Invariant Ordering of Item-Total Regressions

A new observable consequence of the property of invariant item ordering is presented, which holds under Mokken’s double monotonicity model for dichotomous data. The observable consequence is an invariant ordering of the item-total regressions. Kendall’s measure of concordance W and a weighted version of this measure are proposed as measures for this property. Karabatsos and Sheu proposed a Bayesian procedure (Appl. Psychol. Meas. 28:110–125, 2004), which can be used to determine whether the property of an invariant ordering of the item-total regressions should be rejected for a set of items. An example is presented to illustrate the application of the procedures to empirical data.     

Thinking Theologically about Consumer Society

Abstract : To my knowledge, the first Christian theological monograph published in English on consumer society was John Kavanaugh's Following Christ in a Consumer Society, which appeared in 1982. Kavanaugh's groundbreaking text did not exactly open a floodgate. Sixteen years passed before the multi‐authored The Consuming Passion: Christianity and the Consumer Culture appeared, edited by Rodney Clapp. The intervening decade has seen a modest flow of publications on the topic. Most influential in the general theological discussion have probably been Vincent Miller's Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture, and Tom Beaudoin's Consuming Faith: Integrating Who We Are with What We Buy. In view of the spiritual challenges of consumer society, and in comparison with the attention given to consumer society by theoreticians other than theologians, there is a pressing need for more theological reflection on the topic. Thus the current issue of Dialog is before you.     

Punishing War Crimes,Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity: Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge—facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.     

The Causal Exclusion Argument

Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that once we get clear on overdetermination, there is a way to reject the exclusion principle upon which the causal exclusion argument depends, but third that this should not lead to the belief that mental causation is easily accounted for in terms of counterfactual dependencies.     

Retributivism and Multiple Offending

This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. According to the second, the discount follows from a certain view on mercy. However, it is argued that both theories suffer from theoretical flaws and that they are also insufficient in practical terms. That is, they fail to provide a basis for the making of decisions about how multiple-offence cases should be dealt with by the criminal justice system.     

The Alien-Hand Experiment

This article reintroduces a phenomenological experiment designed in the early 1960’s, The Alien-Hand Experiment (TAHE), and it illustrates how phenomena denoted by theoretical concepts like body image, body schema and agency can be studied via the experiment. An analysis of the verbal reports from 26 subjects who participated in TAHE is presented in this article. Subjects were divided into three groups: A group of non-bulimic men, a group of non-bulimic women and a group of female bulimics. The group of (female) bulimics was studied due to the widely spread notion that subjects suffering from eating disorders have a distorted body image. TAHE can be thought of as both a qualitative and quantitative way to study the phenomena arising when the normal relationship between motor behaviour and body experience is disrupted. The present investigation is not an operational definition of body schema and body image, but the two concepts offer a useful interpretive framework.     

Relaxation versus cognitive therapies for dental fear--a psychophysiological approach.

By separating 127 adult dental-phobic patients according to fear etiology and psychophysiologic response style, the authors investigated the outcome of 2 dental fear treatments. Before and after either relaxation or cognitively oriented treatment, subjects were exposed to neutral and fear-relevant video sequences while the subjects' forehead muscle tension, heart rate, and skin conductance were recorded. Pre- to postintervention differences in self-reported dental fear, general fear, and trait anxiety were analyzed together with psychophysiological data. Both treatments resulted in a significant reduction of dental fear. Despite significant interaction effects of Treatment Modality x Psychophysiological Response Style, it could not be concluded that patients with different fear etiologies or response styles benefit differentially from the 2 treatments given.     

When Should Neuroimaging Be Applied in the Criminal Court? On Ideal Comparison and the Shortcomings of Retributivism

When does neuroimaging constitute a sufficiently developed technology to be put into use in the work of determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of crime? This question constitutes the starting point of the present paper. First, it is suggested that an overall answer is provided by what is referred to as the “ideal comparative view.” Secondly, it is—on the ground of this view—argued that the answer as to whether neuroimaging technology should be applied presupposes penal theoretical considerations. Thirdly, it is argued that the retributivist theory of punishment is not well-suited for delivering the sort of theoretical guidance that is required for assessing the desirability of using neuroimaging in the work of the criminal court.