Modeling dynamic inconsistency with a changing reference point

A rational principle of decision making called dynamic consistency was tested by presenting decision makers with a sequence of two gambles. The first gamble was obligatory. Before playing the first gamble, participants were asked to make a planned choice as to whether they would take the second gamble. After experiencing the actual results of the first gamble, decision makers were asked to make a final choice regarding the second gamble. Dynamic consistency requires agreement between the planned and final choices. Violations of dynamic consistency were observed, e.g. anticipating a gain in the first gamble, decision makers planned to take the second gamble; after experiencing the gain, they changed their minds and rejected the second gamble. Two models of dynamic inconsistency were compared. One assumes that experience shifts the reference point and changes the utility associated with the gamble; another assumes that experience changes the subjective probability associated with the gamble. The reference point model provided the best account for the findings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Daydreaming, Consciousness, and Self-Representations: Empirical Approaches to Theories of William James and Sigmund Freud

In honor of Saul Rosenzweig's lifelong efforts to provide empirical tests of psychoanalytic theories, this paper has focused on a series of research approaches to examining the concepts of William James and Sigmund Freud relating to waking fantasy, ongoing thought, and beliefs about the self. Studies involving projective methods, psychometric analyses of self-report questionnaires, laboratory tests of daydreaming during signal-detection tasks, thought-sampling during natural daily activities and psychological correlates of actual-self and ideal-self discrepancies are described. Clinical applications of these methods are also presented. The findings in general point to the value of James's conception of conscious thought as an important basis along with cognitive unconscious processes for studying clinical phenomena, personality, and even the metaphors of dreams. Rosenzweig's emphasis on formal research testing of psychoanalytic processes is supported.     

Life designing: A paradigm for career construction in the 21st century

At the beginning of the 21st century, a new social arrangement of work poses a series of questions and challenges to scholars who aim to help people develop their working lives. Given the globalization of career counseling, we decided to address these issues and then to formulate potentially innovative responses in an international forum. We used this approach to avoid the difficulties of creating models and methods in one country and then trying to export them to other countries where they would be adapted for use. This article presents the initial outcome of this collaboration, a counseling model and methods. The life-designing model for career intervention endorses five presuppositions about people and their work lives: contextual possibilities, dynamic processes, non-linear progression, multiple perspectives, and personal patterns. Thinking from these five presuppositions, we have crafted a contextualized model based on the epistemology of social constructionism, particularly recognizing that an individual’s knowledge and identity are the product of social interaction and that meaning is co-constructed through discourse. The life-design framework for counseling implements the theories of self-constructing [Guichard, J. (2005). Life-long self-construction. International Journal for Educational and Vocational Guidance, 5, 111–124] and career construction [Savickas, M. L. (2005). The theory and practice of career construction. In S. D. Brown & R. W. Lent (Eds.), Career development and counselling: putting theory and research to work (pp. 42–70). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley] that describe vocational behavior and its development. Thus, the framework is structured to be life-long, holistic, contextual, and preventive.     

Similar Processes Despite Divergent Behavior in Two Commonly Used Measures of Risky Decision Making

Performance on complex decision-making tasks may depend on a multitude of processes. Two such tasks, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART), are of particular interest because they are associated with real world risky behavior, including illegal drug use. We used cognitive models to disentangle underlying processes in both tasks. Whereas behavioral measures from the IGT and BART were uncorrelated, cognitive models revealed two reliable cross-task associations. Results suggest that the tasks similarly measure loss aversion and decision-consistency processes, but not necessarily the same learning process. Additionally, substance-using individuals (and especially stimulant users) performed worse on the IGT than healthy controls did, and this pattern could be explained by reduced decision consistency.     

Two Is Better Than One

ABSTRACT— Psychologists too often rely on only one source of evidence to affirm the validity of a construct. However, they usually do not know all the conditions that can produce the evidence they gather. Hence, the inference is often limited to the data gathered and does not generalize to other categories of information. Examples of this habit are presented along with the suggestion that all social scientists should affirm the utility of their concepts with more than one class of information.     

Absence of compensation and reasoning-like processes in the perception of orientation in depth

When errors are present in the perceived depth between the parts of a physically stationary object, the object appears to rotate as the head is moved laterally (Gogel, 1980). This illusory rotation has been attributed either to compensation (Wallach, 1985, 1987) or to inferential-like processes (Rock, 1983). Alternatively, the perceived distances of and directions to the parts of the object are sufficient to explain the illusory perceived orientations and perceived rotations of the stimulus. This was examined in three experiments. In Experiment 1, a perceived illusory orientation of a stimulus object extended in depth was produced by misleading binocular disparity and was measured at two different lateral positions of the head under two conditions. In the static condition, the head was stationary at different times at each of the two measurement positions of the head. In the dynamic condition, continuous motion of the head occurred between these two positions. In Experiment 2, static and dynamic conditions of illusory stimulus orientation were observed with the head stationary. In Experiment 3, a perspective illusion instead of binocular disparity produced the errors in perceived depth. In no experiment did the perceived orientation of the object differ for the static and dynamic conditions. In the absence of head motion, neither compensatory nor inferential-like processes were available. It is concluded that these processes are not needed to explain either illusory or nonillusory perceptions of the orientation or rotation of stimuli viewed with a laterally moving head.