Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles

Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.     

Science-Based Neurorehabilitation: Recommendations for Neurorehabilitation From Basic Science

ABSTRACT

Neuroscience has fundamentally changed the understanding of learning and memory within recent years. Here, the authors discuss a number of specific areas where they believe new understanding of the CNS from basic science is having a fundamental impact on neurorehabilitation and is leading to new therapeutic approaches. These areas have constituted a basis for development of some basic principles for neurorehabilitation: Optimal rehabilitation should involve (a) active (patient) participation in the training, (b) training that does not only involve many repetitions, but also continues to challenge the skill of the training person, (c) motivation and reward, (d) intensive training and practice over a long time, (e) careful organization of the training in relation to other activities, and (f) incorporation of other potentially beneficial parameters such as sleep and diet. It should in this relation also be pointed out that albeit neurorehabilitation may be predicted to have the most optimal effect early in life and as soon after injury as possible, there is no reason to believe that beneficial effects of training may not be obtained late in life or several years after injury.     

Improving precision of ability estimation: Getting more from response times

By considering information about response time (RT) in addition to response accuracy (RA), joint models for RA and RT such as the hierarchical model (van der Linden, 2007) can improve the precision with which ability is estimated over models that only consider RA. The hierarchical model, however, assumes that only the person's speed is informative of ability. This assumption of conditional independence between RT and ability given speed may be violated in practice, and ignores collateral information about ability that may be present in the residual RTs. We propose a posterior predictive check for evaluating the assumption of conditional independence between RT and ability given speed. Furthermore, we propose an extension of the hierarchical model that contains cross-loadings between ability and RT, which enables one to take additional collateral information about ability into account beyond what is possible in the standard hierarchical model. A Bayesian estimation procedure is proposed for the model. Using simulation studies, the performance of the model is evaluated in terms of parameter recovery, and the possible gain in precision over the standard hierarchical model and an RA-only model is considered. The model is applied to data from a high-stakes educational test.     

The Change and Development of Statistical Methods Used in Research Articles in Child Development 1930–2010

The evolution of developmental psychology has been characterized by the use of different quantitative and qualitative methods and procedures. But how does the use of methods and procedures change over time? This study explores the change and development of statistical methods used in articles published in Child Development from 1930 to 2010. The methods used in every article in the first issue of every volume were categorized into four categories. Until 1980 relatively simple statistical methods were used. During the last 30 years there has been an explosive use of more advanced statistical methods employed. The absence of statistical methods or use of simple methods had been eliminated.     

Two Notions of Circularity

Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers failure of transmission but allows for the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then argued that McKinsey’s paradox falls out as a special case of this template for transmission failure. The circularity in play is semantic: the paradox illicitly imports semantically relevant properties of knowledge-individuating sources into the contents of the knowledge states that those sources individuate by instantiating those properties. Importantly, this diagnosis permits the possibility of basic introspective knowledge as propounded by Tyler Burge and other semantic externalists.     

The Meeting Point: Where Language Production and Working Memory Share Resources

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - The interaction between working memory and language processing is widely discussed in cognitive research. However, those studies often explore the...     

Predictive minds in Ouija board sessions

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Ouija board sessions are illustrious examples of how subjective feelings of control – the Sense of Agency (SoA) - can be manipulated in real life...     

Can Lutheran Theology and Virtue Ethics Be Friends?

Lutheran theology is generally suspicious of virtue ethics. This suspicion arises from (1) the Lutheran commitment to justification by faith in God's unconditional promise; and (2) Luther's corollary understanding of sin as existential self‐absorption. Some Lutheran theologians have sought to incorporate virtue ethics by using it as an orientation for Christian life, while making sure to avoid any contamination of the doctrine of justification by virtue ethics. My project is to consider the possibility of a mutual illumination and interaction between the doctrine of justification and virtue ethics’ focus on formation by habituation. As an aid in exploring this possibility I use the distinction in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics between the “ultimate” and the “penultimate.”