Revisiting the factor structure of the 12-item Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale – Revised: Evidence for a third component

The 12-item Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale – Revised (DPSS-12) is widely used to assess the tendency for an individual to respond with disgust (i.e., disgust propensity) and how bothered an individual is by the experience of disgust (i.e., disgust sensitivity). However, heterogeneous items included in the DPSS-12 call into question the adequacy of its two-factor structure. The current study examined the factor structure of the DPSS-12 using two large, nonclinical student samples. Exploratory factor analyses revealed three lower order factors: (1) disgust propensity, (2) disgust sensitivity, and (3) self-focused/ruminative disgust. Confirmatory factor analyses supported the three-factor solution and demonstrated that the model fit better than a unidimensional or two-factor model. Further, a modified two-factor model that excluded the third factor provided a better fit than the original two-factor model. Additionally, the third domain explained a significant portion of the total variance, and evidenced a distinctive pattern of association with relevant constructs including obsessional symptoms. These data suggest the need to refine our knowledge about the latent structure of disgust reflected by this measure.     

Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution

This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged (Experiment 1). Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once (Experiment 2). Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to an individual that appeared distinct or distant from other group members than to an individual that was perceived to be similar or proximal to a cohesive group (Experiments 3 and 4). This effect occurred for both human and nonhuman targets, and was driven by the perception of the target as an entitative group member rather than by the knowledge that the target was an entitative group member (Experiment 5).     

Alternative measures of cognitive complexity as predictors of communication performance

Two studies were conducted to compare the predictive validity of the two of the most popular measures of cognitive complexity: Bieri et al.'s (1966) grid-based measure (elicited and provided versions) and Crockett's (1965) Role Category Questionnaire (RCQ). Two other grid-based measures of construct system quality also were included. Criterion measures included indices of the accommodative, person-centered quality of communication behavior and social reasoning in a variety of contexts.

Results of both studies consistently show Crockett's measure to be a significant predictor of all criterion measures. Bieri et al.'s measures were generally unrelated, although the elicited construct version performed best as a predictor. The two measures of complexity were essentially unrelated in both studies. Implications of the findings for future use of the RCQ and grid-based measures of complexity are discussed. For those interested in the relation of constructs and communication behavior, the RCQ is recommended.     

Distraction shrinks space

Research investigating how people remember the distance of paths they walk has shown two apparently conflicting effects of experience during encoding on subsequent distance judgments. By the feature accumulation effect, discrete path features such as turns, houses, or other landmarks cause an increase in remembered distance. By the distractor effect, performance of a concurrent task during path encoding causes a decrease in remembered distance. In this study, we ask the following: What are the conditions that determine whether the feature accumulation or the distractor effect dominates distortions of space? In two experiments, blindfolded participants were guided along two legs of a right triangle while reciting nonsense syllables. On some trials, one of the two legs contained features: horizontally mounted car antennas (gates) that bent out of the way as participants walked past. At the end of the second leg, participants either indicated the remembered path leg lengths using their hands in a ratio estimation task or attempted to walk, unguided, straight back to the beginning. In addition to response mode, visual access to the paths and time between encoding and response were manipulated to determine whether these factors would affect feature accumulation or distractor effects. Path legs with added features were remembered as shorter than those without, but this result was significant only in the haptic response mode data. This finding suggests that when people form spatial memory representations with the intention of navigating in room-scale spaces, interfering with information accumulation substantially distorts spatial memory.     

Real relationship,working alliance,transference/countertransference and outcome in time-limited counseling and psychotherapy

Six client/therapist dyads (three therapists each working with two clients) were studied to determine how the real relationship unfolds over the course of time-limited treatment and how this unfolding relates to the development of the client/therapist working alliance, client transference, and therapist countertransference. We also examined how these indices of the relationship fluctuate as a function of treatment outcome. Results indicate that in general for all six dyads, therapists’ and clients’ ratings of the real relationship and working alliance were strong throughout treatment. However, patterns of real relationship and working alliance over the course of treatment varied between dyads categorized as more vs. less successful. Therapists’ countertransference was low, as was client transference, but differences in ratings were evident when the dyads were classified by outcome.     

A critical review of the “enculturation hypothesis”: the effects of human rearing on great ape social cognition

Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes capacity to engage in true imitation, in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.     

What counts as knowing? The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge of counting from kindergarten through Grade 2

The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge about counting was explored for children in kindergarten, Grade 1, and Grade 2 (N = 255). Conceptual knowledge was assessed by asking children to make judgments about three types of counts modeled by an animated frog: standard (correct) left-to-right counts, incorrect counts, and unusual counts. On incorrect counts, the frog violated the word-object correspondence principle. On unusual counts, the frog violated a conventional but inessential feature of counting, for example, starting in the middle of the array of objects. Procedural knowledge was assessed using speed and accuracy in counting objects. The patterns of change for procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge were different. Counting speed and accuracy (procedural knowledge) improved with grade. In contrast, there was a curvilinear relation between conceptual knowledge and grade that was further moderated by children's numeration skills (as measured by a standardized test); the most skilled children gradually increased their acceptance of unusual counts over grade, whereas the least skilled children decreased their acceptance of these counts. These results have implications for studying conceptual and procedural knowledge about mathematics.