Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Revisiting confidence intervals for repeated measures designs

Loftus and Masson (1994) proposed a method for computing confidence intervals (CIs) in repeated measures (RM) designs and later proposed that RM CIs for factorial designs should be based on number of observations rather than number of participants (Masson & Loftus, 2003). However, determining the correct number of observations for a particular effect can be complicated, given that its value depends on the relation between the effect and the overall design. To address this, we recently defined a general number-of-observations principle, explained why it obtains, and provided step-by-step instructions for constructing CIs for various effect types (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009). In this note, we provide a brief summary of our approach.     

On two types of conditional reflex: General laws of association

Both types of conditioning are based on the general laws of associations-connections between the centers involved. Whereas the experimental procedures of classical conditioning expose mainly the conditioned stimulus (CS)-unconditioned stimulus (US) connection, those of instrumental conditioning expose the conditioned stimulus (CS)-response (R) connection. Thus, the main differences between the two types of conditioning are those associated with the different centers involved in each, not the associative-connective laws themselves.