Fancy Justice: Martha Nussbaum on the Political Value of the Novel

Abstract: Martha Nussbaum's Poetic Justice undertakes a defense of the novel by showing it to develop the sympathetic imagination. Three parts of her argument come in for criticism, with implications for other such political defenses. Nussbaum sometimes interprets the imagination practically, sometimes theoretically; the two forms have different effects on deliberation. Nussbaum credits the novelistic tradition with fostering the imagination; her example of Hard Times interferes with establishing this general point. Nussbaum suggests an aesthetic element in literature that produces its effect, but does not succeed in identifying that element so as to preserve the consequences of art while avoiding reductionism.     

Meaning Made of Stress among Veterans Transitioning to College: Examining Unique Associations with Suicide Risk and Life‐Threatening Behavior

Meaning made of stress has been shown to be a unique predictor of mental and physical health. In this study, we examined the unique associations between two facets of meaning made of stress (comprehensibility and footing in the world) and suicide risk and life‐threatening behavior among military veterans who have transitioned to college were examined, controlling for demographic factors, religiousness, combat‐related physical injury, combat exposure, depressive symptoms, and posttraumatic stress symptoms. Findings suggest that comprehensibility (having “made sense” of a stressor) is uniquely associated with lower suicide risk and a lower likelihood of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and engaging in self‐mutilating behaviors.     

Law and Gospel,or the Law of the Gospel? Karl Barth’s Political Theology Compared with Luther and Calvin

This essay is an attempt to understand the significance of Barth's redefinition of the "law/gospel" rubric for political theology. Barth's thought is exposited at length, and illumined by comparison with Luther and Calvin. Luther emphasizes the distance between gospel and the law, distinguishing between serving God in the secular regiment, and serving Christ in the spiritual regiment. He thereby challenges the improper relation of state and church, but does so in a manner that can lead to a passive dualism. Calvin holds that preaching the law to the state includes preaching the gospel; thus, the church has a positive vision against which it can evaluate the state's service to God in Christ. This leads, however, to the danger of a 'clerical guardianship' of the state.
Barth finds a positive connection between the two governments in the fact that both communities are based in Christ, in whom the gospel is their law. This grounds his high view of the state as predecessor to the heavenly kingdom, as well as a prophetic mission of the church to the state. This does not lead to a new Christendom, however, first, because Barth hopes not for a kingdom wrought by human hands, but for the Theocracy of God, and second, because Barth sees the fallen reality of both church and state, the state pagan and violent, and the church a poor witness. In the end, though Barth makes a strong case for supporting theological critique of the state, while avoiding Constantinianism, he is unable to solve the problem of how to connect the gospel and the law in the civil community.     

Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper, we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second‐order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.     

Can Bayesianism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?

Philosophia - Chalmers (Mind, 125, 499–510, 2016), responding to Braun (Mind, 125, 469–497, 2016), continues arguments from Chalmers (Mind, 120, 587–636, 2011a) for the conclusion...     

Books Recently Received

(Neill, A. S. Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing. New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1960.) Reviewed By E. Lakin Phillips.