The ABC of Social Desires: Affiliation,Being Alone,and Closeness to Partner

We propose a triadic model of social desires directed at appetence/aversion of affiliation with friends (A), being alone (B), and closeness to one's partner (C) that account for individual differences in subjectively experienced needs for proximity and distance in serious couple relationships. The model assumes that A, B, and C can be conceptualized at the individual level as correlated latent factors measured by appetence and aversion indicators with opposite factor loadings and low shared method variance and at the couple level assuming the same measurement model and identical (co)variances for men and women. The model was confirmed with confirmatory factor analyses in a sex‐balanced internet sample of 476 individuals and a longitudinal sample of both partners of 578 heterosexual couples by assessing the ABC desires with brief appetence/aversion scales. In both samples, the desires showed expected unique associations with the Big Five personality traits, loneliness and relationship satisfaction, perceived available support by friends and partner, and attachment style toward the partner and high 1‐year stability in the longitudinal sample. We suggest that the ABC model helps to integrate research on couples' distance regulation along the lines of communal and agentic motivation. Copyright © 2012 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Why People With an Eye Toward the Future Are More Moral: The Role of Abstract Thinking

After briefly discussing the prominence, basic substance, and history of Fiedler's contingency model of leadership effectiveness, four issues crucial to the current status and future development of the model were considered: (a) the form of the contingent relationship actually constituting the model; (b) the need for direct measurement of situational favorableness; (c) the problem of classifying results from evidential validation studies; and (d) the need for process measurement in studies evaluating organizational applications of the model. Conclusions were offered concerning the contribution already made by the contingency model to leadership research and key directions for future research involving the model.     

Non-Reductionism and Special Concern

The so-called ‘Extreme Claim’ asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.     

Past and Future Non-Existence

According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses.     

Unraveling Effects of Novelty on Creativity

Novelty is inherent to creative processes. A positive effect of novelty on creative task performance was therefore predicted. However, creativity can benefit from divergent, as well as convergent thinking. Subsequently, novelty may benefit creative performance when divergent thinking is required, but it could inhibit creative performance when convergent thinking is required. In Study 1, participants were primed with novelty or familiarity, and performed a creativity task that required divergent thinking. Results showed a beneficial effect of novelty priming on originality of the answers. In Study 2, a creativity task that required convergent thinking was framed as novel, familiar, or neutral. Results showed an inhibitory effect of novelty on creativity. Results are related to information processing styles, and implications for creativity and novelty research are discussed.     

Pain and Sacrifice: Experience and Modulation of Pain in a Religious Piercing Ritual

Fascinating pain-related rituals have been observed throughout the world, but so far no systematic evidence exists to support previous ethnographic reports of analgesic states and dissociative symptoms during these events. To address this issue, we combined quantitative and qualitative measures with the aim of investigating pain experience and modulation of pain during the Thaipusam Kavadi ritual in Mauritius. In Study 1, results indicated low levels of pain intensity during the ritual, and regression analyses showed that expectations of pain were significantly predictive of actual pain intensity ratings. In Study 2, the meanings surrounding the ritual were found to generate expectations of low pain and a positive outcome, and intense prayer was reported as the main coping strategy. In addition, most participants expressed symptoms of dissociation (including amnesia, absorption, and depersonalisation) during Thaipusam, and a high prevalence of these symptoms was associated with low levels of pain.     

Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result

In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents that are incapable of performing even the most elementary logical deductions. A much harder, and considerably less investigated challenge is to ensure that the resulting modal space can also be used to model moderately ideal agents that are not logically omniscient but nevertheless logically competent. Intuitively, while such agents may fail to rule out subtly impossible worlds that verify complex logical falsehoods, they are nevertheless able to rule out blatantly impossible worlds that verify obvious logical falsehoods. To model moderately ideal agents, I argue, the job is to construct a modal space that contains only possible and non-trivially impossible worlds where it is not the case that “anything goes”. But I prove that it is impossible to develop an impossible-world framework that can do this job and that satisfies certain standard conditions. Effectively, I show that attempts to model moderately ideal agents in a world-involving framework collapse to modeling either logical omniscient agents, or extremely non-ideal agents.     

Correlated change of Big Five personality traits across the lifespan: A search for determinants

Correlated change between different personality traits has recently caught the attention of researchers studying personality development. We conducted two studies to examine age effects (Study 1) and effects of cognitive ability (Study 2) on this phenomenon. Results indicated that correlated change was relatively stable from adolescence through adulthood, and then increased after age 70. Second, correlated change was greater among traits that have been linked to the same developmental processes (e.g., social investment or maturation of specific neurological systems). Third, cognitive ability was negatively associated with correlated change. Collectively, our findings suggest that personality change is partly driven by broad mechanisms affecting multiple traits. Associations with age and cognitive ability provide important leads regarding the possible nature of these mechanisms.     

Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr’s incoherence claim.