Beyond belief bias: Reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation

Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.     

The effect of punishment and reinforcement procedures on a stutterer's factor II avoidance response

The purpose of this clinical experiment was to investigate the manipulability of a Factor II avoidance response (arm movement). The substantive hypothesis under test was that its suppression would be enhanced by repeated punishment sessions. During the first of nine therapy sessions response-contingent negative stimulation was not delivered. In the next five, after a base-rate period, “wrong” was made consequent upon the target response. In each of these sessions the suppression of arm movement was apparent. However, the magnitude of the suppression decreased from session to session. Evidently, the continued use of punishment did not enhance suppression. Because of this finding procedural changes were introduced in the next three therapy sessions. Verbal praise was added as a consequence of increasingly stringent omission criteria and three consecutive units of praise led to time-out from the reportedly fatiguing task of continuous speech. A marked reduction and then complete extinction resulted. Moreover, learning was evidenced since the frequency of arm movement lessened in the base-rate period of each session.     

Common Sense and the Natural Light in George Berkeley’s Philosophy

Philosophia - It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be...