmatism still hold great promise and potential for the Hispanic world?     

Implicit contributions of context to recognition

Studies of the impact of context on remembering have not focused on the influence of contextual contingency on subsequent recognition in the condition in which the contingency cannot be verbalized. In two experiments, we analyzed the effect of an implicitly encoded position contingency involving location and semantic category on both hit and false alarm recognition judgments after 1 day and 1 week delays. We vigorously probed for what participants could say about the contingency. We found context effects for both hits and false alarms, whether or not participants could verbalize any knowledge they might have of contingency. These results suggest that people may use contextual information when making a recognition judgment even if they are not aware of this information.