Affectivity in Its Relation to Memory

It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgotten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memorized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is interpreted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.     

Ability evaluation by proxy: role of maximal performance and related attributes in social comparison

Four experiments tested the effects of information about a proxy's related attributes and maximal effort in social comparisons of ability. In Study 1, a proxy's prior performance at maximal effort exerted systematic effects on participants' personal performance predictions for a novel task. When information about the proxy's effort was ambiguous (Study 2). information about related attribute similarity was used in the formulation of performance predictions. In Studies 3 and 4, 2-way interaction terms revealed that participants used related attribute information in generating performance predictions when the proxy's maximum effort was unknown. However, related attribute information was disregarded when proxy's maximum effort was unambiguous. Results were consistent with the proxy comparison model of ability self-evaluation (L. Wheeler, R. Martin, & J. Suls, 1997).     

Action-based and vision-based selection of input: Two sources of control

In the first part of this paper we review evidence suggesting that there exists a mechanism that selects input on the basis of its similarity to the required action. This response-based input selection differs from the more established space- and object-based input selection in that it is not constrained by the structure of the input. Our evidence suggests that the two-choice Stroop effect is caused by this response-based selection mechanism. By contrast, it is known that the flanker effect is determined by the space- and object- based selection mechanisms. We explore whether the conflict resolution of the Stroop and flanker tasks is different as well by embedding these two tasks in a PRP (Psychological Refractory Period) paradigm. We show that the Stroop and the PRP effects are additive whereas the flanker and the PRP effects are underadditive, suggesting that the processes in charge of the conflict resolution in the Stroop and the flanker tasks are indeed different. We discuss possible reasons for this difference, and discuss possible ways in which the response-based mechanism can be implemented in information processing models.