Similar Processes Despite Divergent Behavior in Two Commonly Used Measures of Risky Decision Making

Performance on complex decision-making tasks may depend on a multitude of processes. Two such tasks, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART), are of particular interest because they are associated with real world risky behavior, including illegal drug use. We used cognitive models to disentangle underlying processes in both tasks. Whereas behavioral measures from the IGT and BART were uncorrelated, cognitive models revealed two reliable cross-task associations. Results suggest that the tasks similarly measure loss aversion and decision-consistency processes, but not necessarily the same learning process. Additionally, substance-using individuals (and especially stimulant users) performed worse on the IGT than healthy controls did, and this pattern could be explained by reduced decision consistency.     

Two Is Better Than One

ABSTRACT— Psychologists too often rely on only one source of evidence to affirm the validity of a construct. However, they usually do not know all the conditions that can produce the evidence they gather. Hence, the inference is often limited to the data gathered and does not generalize to other categories of information. Examples of this habit are presented along with the suggestion that all social scientists should affirm the utility of their concepts with more than one class of information.     

Maternal styles in infant psychotherapy: Treatment and research implications

Infant psychotherapy, in which the mother is requested to follow the baby's activities without initiating or directing, is described. Mothers demonstrate different styles of involvement with their infants: a protective mode, a prohibitive mode, a competitive mode, and other ways of interfering with their infants' tendency to explore the environment. Attempts to analyze such factors as position, distance and movement are discussed. Research for recording and analyzing the movement of infant and mother dyads is proposed.     

Absence of compensation and reasoning-like processes in the perception of orientation in depth

When errors are present in the perceived depth between the parts of a physically stationary object, the object appears to rotate as the head is moved laterally (Gogel, 1980). This illusory rotation has been attributed either to compensation (Wallach, 1985, 1987) or to inferential-like processes (Rock, 1983). Alternatively, the perceived distances of and directions to the parts of the object are sufficient to explain the illusory perceived orientations and perceived rotations of the stimulus. This was examined in three experiments. In Experiment 1, a perceived illusory orientation of a stimulus object extended in depth was produced by misleading binocular disparity and was measured at two different lateral positions of the head under two conditions. In the static condition, the head was stationary at different times at each of the two measurement positions of the head. In the dynamic condition, continuous motion of the head occurred between these two positions. In Experiment 2, static and dynamic conditions of illusory stimulus orientation were observed with the head stationary. In Experiment 3, a perspective illusion instead of binocular disparity produced the errors in perceived depth. In no experiment did the perceived orientation of the object differ for the static and dynamic conditions. In the absence of head motion, neither compensatory nor inferential-like processes were available. It is concluded that these processes are not needed to explain either illusory or nonillusory perceptions of the orientation or rotation of stimuli viewed with a laterally moving head.