Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement?

According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Soc Simul 5(3):1–33, 2002; J Artif Soc Soc Simul 9(3):1–28, 2006). Their simulations indicate that if our moral opinions were influenced at least slightly by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were also affected by additional factors such as false authorities, external political shifts and random processes. Gustafsson and Peterson conclude that since no such consensus has been reached in real life, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the AD. Our main claim in this paper is that these results are not as robust as Gustafsson and Peterson seem to think they are. If we run similar simulations in the alternative Laputa simulation environment developed by Angere and Olsson (Angere, Synthese, forthcoming and Olsson, Episteme 8(2):127–143, 2011) considerably less support for the AD is forthcoming.     

Religiously Conservative Citizens and the Ideal of Conscientious Engagement: A Comment on Wolterstorff and Eberle

Nicholas Wolterstorff and Christopher J. Eberle have defended the view that the ethics of liberal citizenship allows citizens to publicly support the passage of coercive laws based solely on their religious convictions. They also develop positive conceptions of virtuous citizenship that place moral limits on how citizens may appeal to their religion. The question I address in this essay is whether the limits they impose on citizens’ appeals to their religion are adequate. Since Eberle’s “ideal of conscientious engagement” provides us with the most extensive statement of these limits, it is the primary focus of my attention here. My conclusion is that in its current form, Eberle’s ideal is not constraining enough. In the first section, I argue that Eberle’s ideal does not require citizens to be self-critical enough about their religious and political commitments. In the second section, I highlight a conflict between Eberle’s ideal and the need for citizens to respect the religious freedom of their fellow citizens. I argue that the way to resolve this conflict is to adopt a more fine-grained conception of religious reasons and to hold that citizens should not rely on religious reasons of certain kinds. In the final section, I argue that laws punishing or discouraging homosexual conduct (which Eberle’s ideal would apparently allow) violate what Wolterstorff calls “the Idea of liberal democracy” and so are not the kind of proposal that virtuous citizens can defend.     

The Anthropology of Islam

Argyle, M. and Beit-Hallahmi, B. The social psychology of religion, London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 256, £5.95 (£2.95 paper)

Rosenthal, Franz, The classical heritage in Islam, transl. Emile and Jenny Marmorstein. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. xx + 298, £5.50

Mirza, Hormazdyar Dastur Kayoji, Outlines of Parsi history, Bombay: Industrial Press, 1974, xxvii + 516 pp, approx £4.50     

Children's Assignment of Gender to Animal Characters in Pictures

Tests showed that 4- to 6-year-old children believe that people can be influenced or “controlled” both by thinking (e.g., both wishful thinking and magical behavior) and by realistic means (e.g., positive reinforcement, example, and group pressure). Belief in control by thinking did not vary by the subjects' sex or age, influence type (wishing or magical behavior), or target response (behavior, emotion, or thought). Quantitative measures, however, suggested that magical behavior was seen by subjects as being more efficient than wishing, and that emotion was considered easier to influence than thinking. Beliefs in control by thinking were not related to a measure of fantasy—reality differentiation (realism).     

Comparing the neural correlates of affective and cognitive theory of mind using fMRI: Involvement of the basal ganglia in affective theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer other people’s mental states like intentions or desires. ToM can be differentiated into affective (i.e., recognizing the feelings of another person) and cognitive (i.e., inferring the mental state of the counterpart) subcomponents. Recently, subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia (BG) have also been ascribed to the multifaceted concept ToM and most BG disorders have been reported to elicit ToM deficits. In order to assess both the correlates of affective and cognitive ToM as well as involvement of the basal ganglia, 30 healthy participants underwent event-related fMRI scanning, neuropsychological testing, and filled in questionnaires concerning different aspects of ToM and empathy. Directly contrasting affective (aff) as well as cognitive (cog) ToM to the control (phy) condition, activation was found in classical ToM regions, namely parts of the temporal lobe including the superior temporal sulcus, the supplementary motor area, and parietal structures in the right hemisphere. The contrast aff > phy yielded additional activation in the orbitofrontal cortex on the right and the cingulate cortex, the precentral and inferior frontal gyrus and the cerebellum on the left. The right BG were recruited in this contrast as well. The direct contrast aff > cog showed activation in the temporoparietal junction and the cingulate cortex on the right as well as in the left supplementary motor area. The reverse contrast cog > aff however did not yield any significant clusters. In summary, affective and cognitive ToM partly share neural correlates but can also be differentiated anatomically. Furthermore, the BG are involved in affective ToM and thus their contribution is discussed as possibly providing a motor component of simulation processes, particularly in affective ToM.     

The perceived onset position of a moving target: Effects of trial contexts are evoked by different attentional allocations

Previous studies have shown that the localization of the perceived onset position of a moving target varies with the trial context. When the moving target appeared at predictable positions to the left or right of fixation (constant context), localization judgments of the perceived onset positions were essentially displaced in motion direction (Fröhlich effect). In contrast, when the target appeared at unpredictable positions in the visual field (random context), localization judgments were at least drastically reduced. Four explanations of this influence of trial context on localization judgments were examined in three experiments. Findings ruled out an overcompensation mechanism effective in random-context conditions, a predictive mechanism effective in constant-context conditions and a detrimental mechanism originating from more trial repetitions in constant-context conditions. Instead, the results indicated that different attentional allocations are responsible for the localization differences. They also demonstrated that attentional mechanisms are at the basis of the Fröhlich effect.     

Cross-modal associations between vision, touch, and audition influence visual search through top-down attention, not bottom-up capture

Recently, Guzman-Martinez, Ortega, Grabowecky, Mossbridge, and Suzuki (Current Biology : CB, 22(5), 383–388, 2012) reported that observers could systematically match auditory amplitude modulations and tactile amplitude modulations to visual spatial frequencies, proposing that these cross-modal matches produced automatic attentional effects. Using a series of visual search tasks, we investigated whether informative auditory, tactile, or bimodal cues can guide attention toward a visual Gabor of matched spatial frequency (among others with different spatial frequencies). These cues improved visual search for some but not all frequencies. Auditory cues improved search only for the lowest and highest spatial frequencies, whereas tactile cues were more effective and frequency specific, although less effective than visual cues. Importantly, although tactile cues could produce efficient search when informative, they had no effect when uninformative. This suggests that cross-modal frequency matching occurs at a cognitive rather than sensory level and, therefore, influences visual search through voluntary, goal-directed behavior, rather than automatic attentional capture.     

Memory for a staged criminal event witnessed live and on video

Memory for a staged robbery was tested in two groups of participants witnessing the event either live (n = 62) or on video (n = 64). Immediately after the event participants filled out a questionnaire probing memory with emphasis on the timing of the event and robber characteristics. The results showed that participants who watched a video recording of the event reported more details and with a higher accuracy than participants who were present on the scene, but the pattern of memory errors were similar in the two conditions. It is concluded that laboratory experiments may overestimate the memory of eyewitnesses but are otherwise able to simulate essential aspects of memory performance in naturalistic contexts.