When can we trust theF-approximation of the box-test?

Consider a multivariate context withp variates andk independent samples, each of sizen. To test equality of thek population covariance matrices, the likelihood ratio test is commonly employed. Box'sF-approximation to the null distribution of the test statistic can be used to computep-values, if sample sizes are not too small. It is suggested to regard theF-approximation as accurate if the sample sizesn are greater than or equal to 1+0.0613p ²+2.7265p-1.4182p ^0.5+0.235p ^1.4* In (k), for 5p30,k20.This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Ste 405/2-1.     

Internet-based parent management training: a randomized controlled study

ObjectiveThe current study evaluated the efficacy of an Internet-based parent-training program for children with conduct problems. Dose–response ratio and costs for the program were also considered.MethodParents of 104 children (aged 3–12 years) were randomly allocated to either parent training or a waitlist control condition. Diagnostic assessment was conducted at baseline and parent ratings of child externalizing behaviors and parent strategies were completed before and after treatment and at 6-month follow-up.ResultsAt post-treatment assessment, children whose parent(s) had received the intervention showed a greater reduction in conduct problems compared to the waitlist children. Between group intent-to-treat effect sizes (Cohen’s d) on the Eyberg Intensity and Problem scales were .42 and .72, respectively (study completers .66 and 1.08). In addition, parents in the intervention group reported less use of harsh and inconsistent discipline after the treatment, as well as more positive praise. Effects on behavior problems were maintained at 6-month follow-up.ConclusionsThe results support the efficacy of parent training, administered through Internet, with outcomes comparable to many of the group-based parent training programs. The efficacy, low cost, and higher accessibility make this intervention a fitting part in a stepped-care model.     

Relationships and the social brain: integrating psychological and evolutionary perspectives

Psychological studies of relationships tend to focus on specific types of close personal relationships (romantic, parent-offspring, friendship) and examine characteristics of both the individuals and the dyad. This paper looks more broadly at the wider range of relationships that constitute an individual's personal social world. Recent work on the composition of personal social networks suggests that they consist of a series of layers that differ in the quality and quantity of relationships involved. Each layer increases relationship numbers by an approximate multiple of 3 (5-15-50-150) but decreasing levels of intimacy (strong, medium, and weak ties) and frequency of interaction. To account for these regularities, we draw on both social and evolutionary psychology to argue that relationships at different layers serve different functions and have different cost-benefit profiles. At each layer, the benefits are asymptotic but the costs of maintaining a relationship at that level (most obviously, the time that has to be invested in servicing it) are roughly linear with the number of relationships. The trade-off between costs and benefits at a given level, and across the different types of demands and resources typical of different levels, gives rise to a distribution of social effort that generates and maintains a hierarchy of layered sets of relationships within social networks. We suggest that, psychologically, these trade-offs are related to the level of trust in a relationship, and that this is itself a function of the time invested in the relationship.     

See what you think: reappraisal modulates behavioral and neural responses to social stimuli

The social environment requires people to quickly form contextually appropriate social evaluations. Models of social cognition suggest that this ability depends on the interaction of automatic and controlled evaluative systems. However, controlled processes, such as reappraisal of an initial response, have rarely been studied in the context of social evaluation. In the two studies reported here, participants reappraised or simply observed angry or neutral faces. In Study 1, reappraisal modulated evaluations of angry faces on explicit as well as implicit behavioral levels. In Study 2, reappraisal altered both early and late phases of evaluative electrocortical processing. These studies suggest that controlled processes, such as reappraisal, can quickly and substantially modulate early evaluative processes in the context of biologically significant social stimuli.     

Reinstatement of fear in humans: autonomic and experiential responses in a differential conditioning paradigm

The present study investigated reinstatement of fear in humans using an aversive differential conditioning paradigm. Two neutral human face pictures were presented during habituation, acquisition, extinction, and postreinstatement phases. One picture served as a conditioned stimulus (CS) reinforced by an unconditioned stimulus (US) in the form of electrical stimulation (CS+) and the second picture as a control stimulus that was never reinforced (CS-). The prediction that in a reinstatement manipulation a previously extinguished fear response in humans can be reinstated in a reinstatement group by the mere presentation of three unpredicted electrical stimulations (USs) was tested. Participants in the control group were not exposed to unpredicted USs and no reinstatement effect was expected. Outcome measures included subjective US expectancy ratings and skin conductance responses. Results showed non-selective return of the fear response due to fear recovery associated with both CSs (CS+/CS-) in the reinstatement group. Unexpected fear recovery was observed for both CSs (CS+/CS-) in control participants. Results are discussed with respect to context conditioning, fear generalisation, and anxiety-related cognitive mechanisms underlying fear recovery after extinction.     

Problems in Epistemic Space

When a proposition might be the case, for all an agent knows, we can say that the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. In the standard possible worlds framework, we analyze modal claims using quantification over possible worlds. It is natural to expect that something similar can be done for modal claims involving epistemic possibility. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the prospects of constructing a space of worlds—epistemic space—that allows us to model what is epistemically possible for ordinary, non-ideally rational agents like you and me. I will argue that the prospects look dim for successfully constructing such a space. In turn, this will make a case for the claim that we cannot use the standard possible worlds framework to model what is epistemically possible for ordinary agents.     

The relationship between acculturation preferences and prejudice: Longitudinal evidence from majority and minority groups in three European countries

A longitudinal field survey tested the reciprocal effects of acculturation preferences and prejudice among ethnic minorities and majorities. Data were collected at two points in time from 512 members of ethnic minorities and 1143 majority members in Germany, Belgium and England. Path analyses yielded not only the lagged effects of prejudice on acculturation preferences but also the reverse for both majority and minority members. The mutual longitudinal effects between prejudice and desire for culture maintenance were negative, and the mutual effects between prejudice and desire for culture adoption were positive for majority members. The reverse was the case for minority participants. Moreover, the two acculturation dimensions interacted in their effect on prejudice for majority participants but not for minority participants. The effect of desire for culture adoption on prejudice was moderated by perceived intergroup similarity. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of supervenience and constitution in neuroscientific research

This paper is concerned with the notions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution as they have been discussed in the philosophy of neuroscience. Since both notions essentially involve specific dependence and determination relations among properties and sets of properties, the question arises whether the notions are systematically connected and how they connect to science. In a first step, some definitions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution are presented and tested for logical independence. Afterwards, certain assumptions fundamental to neuroscientific inquiry are made explicit in order to show that the presented definitions of supervenience are virtually uninteresting for theory construction in this field. In a third step, a new formulation of supervenience is developed that makes explicit reference to the notion of constitution and that bridges the gap between the philosophical concepts and explanatory practice in neuroscience.     

On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance.