Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups

According to the psychological essentialism perspective, people tend to explain differences between groups by attributing them different essences. Given a pervasive ethnocentrism, this tendency implies that the human essence will be restricted to the ingroup whereas outgroups will receive a lesser degree of humanity. Therefore, it is argued that people attribute more uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup than to the outgroup. The present article focuses on secondary emotions that constitute such characteristics. Study 1 showed that members of high‐ and low‐status groups attribute more positive secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Study 2 verified that the differential attribution extended also to negative secondary emotions. No exemplars of emotions were provided in Study 3. Instead, participants had to estimate the means of two distributions of numbers that supposedly represented characteristics of the ingroup and of the outgroup. The results of this third experiment illustrated the reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing the counter model for perceptual identification: Effects of repetition priming and word frequency

The counter model for perceptual identification (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1997) differs from alternative views of word recognition in two important ways. First, it assumes that prior study of a word does not result in increased sensitivity but, rather, in bias. Second, the effects of word frequency and prior study are explained by different mechanisms. In the present experiment, study status and word frequency of target and foil were varied independently. Using a forced-choice task, we replicated the bias effect. However, we also found several interactions between frequency and prior study that are in direct conflict with the counter model. Most important, prior study of both alternatives resulted in an attenuation of the frequency effect and an increase in performance for low-frequency targets, but not for high-frequency targets. These findings suggest that the effects of frequency and prior study are not mediated by completely independent mechanisms.     

The effect of expectation on the identification of known and unknown persons

In this experiment we investigated the influence of expectation, exposure time and jacket hood positioning on person identification. Thirty subjects, all employees of the TNO Institute for Perception, participated in the experiment. They were presented with slides showing known and unknown persons who were photographed under bad lighting conditions. Limited viewing conditions considerably deteriorated subjects' performance and under these circumstances all experimental manipulations significantly affected identification accuracy. Contrary to what was expected longer exposure times impaired performance. The results are discussed in light of recent research on face recognition (Bruce and Young, 1986; Read, Vokey, and Hammersley, 1990).     

Holding an object one is looking at: Kinesthetic information on the object’s distance does not improve visual judgments of its size

Visual judgments of distance are often inaccurate. Nevertheless, information on distance must be procured if retinal image size is to be used to judge an object’s dimensions. In the present study, we examined whether kinesthetic information about an object’s distance—based on the posture of the arm and hand when holding it—influences the object’s perceived size. Subjects were presented with a computer simulation of a cube. This cube’s position was coupled to that of a rod in the subject’s hand. Its size was varied between presentations. Subjects had to judge whether the cube they saw was larger than, smaller than, or the same size as a reference. On some presentations, a small difference was introduced between the positions of the rod and of the simulated cube. When the simulated cube was slightly closer than the rod, subjects judged the cube to be larger. When it was farther away, they judged it to be smaller. We show that these changes in perceived size are due to alterations in the cube’s distance from the subject rather than to kinesthetic information.     

Linear and nonlinear opponent color coding

The linearity axiom as proposed by Krantz (1975) is confirmed for red/green equilibria, i.e., lights which appear neither reddish nor greenish (unique yellows, unique blues, and achromatic colors). This experiment also gave some evidence of “veiling,” i.e., the masking of a weak hue component by a strong one. In a second experiment, hue magnitude estimates (HME) for the green component were obtained in variable mixtures of unique green and unique yellow stimuli. Contrary to the suggestion raised by the work of Yager and Taylor (1970), we did not find the relation between the HME and the luminance of the green stimulus to be independent of the amount of added yellow. A relation proposed by Indow and Stevens (1966), in which the proportion of the green luminance is taken as the relevant psychophysical unit, gives a better fit to our data. It is shown, however, that alternative interpretations of such data are possible and that this type of experiment cannot be conclusive regarding the issue of the possibility of absolute judgment of opponent hue attributes.

     

Multimedia instructions and cognitive load theory: Effects of modality and cueing

Background: Recent research on the influence of presentation format on the effectiveness of multimedia instructions has yielded some interesting results. According to cognitive load theory (Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998) and Mayer's theory of multimedia learning (Mayer, 2001), replacing visual text with spoken text (the modality effect) and adding visual cues relating elements of a picture to the text (the cueing effect) both increase the effectiveness of multimedia instructions in terms of better learning results or less mental effort spent. Aims: The aim of this study was to test the generalisability of the modality and cueing effect in a classroom setting. Sample: The participants were 111 second‐year students from the Department of Education at the University of Gent in Belgium (age between 19 and 25 years). Method: The participants studied a web‐based multimedia lesson on instructional design for about one hour. Afterwards they completed a retention and a transfer test. During both the instruction and the tests, self‐report measures of mental effort were administered. Results: Adding visual cues to the pictures resulted in higher retention scores, while replacing visual text with spoken text resulted in lower retention and transfer scores. Conclusions: Only a weak cueing effect and even a reverse modality effect have been found, indicating that both effects do not easily generalise to non‐laboratory settings. A possible explanation for the reversed modality effect is that the multimedia instructions in this study were learner‐paced, as opposed to the system‐paced instructions used in earlier research.     

All is well that ends well,at least for proselfs: emotional reactions to equality violation as a function of social value orientation

In step‐level public good dilemmas the equality rule serves as an important distribution rule to tacitly coordinate group members' decisions. In two studies, we examined the motives that may underlie the use of the equality rule. More specifically, we examined whether people use the equality rule out of fairness concerns or out of efficiency concerns. For this purpose, we assessed people's emotional reactions toward a violator of the equality rule when the group succeeded vs. failed, as a function of social value orientation. The results of both experiments showed that proselfs' emotional reactions towards a violator were a function of the success or the failure of the group, whereas prosocials' emotional reactions did not vary as a function of the outcome feedback. These results suggest that prosocials prefer the equality rule out of fairness concerns whereas for proselfs efficiency concerns dominate. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance

How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to make its metaphysical commitments explicit. I do so by building on Sharon Street’s version of “Humean Constructivism”. Instead of the realist notion of attitude-independence, the antirealist account of moral objectivity that I articulate centres on the notion of standpoint-invariance. While constructivists have been criticized for compromising on the issue of moral objectivity, I make a preliminary case for the thesis that, armed with the notion of standpoint-invariance, constructivists have resources to vindicate an account of objectivity with just the right strength, given the commitments of ordinary moral thought and practice. In support of this thesis I highlight recent experimental findings about folk moral objectivism. Empirical observations about the nature of moral discourse have traditionally been taken to give prima facie support to moral realism. I argue, by contrast, that from what we can tell from our current experimental understanding, antirealists can capture the commitments of ordinary discourse at least as well as realists can.     

A Christian Cancellation of the Secularist Truce? Waning Christian Religiosity and Waxing Religious Deprivatization in the West

Analysis of International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data collected in 18 Western countries in 1998 demonstrates that Christian desires for a public role of religion are strongest in countries where Christian religiosity is numerically most marginal. Moreover, Dutch data covering the period 1970–1996 confirm that the decline of the number of Christians in the Netherlands has been coincided by a strengthening of the call for public religion among the remaining faithful and by increased polarization about this with the nonreligious. Religious decline and religious privatization, two of the most crucial dimensions of secularization ( Casanova 1994 ), hence develop dialectically: as the number of Christians declines, the remaining faithful seem increasingly unwilling to accept the “secularist truce”—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom yet bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private realm.